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Abstract
Multi-agent systems operating in complex domains crucially require agents to interact with
each other. An important result of this interaction is that some of the private knowledge
of the agents is being shared in the group of agents. This thesis investigates the theme of
knowledge sharing from a theoretical point of view by means of the formal tools provided
by modal logic.
More specifically this thesis addresses the following three points.
First, the case of hypercube systems, a special class of interpreted systems as defined by
Halpern and colleagues, is analysed in full detail. It is here proven that the logic S5WD 
constitutes a sound and complete axiomatisation for hypercube systems. This logic, an ex-
tension of the modal system S5 commonly used to represent knowledge of a multi-agent
system, regulates how knowledge is being shared among agents modelled by hypercube
systems. The logic S5WD is proven to be decidable. Hypercube systems are proven to be
synchronous agents with perfect recall that communicate only by broadcasting, in separate
work jointly with Ron van der Meyden not fully reported in this thesis.
Second, it is argued that a full spectrum of degrees of knowledge sharing can be present
in any multi-agent system, with no sharing and full sharing at the extremes. This theme is
investigated axiomatically and a range of logics representing a particular class of knowledge
sharing between two agents is presented. All the logics but two in this spectrum are proven
complete by standard canonicity proofs. We conjecture that these two remaining logics are
not canonical and it is an open problem whether or not they are complete.
Third, following a influential position paper by Halpern and Vardi, the idea of refining
and checking of knowledge structures in multi-agent systems is investigated. It is shown
that, Kripke models, the standard semantic tools for this analysis are not adequate and an
alternative notion, Kripke trees, is put forward. An algorithm for refining and checking
Kripke trees is presented and its major properties investigated. The algorithm succeeds in
solving the famous muddy-children puzzle, in which agents communicate and reason about
each other’s knowledge.
The thesis concludes by discussing the extent to which combining logics, a promising
new area in pure logic, can provide a significant boost in research for epistemic and other
theories for multi-agent systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Agent technology
Under the caption name of “Agent” lives one of the potentially ground-breaking paradigms
that have hit Computer Science since the advent of Object-Oriented Programming [Mey88,
Boo86]. Agents (see [WJ95, Woo97] for short reviews, or [Je98, Bra97] for more extensive
expositions), like expert systems and others, are one of the paradigms that originated in
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and that were quickly taken up by many computer scientists
not necessarily working in AI. Indeed, it is striking to note how many Computer Science
sub-disciplines have now well-established research areas that contain the keyword “agent-
based” in their titles. The international community has seen research in agents for automatic
diagnosis [Sch98], agents for control systems [GL87], agents for Internet-based information
retrieval [EW94], agents for telecommunication [HB99b, HB99a], agents for automatic nego-
tiation [PSJ98], etc.
The agent-paradigm has even gone beyond the boundaries of AI and Computer Science
where it was born and has influenced Psychology [CC95, Cas98], Economics [Wel93], and
other disciplines. Only in Computer Science there are currently no less than ten annual or
bi-annual international conferences on agents themes, and more than a handful of inter-
national journals. So many different theories, languages and architectures for agents have
been proposed that agent standards are currently under investigation (see [FIP] for example)
in order to provide a more systematic technology transfer to the industry.
Indeed, even more striking for an idea forged in academic departments, big business is
also fascinated by the concept. In 1998, the pioneer agent company ”Firefly” was sold to Mi-
crosoft for approximately US$40M. Similarly, NetBot, the company set up by agent pioneers
Oren Etzioni and Dan Weld, was acquired by the search engine company Excite for a sim-
ilar sum in early 1998. Still in 1998, even Excite was taken over for about US$7Billion and
in January 1999 a major investment of News Corporation, the global media conglomerate
controlled by Rupert Murdoch, in Yahoo was unveiled.
Microsoft, Sun, Hewlett Packard, Mitsubishi Electronics, British Telecom, just to name a
few, all have internal ongoing research on agent-related topics.
So, what are these agents and what is all this fuss about? Many definitions of agents
have been proposed [RN95, Mae95, HR95, WJ95, Ld95]; I will not argue about any of these,
nor will I discuss which ones and why are perhaps the more appropriate and I simply refer
9
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the interested reader to [FG96b] for some of the most recent discussions. Instead, in line with
much of the literature in this area, wewill use theworking definition of agent given in [WJ95]
to denote a self-contained problem solving system capable of autonomous, reactive, pro-active, social
behaviour. More precisely, as it will become clear in the next section, we will follow Dennet’s
(see [Den87]) “intentional’s stance” approach by assuming that an agent’s behaviour can
usefully be described in terms of collections of mental attitudes such as knowledge, beliefs,
intentions, desires, obligations, etc. Clearly, depending on the application only a subset of
these will be employed.
As to why agents are attracting so much attention, agents are new abstraction tools and
as such they are increasingly seen as a most promising approach to developing complex
distributed computing systems. Applications built upon the agent paradigm (agent-based
systems or simply multi-agent systems (MAS)) already cover a wide number of areas includ-
ing electronic commerce [CM96], information management [Mae94], health care [HJF95],
process control [JCL95], electronic games [WG96], manufacturing [Par98], etc. (for a com-
parative survey of these applications, see [JW95, JW98] and [Par96]). The nowadays general
feeling about developing agent-based software can perhaps be summarised by using the
own words of one of the many companies selling packages for agent-based programming:
Software developers and system designers use high-level abstractions in
building complex software for one reason; to manage complexity. An abstrac-
tion focuses on the important and essential properties of a problem and hides the
incidental components of that problem. Agents provide a new way of managing
complexity because they provide a new way of describing a complex system or
process. Using agents, it is easy to define a system in terms of agent-mediated
processes.
([AGB], front page).
With so much different intellectual and economic investment in the idea of agent-based
computing, it should not be too surprising that the term “agent” is seriously running the
risk of becoming a conceptually overloaded term and agent-based technology an ill-defined
software architecture (and sometimes quite simply a vehicle for re-branding object-oriented
software for distributed computing).
Indeed some researchers (see for example [WJ98]) have already pointed out the real risks
for agent-based systems of a backslash similar to the one happened to, for example, expert
systems that were once guaranteed to change the face of computing as we knew it.
My opinion on this is that after more than 5 years years since the real boom in interest
in MAS (perhaps to be identified by the publication of [Sho93]) we still desperately need to
ground our intuitions as to what properties MAS should have and how we should go about
building a MAS system.
This thesis offers no contribution to the latter issue (see [KG97, Woo97] for some recent
approaches) but tries to enhance our understanding on the former. Arguably the best option
to try to understand and explore a complex concept as the one of agent is to use a formal
language. Among many that have been proposed (Z for example [Ld95] but see [dFL 97]
for a short discussion) here I chose formal logic to carry out my analysis. The reasons for this
are threefold. Firstly, logic is now a fully-fledged formal technique that has been pursued
with great success for many years for its own sake1 and with respect to Computer Science2.
1For example propositional logic, first order logic, second order logic, modal logics, linear logics, etc.
2Complexity theory, non-monotonic logics, automatic theorem-proving, model-checking, logic program-
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Secondly, logic has been proven to be particularly suitable as formal model of key charac-
teristics of agents such as their knowledge, beliefs, intentions, etc. and some results on these
topics are already available. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, logic-based methods
are now clearly valuable tools for the task of validation and verification [MP91, MP95, CES86]
of computing systems3. This is indeed crucial if we are to deliver on our promises of using
agents to build safe and reliable systems to fly airplanes, to control space missions, to op-
erate automatic transactions on the Internet, to diagnose automatically telecommunication
networks and so on. In fact in all these areas the techniques now currently used to certify
software (e.g. testing [Mye79, Bei84, Bei90]) have been proven in some cases quite unsuc-
cessful; the Intel Pentium division bug [Pra95], the explosion of Arianne V [Dow97] being
perhaps the most distressing.
In this thesis I will use formal logic as a working technique to reason about key character-
istics of MAS. By presenting some technical results achieved by using this tool, my ultimate
aim is to show that some very basic questions on MAS theories are still unanswered and
that logic is a good tool for such an investigation. More specifically, this work will focus on
interactions in the private knowledge of agents in a MAS. Quite surprisingly, little work has
been done in this area so far and my intention is to contribute to this by carrying out a case
study analysis at different level of abstraction (logical, semantical, and with a more low-level
descriptive language).
Given this assumption, the content of this work is bound to be quite technical and this is
why in the next section we will give a quick overview at some of the technical tools that we
will be using through this thesis. This is needed for two reasons. First, because it will give
formal logic the up-front role that it is going to have in the rest of this work. Secondly, and
more importantly, because it will introduce the frame of reference for the discussion that it
will follow on MAS theories and on the reasons why this thesis is an attempt to contribute
to them.
1.2 Modal logic
If one is to use formal logic to reason about MAS the obvious question to ask is which logic
to adopt. As we will observe in Section 1.3, one of the key mental states of an agent is its
beliefs and it can be observed that first-order logic [End72], the natural candidate, is actually
not the best option available. For example, for representing beliefs, one could think about
formulae like
 
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
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
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


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


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

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
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This formula raises two types of problems. The first one is syntactic: the formula above is not
a legal first-order formula because the predicate

occurs in the scope of the predicate
 



. This could be overcome (at the expense of a much heavier formalism) by using one
of the extensions that have been presented4 to allow for this kind of expressions. The second
ming, functional programming, etc.
3This is not handwaving. Big commercial enterprises like Intel, British Telecom and others are now currently
investing much financial resources into the use of formal methods (model checking for example) to valididate
and verify hardware and software. The reason they are doing this is that the development of formal tools for
validation and verification are currently seen as more economical than testing on a mid-long term perspective.
4See for example [Mon63], [Tho80a] and the more recent [Tur90], and [Dav93].
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one is semantical and is bound to the fact that states like belief, desire, etc. are referentially
opaque. To see what we mean by this consider a reasonable interpretation in which we have
the equality of terms

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 
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

-



. By substitution of terms we may now
derive
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but this is counterintuitive as agent ‘Tweety’ may be in a situation in which he does not
believe that Lewis Carroll is actually a pseudonym for Charles Dodgson.
Modal logic offers a neat solution to this and other problems related to representing
mental states and it also comes with a semantics which is more intuitive for this task. This is
the reason why this thesis builds upon some techniques developed in propositional modal
logic, whose knowledge I will have to assume from the reader. The aim of the rest of this
section is not to present an introduction to modal logic, but to fix the notation we will be
using throughout the thesis and to provide references for some of the known results that we
will be using later on. Proofs of the theorems reported in this section can be found in most
of the references below.
The first systematic approach to modal logic can be found in [LL59]. More recent and
very good introductions to the subject are [Che80, HC84, Boo93, Pop94, HC96] and the
more concise [Gol92]. For the similarities of themes and motivations [MH95] is also an
excellent reference and it has provided a basis for this work. Among these, [Pop94] and
[MH95] are the only one taking a full multi-modal perspective from the beginning. Recent-
ly, more advanced works have been presented (see [CZ97], [Sur98]) or are in preparation
(see [BdRV99]) showing how active the field is, especially with respect to Computer Sci-
ence. Modal propositional logic in itself builds upon propositional calculus whose standard
references are [Men64] and the more recent [Gam91, Ham78].
1.2.1 Syntax
As standard, sets



will be denoted by Italic capital letters. Ifis a set, denotes
its cardinality, and


the identity relation on it. Ifis an equivalence relation onand
	


, then

is the set of equivalence classes of, and 	

is the equivalence class
containing	.
We assume a countable set 
 








of propositional atoms, and a finite set
 







of agents. For most of this work, our formal languageis given by the usual
grammar: 
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where








. We will make it clear when we are operating in a richer language.
The other propositional and modal connectives can be defined in the usual way, in par-
ticular:
 


 





Everything which has not been defined or discussed here is to be interpreted in line with the
standard tradition.
1.2.2 Semantics
Throughout this thesis we will only be using the traditional “possible-worlds” semantics
proposed in the modern form by Kripke in [Kri63] and the one of “interpreted systems” first
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put forward by Halpern and Fagin in [HF89]. Other approaches are possible, for example
algebraic semantics (which dates back to [McK41]) was the first semantics for modal logic.
Like in Section 1.2.1 as throughout this work we assume a set
 







of agents.
We first recall the basic definitions of Kripke semantics.
Kripke frames were first proposed in [Car46] and later developed in [Bay58, Hin57,
Kan57, Mon60, Pri62]. The formalisation presented here and widely used nowadays was
first presented in [Kri59, Kri63] and later advocated in [Lem77]5.
Definition 1.1 (Kripke frames and Kripke models). A frame is a tuple 
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. If all the relations are equivalence relations, the frame is an equivalence frame and
we writefor

.
Amodelis a tuple
 










 




, where










 

is its underlying frame
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is an interpretation for the atoms. An equivalence model is a model whose
underlying frame is an equivalence frame.
Committing an abuse of notation, given a frame  
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Satisfaction on Kripke structures is defined as follows:
Definition 1.2 (Satisfaction). The satisfaction of a formula

in a worldof a model, formally
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, is inductively defined as follows:
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 




if 


 



,

 





if 
 



and
 



,

 





if for each




we have




implies
 




.
Satisfaction for the other logical connectives can be defined in the usual way.
Validity on Kripke structures is defined as follows:
Definition 1.3 (Validity). A formula

is valid on a model
 










 




, formally

 

, if for any point 



we have
 



. A formula

is valid on a frame  
 










 

if for any interpretationwe have

 





 

. A class of modelsvalidates a
formula

if for any model


we have
 

. A formula

is valid on a class of framesif
for any frame 


we have 
 

.
We now turn our attention to interpreted systems; we follow the definition in the form
given in [FHMV95]. Given a set
 







, considersets of local states, one for every
agent of the MAS and a set of states for the environment. We denote bythe non-empty
set of local states possible for agent

, and bythe non-empty set of possible states for the
environment. Elements ofwill be denoted by







Elements ofwill be denoted by








5The term “frame” was first suggested by Dana Scott and used by Segerberg in [Seg68].
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Definition 1.4 (Global states of interpreted systems). A set of global states for an interpre-
ted system is a subset of the Cartesian product 







 


.
A global state represents the situation of all the agents and of the environment at a par-
ticular instant of time. The idea behind considering a subset is that some of the tuples that
originate from the Cartesian product might not be possible because of explicit constraints
present in the MAS. By considering functions (runs) from the natural numbers to the set of
global states, it is possible to represent the temporal evolution of the system. An interpre-
ted system is a set of functions on the global states with a valuation for the atoms of the
language.
Although in this work we will discuss temporal evolution of MAS, we will not consider
runs of interpreted systems explicitly. So, for us the key definition will be the one of global
states (Definition 1.4) and an interpreted system will simply be defined on global states. We
call these static interpreted systems.
Definition 1.5 (Static interpreted systems). A static interpreted system is a tuple 
 

 




,
where is a set of global states as in Definition 1.4 and




is an interpretation for the atoms.
Any static interpreted system is immediately suitable to interpret a propositional lan-
guage on its set of global states. We now see how they can be adapted to interpret a multi-
modal language.
Consider a family of first-order predicates






	





 

 ; we can use these to specify
when two global states are related for agent

.
Definition 1.6. Given a static interpreted system  
 

 




, consider the Kripke model
 

 




, where the frame 
 

 








 

is defined by: 




if







. The modelis
called the model generated by  .
This construction can be regarded as a way of seeing interpreted systems as a special
class of Kripke models.
When  is clear from the context we will omit the subscript  from. If
 













is the model generated by  , then  
 










, the frame underlying


 , is also called the frame generated by the set of global states.
In the applications (logics for knowledge for example), the family of predicates






	is
fixed in advance; if that is the case we can then define validity on static interpreted systems
by relying on the generated Kripke models.
Definition 1.7. A formula

is valid on a static interpreted system  ,  
 

, if 
 

.
A formula

is valid on a set of global states  ,  
 

, if for any interpretationwe have that

 





 

. A formula

is valid on a class of static interpreted systems

if for every  




we have  
 

. A formula

is valid on a class of global states

if for every 



we have that
 
 

.
1.2.3 Proof theory
As is known, modal logic was historically introduced simply by giving an axiomatic account
of various modal logic systems, but without relating these to any semantics. In particular
the intuitive possible-worlds semantics that we described in Section 1.2.2 was introduced
some twenty years after the first modal systems were introduced (the system S3 described in
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[Lew18]). Modal systems were simply described as sets of formulae that could be deduced
from axioms and rules of inference. This Hilbert-style way of expressing a logic is sometimes
referred to as “syntactic approach” in contrast to the “semantic approach” described in the
previous subsection.
Definition 1.8. A normal modal system  , whereis the number of modal boxes of the logic, is
the set of formulae that can be deduced from a set of axioms and inference rules. The set of axioms
includes the following:
Taut Any propositional tautology
K 















The set of inference rules include the following:
Uniform Substitution The result of uniformly replacing any propositional variables

 
in a theorem by any formula






 is itself a theorem6,
Modus Ponens If

and



are theorems so is

,
Necessitation If

is a theorem, so is

, for any



.
Sometimes we will use the short-cuts US for the rule of uniform substitution and similar-
lyMP andNec formodus ponens and necessitation. In the followingwewill also extensively
use the term “logic” for normal modal system. We write

to mean that the formula

is a theorem of the logic  , and, as expected, we write





to mean that it is not the case
that

.
Definition 1.9 (Maximal consistency). A formula

is   -consistent (or simply consistent if
 
 is clear from the context) if






. A finite set of formulae









is   -consistent
if














. An infinite set of formulae 	is   -consistent if any finite subset of 	is
 
 -consistent.
A set	of formulas ismaximal if for every formula

we have that either



	or



	.
A set	is  -maximal consistent if it is both-consistent and maximal.
Formulae and sets of formulae are inconsistent if it is not the case that they are consistent.
The importance of consistent sets is mainly due to the fact that every set admits a maximal
consistent extension:
Lemma 1.10 (Lindembaum’s Lemma). Let  be a normal modal logic. Given an  -consistent
set of formulae	, there is a maximal  -consistent set
such that	


.
The maximal extension
is not necessarily unique.
We now introduce the logic systems that will be used as reference throughout this thesis.
The weakest normal modal logic (i.e. the one containing the smallest number of theorems) is
the logic K . The logic K is obtained from Definition 1.8 by stipulating that no extra axioms
and inference rules are included.
Stronger logics can be defined by enriching the list of axioms and inference rules. Fig-
ure 1.1 will serve as a reference for the names of the axioms we will be using in this work.
6In the following we will use the expression













to denote the formula which results from
by replacinguniformly by




.
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Axiom Axiom name





T




 


D









4
 





 


5
 







 


G1


 



 




M



 


B
 



Triv
Figure 1.1: The traditional reference names for some important axioms.
Logic Name of the logic
K + T T 
K + D KD 
K + 4 K4 
K + Triv Triv 
T + 4 S4 
S4 + G1 S4.2 
T + 5 S5 
D + 4 KD4 
KD4 + 5 KD45 
Figure 1.2: The traditional reference names for some important logics.
We will use only modal logics that can be expressed by using Definition 1.8 in which no
extra inference rules are included. So, we will be able to express any logic of interest  as
the system K to which we add a set of axioms 	. In doing this we will sometimes write
 
 = K +	. Often the set	will be a singleton. Historically some logics have been given
particular names, that we will also use and that we report in Figure 1.2.
It should be noted that a certain logic can be defined in many ways by adding different
axioms to the system K and Figure 1.2 is only a possible definition. For example the logic
S5 above defined as S5 = T + 5 can also be defined as S5 = S4 + B. Many more systems
are known and this list serves only as a reference.
We will also make use a standard shortcut: If a system L can be axiomatised by taking a
logic M and adding an axiom whose name is A, by MA we will denote the logic L = M + A.
1.2.4 Methodologies
Over the last thirty years, many formal techniques have been developed for the study of
modal logics grounded on Kripke semantics, such as completeness proofs via canonical
models [Mak66, Kap66, Lem77], decidability via filtrations [Lem77], and more recently com-
pleteness and decidability transfer via combining logics [KW91, Gab96a]. Indeed part of this
heritage of techniques constitutes the pillars upon which most of this thesis is built upon.
To fix the notation I present here some results that we will use later on. The reader is
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assumed familiar with these and they serve as a reference only. For the proofs the reader is
referred to any of the general references for modal logic mentioned before.
Definition 1.11 (Isomorphism of frames). Two frames 
 










 

,  

 














 

of a classof frames are isomorphic ( 
 
 
 

) if and only if:
There exists a bijection
 





,
For all 





, and all



, 



if and only if
 






 



.
Isomorphic frames validate the same formulae.
Lemma 1.12. If and 

are isomorphic frames then for all

we have 
 
if and only 


 
.
An equivalent notion of isomorphism can be defined on models. A result equivalent to
Lemma 1.12 holds for that case.
Isomorphism is a very strong property. A weaker interesting property is p-morphism. We
can define these both at the level of frames and at the level of Kripke models.
Definition 1.13 (P-morphism). A frame p-morphism from 
 










 

to 

 













 

is a function





such that:
1. the functionis surjective,
2. for all




and each

 


, if


then










,
3. for each

 


and



and 





, if








then there exists



such that



and



 


.
If
 










 




and

 













 





are Kripke structures, then amodel p-
morphism fromto

is a mapping





that is a frame p-morphism from










 

to













 

that satisfies









if and only if






for all propositionsand
points



.
If there is a p-morphism from to 

, 

is also said to be a p-morphic image of .
The following result (see for example [Gol92] for the mono modal case) shows that-
morphisms preserve satisfaction and validity for the language.
Lemma 1.14. Ifis a model p-morphism fromto

then for all worldsofand formulae


, we have
 



if and only if


 






. Thus

is valid inif and only if

is valid in


. Ifis a frame p-morphism from to 

then for all



, if 
 

then 


 

.
The following are two other basic concepts that we will use.
Definition 1.15 (Reachable points). Given a frame 
 










and two points	
	



,
we say that 	is reachable in steps from	if there are





and









in
such that	







	

















	. We also say that	is reachable from	if there is
somesuch that	is reachable from	insteps.
Definition 1.16 (Connected model). A frame is connected if for every	
	



we have that	is
reachable from	. A model is connected if its underlying frame is.
Given a point on model, the connected sub-model that contains that point is usually
called the generated model.
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Property of the frames Property name Axiom A Name










Serial 


 


D




 Reflexive 



T










and











Transitive 







4













 Symmetric




 


B










and











Euclidean  




 


5










and















and






Convergent  


 




G1




and











 



Reflexive dead-end

 



Triv
Figure 1.3: Correspondences between property of the frames and validity of axioms (Theo-
rem 1.19).
Definition 1.17. Given a model
 









 




and a point



, the model

 













 





generated byfromis defined as follows:
The set


containsand all the points reachable from.
If









and





then






, for any










.
The interpretation is defined by:




 







.
Clearly, given any equivalence model the model generated by any point of it is connect-
ed.
The following result (see, e.g. [HC84] page 80) makes precise the claim that satisfaction
of a formula ofat a world depends only on connected worlds.
Lemma 1.18. For all worldsof a modeland for all formulae



we have
 



if and
only if

 



.
One of the basic insights into modal logic is provided by what is usually referred to as
correspondence theory. This provides a one-to-one relation between the validity of a certain
axiom on a class of frames and properties of the relations of these frames.
Theorem 1.19 (Correspondences). For the properties and axioms A indicated in Figure 1.3 we
have that: a frame has the property if and only if 
 
.
Some axioms do not correspond to any first-order property and conversely some first-
order properties (irreflexivity for example) cannot be captured by any axiom. Correspon-
dence theory studies under which circumstances syntax and semantics are equally powerful.
See [Ben84] for details.
As in any logic, two major concepts relate the syntax and semantics in modal logics:
soundness and completeness.
Definition 1.20 (Soundness and completeness). Given a logic  and a class of frames,  is
sound with respect toif for any formula



we have that  

implies
 

. A logic  is
complete with respect to a class of framesif for any formula



we have that
 

implies
 
 


.
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Note that completeness is defined with respect to a class of frames, not with respect a
class of models. Completeness can be proven in a number of ways, the easiest of which is by
using what is often called the canonical model.
Definition 1.21 (Canonical model). Given a logic  , the canonical model


 
 













is a model built as follows.
The set

is made of all the maximal  -consistent sets of formulae,
the family of relations




on


is defined by





if for all formulae


we have that






implies






The interpretation




for the atoms is defined as






if


.
When it is clear that we are referring to the canonical model of a logic  , we will simply
denote it as. The canonical model has the property of validating all and only the theorems
of the logic.
Theorem 1.22. For any formula



,


 

 

if and only if

.
The importance of the canonical model is due to the fact that some logics are not only
described by the canonical model but also by the frame of the canonical model, called the
canonical frame. When this circumstance holds we call the logic canonical.
It can be proved that under certain circumstances completeness of a logic L with respect
to a class of framescan be proved simply by reasoning about the canonical frame.
Theorem 1.23 (Completeness via the canonical model). Let  be a logic and letbe a class
of frames. If the frame 


  underlying the canonical model


  for  is in the classthen the
logic  is complete with respect to.
By using Theorem 1.23 and considerations on soundness, it is not hard to show the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 1.24 (Completeness of basic logics). For the properties and logics  shown in Fig-
ure 1.4 we have that: the logic  is sound and complete with respect to the class of frames that have
property .
The last meta-property we need to introduce is decidability.
Definition 1.25 (Decidability). A logic  is decidable if there is an effective procedure that in
a finite number of steps determines whether given a formula



it is the case that

or that





.
Decidability is related to two other properties properties as follows.
Theorem 1.26. If a logic  is finitely axiomatisable and has the finite model property then  is
decidable.
All the logics we have seen so far and that we will work with are finitely axiomatisable
(i.e. they can be axiomatised by considering a finite number of axiom schemas) and so, a good
way for us to prove decidability will be to prove that the logic has the finite model property.
That is defined as follows:
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Property of the frames Logic L 
- K 
Reflexive T 
Serial KD 
Transitive 4 
Reflexive and transitive S4 
Reflexive, transitive and convergent S4.2 
Reflexive, symmetric, transitive S5 
Serial and transitive KD4 
Serial, transitive and Euclidean KD45 
Reflexive dead-end7 Triv 
Figure 1.4: Completeness table for some basic modal systems discussed in Theorem 1.24.
Definition 1.27 (Finite model property). A logic  is said to have the finite model property
(or fmp in short) if for any formula



we have that





implies that there is a finite model
for  such that


 

.
A logic can be proved to have the fmp in a number of different ways: algebraically as in
[McK41], [Ber49], by the use of a “mini-canonical” model as in [HC96], etc. Here we will use
the another standard technique which is better suited for this case: filtrations (first presented
in [Lem77]). It is more convenient to describe this technique while we will be using it, i.e. in
Chapter 3.
For now all we need to mention is that all the logics that we discussed so far can be
proven to have the fmp.
Theorem 1.28 (Decidability of basic logics). All the logics in Figure 1.2 have the fmp and so
they are decidable.
1.2.4.1 Two useful lemmas about S5 
In this thesis we will extensively use the modal logic S5 . We report here two lemmas that
we will extensively use later.
Lemma 1.29. For any






we have



implies





and 


 


.
Proof. If 



, by necessitating by  (the logic S5 is normal; see Definition 1.8 and
Figure 1.2) we have





. By axiom K we have





.
If 



, by contraposition and the first part of this lemma we have 






. By contraposition again and by using the definition   we have 


 


.
Lemma 1.30. For any



, we have

 





 
 




and 

 


 


 
 

 


where



.
7This is defined as follows. Given any worldwe have that


and that for any world






implies




.
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Proof. We prove the first chain of bi-implications. By axiom 4







. By axiom T
and Lemma 1.29 we have





. For the second part of the bi-implication, assume



, then by taking the contrapositive of axiom T:

 

and substituting
 


we have




 




. The implication 





is simply an instance of the contrapositive
of axiom 5.
1.3 Agent theories
In this section wewill give a quick overview at which characteristics of agents can effectively
be expressed by means of a modal language - it should be stressed that this section is by no
means an exhaustive review of the work in this area as this has already been carried out
elsewhere (see [WJ95]). My wish, instead, is to give the flavour of these formalisms in order
to prepare the grounds for discussing the topic of this thesis in the last section.
The basic assumption of logicians working on agents, as for any other researcher work-
ing on MAS formalisms for that matter, is that it is both reasonable and useful to ascribe
mentalistic attitudes to agents8. The philosophical background to such an attitude was giv-
en by the influential [Den87], in which Daniel Dennet coined the term “intentional stance”
to describe the attitude of describing and predicting the behaviour of complex systems by
means of intensional attitudes such as beliefs and desires.
Interestingly, Dennet was not the first to put forward such a proposal and a similar ap-
proach was also suggested nearly twenty years before by one of the fathers of AI, John Mc-
Carthy. Back in 1979, he wrote:
To ascribe beliefs, free will, intentions, consciousness, abilities, or wants to a ma-
chine is legitimate when such an ascription expresses the same information about
the machine that it expresses about a person. It is useful when the ascription
helps us understand the structure of the machine, its past or future behaviour, or
how to repair or improve it. It is perhaps never logically required even for hu-
mans, but expressing reasonably briefly what is actually known about the state
of the machine in a particular situation may require mental qualities or qualities
isomorphic to them. Theories of belief, knowledge, and wanting can be con-
structed for machines in a simpler setting than for humans, and later applied to
humans. Ascription of mental qualities is most straightforward for machines of
known structure such as thermostats and computer systems, but it is most useful
when applied to entities whose structure is incompletely known.
([McC79], page 1. Cited in [Woo92, Sho93]).
The above is exactly the approach taken in this thesis, in line with much of the literature
on MAS. We look at agents as systems that can be described by assuming an “intentional
stance” and we aim to model key characteristics of them. MAS formal theories are then to
be regarded as specifications.
If specifications are to be useful, they need to be verifiable. Loosely speaking verification
means “testing that the specification meets the desired requirements”. In this thesis we take
the view that formal logic provides a good tool for specifying and reasoning about MAS;
why is it so? The answer comes by considering three key issues: syntax, semantics and
8We will randomly use female and male gender for the term agent.
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proof-theory. The syntax of a specification is just the language that we use to describe it and
as such it cannot provide many insights into the system. In most of the cases, this will be the
multi-modal language that we described in Section 1.2.1 (we will make clear when we are
using extensions of it).
The semantics of a MAS theory will be based on Kripke style possible worlds or inter-
preted systems (see Section 1.2.2). Semantics provides a way of describing the application
which is “relatively” grounded on it. Suppose we have a class of MAS that can be fully de-
scribed by a class of framesand we want to test whether a particular MAS of this class,
described by a finite conjunction of formulas

 
 




 
 , satisfies a property that can
be written as

. This can be done by checking the entailment

 
 

, i.e. whether for any
modelbuilt on a frame inand for any worldwe have that
 






.
Proof theory (which we will use in the shape of Section 1.2.3) can also be used to check
the properties of a MAS, but it takes a different perspective. The class of MAS under analysis
is specified by a set of axiom schemas and inference rules that describe a logic  ; a particular
MAS in this class is again identified by a conjunction of formulas
. In this case, verifying
that the specification of the particular MASmeets a requirement

amounts to proving in the
logic  that

follows from
, i.e. that


, or in other words that



.
Throughout this thesis wewill be often be proving soundness and completeness of a logic
with respect to a certain semantics. This guarantees that these two methods for reasoning
about a MAS are equally powerful, i.e. that



if and only if 
 
 




.
Although the two methods are logically equivalent we need to be careful here as there
are two schools of thought on how one should in principle verify a MAS.
There are those who think that given a MAS one could in principle be able to have a
model of the system (for example as a class of frames of modal logic). According to these
completeness is about being able to reason about a MAS by using a Hilbert style proof sys-
tem that is equivalent to the semantical description. This unlocks the possibility of using
automatic theorem proving techniques (Isabelle [Pau94] is one of them) to test the specifica-
tion.
A radically different way of seeing the process is to start from the axiomatisation. One
could choose the axiom schemas that suit best his or her needs to describe the system and
then test whether a formula (representing a property) is a theorem of the logic (representing
the system) by testing validity of the formula on the corresponding semantical class, for
example by using semantical refutation techniques like tableaux ([Fit83]).
People feel (and argue) quite passionately about these issues and this thesis is not about
solving this long-going dispute (but we come back to this point in Section 1.4.2). More neu-
trally I would take the view that completeness gives us a collection of newmethods for prov-
ing properties of the MAS whichever side we come from. Another advantage is that thanks
to completeness we have two expressive tools to prove properties and sometimes simply by
switching to the more appropriate one, proof-theoretical or semantical, hard problems be-
come easier to solve. For example, it is thanks to completeness that comparing two or more
logics and deciding whether they are different or equivalent is now an accessible problem
(note that this used to be a very hard problem before works such as [Lem77] became known)
and it is very relevant for MAS theories.
We should see the process of generating a good specification for a MAS as an incremental
process. One way is to start from the semantics, find a complete axiomatisation for it, and
then carry out experiments on the axiomatisation by using automatic theorem proving on
it. This will probably reveal that some theorems that we did not want to be true are actually
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true and some other formulae that we assumedwould hold actually do not. By completeness
the semantics we started from is either not the intended one or, if matching the application,
it reveals some unwanted properties about the application. We can then go back to the
semantics and change it accordingly. But the opposite path9, is in principle equally possible
and it is up to us to decide what to start with.
The argument above is to show that if we want agent theories to be useful for the speci-
fication of MAS, we need to provide sound and complete axiomatisations for them. This is the
reason why the theme of completeness will play such a crucial role in this work.
The rest of this section is organised as follows. First I will present logics modelling a
single aspect of agency. After this wewill move to themulti-agent casewherewewill discuss
some general issues and analyse a few important multi-agent theories.
1.3.1 Single-agent theories
In this subsection we use modal operators to model intentional aspects of agency. The whole
sub-section is devoted to the specification of a single agent. Syntax, semantics and proof
theory are the ones described in Section 1.2 but limited to onemodal box.
1.3.1.1 Epistemic logics
The design of an agent of knowledge is a central issue in agents theory, as knowledge is a
key property of any intelligent system (see for example [RN95], Section 1).
The most widely used system to model knowledge was proposed by Hintikka in his
famous book [Hin62] and since then used by many others.
The syntax is the one presented in Section 1.2, in which the modal boxis here written
as . In this setting a formula 

reads as “the agent knows

”. The operatorthe dual of
 , is defined as in corresponding to the modal diamond (page 12). A formula

is read
as “the agent considers

to be possible according to his knowledge”.
The interpretation is given on Kripke models (Definition 1.1) following Definition 1.2.
In this case the fact that two states
are related by the accessibility relation intuitively
means “the states
are epistemically possible according to the agent’s knowledge”. The
favoured approach uses an equivalence relation for the accessibility relation. Let us see why.
First the relation should be reflexive. In fact, if not an agent in the state, the actual
state, could regardas being impossible. So the agent would be able to have false knowl-
edge. This is contrary to our intuition of knowledge as “true belief”.
Let us now see why the relation should be symmetric. Suppose an agent at a state
considersas possible but inshe considersnot to be possible. Then she would know
inthatcannot be a possible state, but we have just noticed in the previous paragraph
that this would be absurd. Sohas to be possible fromwheneveris possible from

.
Finally transitivity. Suppose an agent in considers to be epistemically possible
and that inshe considersas epistemically possible. Then if she did not regardas
possible when in, it would mean that in, she would know thatcannot be the case.
But then, she would also know this at(because it is considered possible from) and so

would not be regarded as possible from.
9That is, from the axiomatisation find a complete semantics, check this one for satisfaction of desired proper-
ties with semantical methods and if necessary change the axiomatisation accordingly.
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There is another way of showing that an equivalence relation is adequate for the case
of knowledge. Recall Definition 1.4 of static interpreted systems and how these generate
Kripke models (Definition 1.6). Consider two global states10: 
 








and 

 










;
where






are local states for the environment and






are states for agent 1. Suppose the
agent is in the state (which implies that its local state is

), when can we say that 

is
epistemically possible for the agent in consideration? Well, we can say that the agent will
regard 

to be possible when its local states in the two global states are the same. In fact
if


 

then up to the agent’s knowledge there is no difference between the two states 
and 

. So, for the case of knowledge we can fix the predicate






	of Definition 1.6 to
be exactly the equality of local states, i.e.




















if


 

. So, any generated frame
will be an equivalence frame. This is the approach taken in [FHMV95]; see this reference for
more details.
So, whether we favour Kripke models or interpreted systems as semantic foundations
for logic for MAS, it is reasonable to consider the accessibility relation on the frames to be
an equivalence relation. As we observed in Theorem 1.24, the logic which is complete with
respect to equivalence frames is S5 = T + 5. Note that that axiom 4 can be proven in S5. So, it
is convenient to think of S5 as defined as follows:
Taut  

, where

is any propositional tautology
K   







 


 


T   


4   

  

5  

 

US If 

, then 











 


 

MP If 

and 



, then 

Nec If 

, then  

In the context of knowledge, the axiom K states the closure of the agent’s knowledge
under implication. Axiom T asserts the truth of anything that is known by the agent. Axiom
4 expresses positive introspection (in the sense of [Kon86]) in the agent knowledge, meaning
that if the agent knows a fact then he or she knows to know it. Axiom 5 represents a negative
introspection property, because it states that the agent knows that he or she does not know
something whenever he or she does not know it. The inference rule of necessitation asserts
that the agent knows any valid formulae, in particular all the propositional tautologies.
The properties described above are very strong. It would not be reasonable for us to
think that any real agent can master these abilities while operating in any scenario and we
should regard agents modelled by S5 (or S5-agents) as ideal agents. This is so, because they
behave like perfect reasoners. Indeed we should interpret any formula 

as “

follows from
the information that the agent holds”, thus an agent would have explicit knowledge of

if he or she had infinite computational resources. In this idealisation an S5-agent is logi-
cally omniscient and with complete introspection properties. For a review of philosophical
arguments for and against S5 as a logic for knowledge see [Len78].
The logic S5 with its extensions is extensively studied because it provides an important
theoretical base for the study of knowledge. In order to model more realistic scenarios the
system S5 has been modified to incorporate more practical needs.
10Here we are dealing with the case

.
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If it is positive (respectively negative) introspection bothering us for its philosophical
implications (how can an agent be aware of anything he or she knows and does not know?!),
then S5 can simply be replaced by the weaker KT4 (respectively KT5). Or we could simply
consider KT should we want to drop both. We know from Theorem 1.24 that these logics are
still complete with respect to an appropriate class of frames.
If we are uneasy with what is usually called “the logical omniscience problem” (i.e. the
agents knowing all valid formulae together with his or her knowledge being closed under
implication), we would like to drop axiom K and the inference rule of necessitation altogeth-
er. This is not possible in any normal modal system (see Definition 1.8) and we would need
to modify the semantics heavily. A number of frameworks have been proposed, the most
known of which are perhaps [Thi92] and [FHV95]. Neither of these last two systems reject
modal logic on its own: the former uses a partial semantics for interpreting the formulae,
the latter has a non-standard negation built in the semantics in order to block some of the
critical schemas of inference, that provoke omniscience.
S5 is a successful logic for modelling idealised knowledge also because, apart from being
complete, is also decidable (see Theorem 1.28).
Some proposals [Gar84, LM94, LC96, Lom95] have also been put forward on how to
extend systems similar to S5 to the first order case in order to provide more expressive
specifications. A major expressive capability in first order epistemic logic is the ability of
representing statements like “knowing who” (rather than the usual “knowing that” of the
propositional case described here), but this has to be paid in terms of the heavy formal ma-
chinery needed and in the difficulty of proving completeness results.
Of course modal logic is by no means the only logic technique to model knowledge and
alternative proposals have been put forward (for example [Lev84, Kon86, Tur90] or even first
order [McC78]). Since in this thesis we only deal with modal logics we will not discuss these
here.
1.3.1.2 Doxastic logics
The representation of beliefs of an agent is equally (some would argue more) important as
the representation of the agent’s knowledge. The commonly accepted difference between
the two concepts is that while the beliefs of an agent may be false, this is not the case for
her knowledge. This is why the logic commonly used for this task is the logic KD45 which
is basically the logic S5 in which the axiom T:



is replaced by the weaker D:






, that simply guarantees the coherence of the agent’s beliefs.
As we showed in Figure 1.2, the logic KD45 can be axiomatised as below in which modal
formulae 

in this case are meant to be read as “the agent believes that

”:
Taut  

where

is any propositional tautology
K   







 


 


D   


 


4   

  

5   

 

 

US If 

, then 











 


 

MP If 

and 



, then 

Nec If 

, then  

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The semantics is given through Kripke structures and, for reasons similar to the one
presented on page 23 for the epistemic case, the binary relation (which intuitively means
“being possible according to the agent’s beliefs)” is in this case chosen to be serial, transitive
and Euclidean. Indeed the logic KD45 is complete with respect to serial, Euclidean and
transitive frames, and decidable (see Theorem 1.24 and Theorem 1.28). The methods and
the aims of extending KD45 to first order logic are equivalent to the ones for S5; see the
references above.
The logic KD45, just as S5, suffers from the logical omniscience problem and in order to
overcome this difficulty some systems have been presented. The most famous is probably
the one presented in [Lev84] in which Levesque distinguishes between implicit and explicit
beliefs. Implicit beliefs, i.e. beliefs that an agent may not be aware of, still enjoy logical
omniscience (indeed they are modelled just like KD45) but explicit believes are based on
a model similar to the one in situation semantics [BP84]. Interestingly it has been noted
in [MH95] that even Levesque’s explicit beliefs suffer from logical omniscience when seen
from a relevance logic perspective [Dun86]. Other treatments that depart further more from
the traditional approach presented here are [FH88], [Jas91], [Jas93], and [HM89]. Discussing
these is beyond the scopes of this introduction.
1.3.1.3 Logics of intention
Philosophers have long been concerned with the mental state of intention. It has been con-
sidered for long time that the intention of an agent could be expressed as a combination of
desires and believes, but after the influential work of Bratman [Bra87] and [Bra90] intentions
are generally considered as an irreducible mental state.
Intentions involve actions, hence change, differently from belief and knowledge that con-
cern static states. For this reason some authors ([Cas75] and others) have suggested that in-
tentions should be specified with logics for actions, e.g. dynamic logic. Others ([CL90] and
[Bra83]) have claimed that this would make it impossible to integrate different mental states
in a single framework.
For the scopes of this section here we report a simple modal treatment of intentions that
constitutes a fragment of the BDI system presented in [Rao96] to define a comprehensive
formalism for MAS. The language is the usual modal propositional logic, where a modal
formula 

reads “the agent intends that

”; on the semantical side a world is related to
another one, if the latter is a possible way of achieving the agent’s intention at the former
world.
The system used in that work, the modal logic KD, is axiomatised as follows:
Taut 

, where

is any propositional tautology
K 













D 





US If

, then











 


 

MP If

and



, then

Nec If

, then

KD models an ideal agent of intention. This is because the modal schema D guarantees
the consistency of the agent’s intentions. It is therefore not admissible for an agent to intend
and

at the same time. The logic KD is sound and complete with respect to serial frames
(see Theorem 1.24) and enjoys decidability (see Theorem 1.28).
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The modal logic KD has also been used in [Col96] to model intentional comunication.
1.3.1.4 Time
Although time is not a mental state, it is an essential component of any model aiming at
representing the temporal evolution of agent’s and environment’s change.
The formalisation of temporal evolution has been for a long time topic of research among
logicians and the literature of the field is cumbersome (excellent references are [MP92, CE81,
GHR93, Ben83, Eme90]). For the purpose of this document we only point out the most
common usages of modal logic for representing temporal evolution in agent theories.
First we report the mainstream approach (the one presented in [GHR93] for example).
This is given by a syntax defined on a propositional language enriched by two modal opera-
tors,
 



, which are read as “always in the future” and “always in the past” respectively.
The boxes
 
andgenerate through the usual relation their duals: 
 

 


 


, and
 


 





. Formulae 
 

are read as “sometimes in the future”, while 

are read
as “sometimes in the past”.
The semantics is given through Kripke frames  
 





 





, in which the worlds
represent state of affairs at particular time instants and the two binary relations

 



are
bound by the property
For any







 


if and only if






that captures the intuition of the the two (forward and backwards) flows (sequences of states
related by one of the relations) of time being one the converse of the other. Further proper-
ties can be imposed on these relations. Often it is meaningful to consider





 , as partial
orderings, but many more issues arise like whether the relations have to be linear or branch-
ing, strict, total, etc. Indeed much of the literature of modal logic arose in the effort of having
a good formal model of temporal evolution. All these issues are very important but not so
relevant in the context of this thesis and so we simply present the weakest axiomatisation
for linear time (from [GHR93], page 92):
Taut Any propositional tautology
K 
 








 



 


K


















R





 
 

R 


 
 


4

 



 

 


4  
 


 
 
 
 

US If

, then











 


 

MP If

and



, then

Nec If

, then

and
 

It can be observed that axiom 4 is present for both modal operators representing the
transitivity of temporal evolution.
We now turn our attention to a slightly different model of temporal evolution, often used
to model MAS and due to Fagin, Halpern, Vardi and Moses; we present it as it appears in
[FHMV95] and [HF89]. Recall Definition 1.4 where we reported the definition of a set of
global states for interpreted systems. We have already seen that interpreted systems can be
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used to model knowledge (see page 24), we now show how they can also be used to model
time. To describe it we use the full notion of interpreted sytem without limitating it to the
static case as we did in Definition 1.5.
Given a set of global states , consider a set of runs

 


 
 

, where
 
is the
set of natural numbers. Thus a run is simply a sequence of globals states
 






 



.
If 



 











 

is the global state identified by run at time, then 



 

and 



 
, for

 




. An interpreted system suitable to model time can then be
defined as  
 






, whereis an interpretation function suitable to interpret a set of
propositional variables, and

is a set of runs

as defined above.
The syntax commonly used in this context is slightly different from the one presented
above and it is defined from the usual set of propositional variables enriched by two modal
operators: 


, the first being unary and the second binary. We do not present here op-
erators for the past. A formula

should be read as “at the next step

”, while a formula


means “

until

”. The interpretation for these connectives is standard and the opera-
tors of(“always true”), and (“sometime true”) can be defined in terms of

, given the
equivalence 

 






.
Satisfaction for this language is defined as follows:
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 



 if 
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
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
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
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such that

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


Satisfaction for the other logical connectives can be defined in the usual way.
This formal machinery does not deal with continuous time, nor with the indeterminism
of branching time, but it can be extended appropriately to deal with them (see for example
[EH85]).
An interpreted system suitable to model temporal evolution can be axiomatised by the
following:


Where

is any propositional tautology


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
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

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

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 
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
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If

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



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
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If

, then

If




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


, then









The above axiomatisation is known to be sound and complete for linear flows of time
[GPSS80].
We have now terminated with our description of modal theories that deal with one as-
pect of agency of an agent. We have seen that a modal language is well-suited to represent
the idealisation of the concepts involved. We leave the single-agent case and we turn our
attention to the multi-agent case.
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1.3.2 Multi-agent theories
So far we have discussed theories addressing one of the mental states that we can ascribe
(in the sense of [McC79] and [Den87]) to a system composed by one agent and the envi-
ronment. Distributed Artificial Intelligence, though, needs theories that take into account
several agents operating in their environment (sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in con-
flict, sometimes independently one for another). This is why the theories of mental states for
an agent of Section 1.3.1 have been extended to the multi-agent case.
In order to discuss properly the multi-agent case, three issues need to be considered:
multiplicity of the agents, group properties and interaction properties.
1.3.2.1 Multiplicity of the agents
In order to deal with the multiplicity of the agents, a MAS theory has to be able to represent
not just one mental state (as we saw in Section 1.3.1) but several mental states of the same
type, one for every agent in the set. Technically, this can be achieved by considering the
multi-modal extensions of the modal logics in use for the mental state in consideration.
So, in order to represent a group of agents, we need to use the syntax, semantics and
proof theory as they were defined in a multi-modal context over a setof agents in Sec-
tion 1.2. As it was reported there, the properties of the logics that are relevant here (mainly
completeness and decidability) are not affected by moving to the multi-agent case.
For the case of knowledge, the multi-modal extension of [Hin62] was first proposed by
Halpern andMoses in [HM90]; a good analysis of the logic appears in [HM92a]. Similarly, all
the logics that we reported in the previous section can be extended to the multi-agent case.
For example the logic KD45 has been extensively used for the representation of beliefs.
1.3.2.2 Group properties
Group properties arise naturally when we investigate a group of agents as a whole instead
of as a collection of individuals. Let us consider the interesting case of knowledge; we will
follow the approach that appears in [FHMV95].
We have seen how to reason about the knowledge of any agent in a set
 







:
we can use a language withmodal boxes 




and we now know why the system S5 
is a suitable candidate. As stated in Theorem 1.24, the logic S5 is complete with respect to
equivalence frames.
We now extend this machinery by considering particular types of knowledge of the
group. In doing so we will extend the syntax of Section 1.2.1 with new modal operators
and we will give their semantics. Three notions of group knowledge are particularly impor-
tant: “everybody knows”, distributed knowledge and common knowledge. All of these can
be expressed in modal logic by extending the logic S5 .
“Everybody in a group knows

” is a state of knowledge of a group 

of agents
that arises when all the agents have the knowledge about some fact

. Formally, we can
extend our syntax by introducing a modal box, whose interpretation is defined in terms
of the 




 :

 





if
 


 


for any



 

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Not surprisingly, the logic S5 
 
S5 





 




 



is sound and complete with
respect to equivalence frames.
We now turn our attention to common knowledge. Common knowledge was first pro-
posed in [Lew69] and later formalised in [MSHI78] and [Mil81] and [Leh84]. A fact

is com-
mon knowledge among a group of agents 

, formally

, when every agent knows

and every agent knows that every agent knows

and so on. In fact it can be argued that any
number of finite conjunctions of everybody knows is not enough to capture the intuition of
certain circumstances. For example suppose that in a group of agents an announcement, say
the formula

, is made. Under the assumption of all the agents being perfect reasoners able
to receive the message one can easily persuade himself that the knowledge of the group after
that the announcement is made becomes stronger than any chain of “everyone knows”. In
fact, it would not only be that everyone knows

but also that everyone knows that everyone
knows

and that everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows

and so on.
Common knowledge is particularly useful when modelling situations in which the agents
share a strong core of knowledge. Typically, protocols in a distributed system are commonly
known.
The syntax of the system S5 defined above can be extended to accommodate common
knowledge. Indeed, common knowledge of a fact

among a group 

of agents can be
expressed as a modal operator

, whose interpretation can be defined as follows:
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

is a shorthand for

,times.
The obtained logic that we call S5 

 
can be presented as follows:
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Having done so, it is possible to prove completeness of the logic S5 

 
with respect to
equivalence frames. This was originally done in [KP81].
We now discuss an extension of S5 

 
that includes an operator for distributed knowl-
edge. Distributed knowledge of a fact

among a group of agents arises when the agents
of the group can obtain knowledge of

(that is not necessarily known by any agent) by
confronting their mental states and eliminating epistemic alternatives that are not deemed
possible by some agent. One can see distributed knowledge as the knowledge of a wise
man, external to the group , that knows what the agents consider possible and, therefore,
can infer some knowledge about the community as a whole.
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Distributed knowledge, sometimes also called “implicit knowledge” (as for example in
[HM92b]) cannot be defined in terms of “everybody knows” or common knowledge. Still,
we can express it by using another modal operator whose interpretation we can define
in terms of the accessibility relations of the agents in . In particular, we say that a fact

is
distributely known among a group of agents at worldif

holds at all the worlds that
are related tovia every accessibility relation of the agents in , i.e.

 


 


if for any




we have










implies
 





The reason for considering the intersection of the accessibility relations lies on the observa-
tion that if some agent knows that an epistemic alternative is not possible this knowledge
will permit the others to rule out this epistemic alternative. Hence, in a distributed setting
they only need considering the alternatives that all of them consider possible.
Given the above definition, the two following axioms will hold for an axiomatisation of
distributed knowledge:
 





 


, for any











 (1.1)
 



 


, for any 

 

 (1.2)
Proving completeness for a language that includes distributed knowledge was indepen-
dently achieved in [HM92b] and [FHV92]. The result is the modal logic S5

  that can be
axiomatised by taking the logic S5 and adding the S5 axiomatisation for the operator
plus the two axioms 1.1, 1.2 above.
Completeness for a language including all the operators of group knowledge is presented
in [HM97]. The logic S5 

 


, obtained by taking the union of the axiomatisations of S5

 and
S5 

 
, is still complete with respect to equivalence frames.
Other group properties of knowledge that we do not report here are also studied; for ex-
ample, see [HLM96] for a different notion of distributed knowledge. The complete axioma-
tisation for common knowledge described above can be relaxed from S5-operators to KD45-
operators obtaining a complete axiomatisation for mutual belief (see for example [Col93]).
Considering a group of agents, there are other group properties that we may consider,
like joint intentions. The treatments in these cases are usually similar to the case described
above and we do not present them here.
1.3.2.3 Interactions between different mental states of the same agent
In Section 1.3.1 we have discussed that many mental states are needed to describe an intel-
ligent system. We have observed that there are subtle differences between the concepts of
knowledge and belief, between desire and intention, etc. If we are to specify a fully-fledged
intelligent system, in general we do not want all these modules to be independent from each
other. Rather, we would like to be able to specify some sort of dependency among these
characteristics. For example, it would not be reasonable to let an agentbelieve facts that
already knows to be false. Equally, it would seem unreasonable to let agentintend to bring
about something which is not believed to be possible by.
In order to specify interesting MAS theories it is not enough to consider many single
aspect theories and “paste” them together as independent modules, but we need express
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Interactions
"Knowledge stronger than belief"
Interaction Axioms
 






Figure 1.5: A representation of interactions and interaction axioms. The solid line connects
a relation between two mental attitudes to its formalisation in the language of modal logic.
The dashed line shows the general relation that exists between interactions between mental
states and interaction axioms. Interaction axioms are the formal tools we will employ to
represent interactions between mental states.
appropriate interactions between the different mentalistic components. By interaction we in-
formally mean a form of binding between the mental states of the agents, a relation between
the mentalistic components. For example, an interaction between knowledge and belief (as
we shall see briefly) may be that “knowledge is stronger than belief”, meaning that every-
thing which is known is also believed.
Modal logic, once again, proves to be powerful enough to capture formally our needs.
If we imagine using more than one modal operator for every agent to express the mental
states in interest we can represent the interactions between different mental states as inter-
action axioms, i.e. formulae containing different modal operators. In the example above, the
interaction between knowledge and belief can be expressed by the implication 


 


,
where and are the operators for knowledge and belief respectively referring to agent

. See Figure 1.5.
In the next three examples we explore a few interesting cases of interaction from the
literature.
1.3.2.3.1 Case 1: Knowledge and belief. Kraus and Lehmann presented in [KL88] a com-
bined system for reasoning about both knowledge and beliefs of a set
 







of
agents (this system was then revisited by van der Hoek and Meyer in [Hoe93] where more
interactions are studied). They propose a multi-modal logic for knowledge and belief with
group properties, and a very reasonable collection of interaction axioms. The language is
multi-modal as in Section 1.2 but defined on two families of modal operators, and (

is as always in a setof agents), enriched by the modal operators of “everybody knows”
(), “everybody believes” (), common knowledge () and common belief (). Com-
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mon knowledge is defined as Section 1.3.2.211; the operator of common belief is defined as
common knowledge but interpreted on the accessibility relation for belief.
More precisely, the semantics is based on possible worlds as in Section 1.2 but with
two families of relations. Formally, frames for this system are tuples of the form  
 










	



 




	

, where






	is a family of equivalence relations used to interpret
the knowledge operators 

. The family

 




	is composed by Euclidean, serial
and transitive binary relations used to interpret the belief operators 

.
The two families of relations satisfy the following two extra properties:
1. for any

in,
 



.
2. for any

in, 
 


 
.
The relation 1 represents the fact that knowledge should be stronger than belief, while rela-
tion 2 represents the introspection of knowledge over belief.
Kraus and Lehmann prove that these constrains on the class of frames correspond to the
following sound and complete axiomatisation:
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, then

If
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, then

The system is complex and can be seen as composed by several layers. The basic level is
inherited from propositional logic and contains Modus Ponens and the classical tautologies.
Next we can recognise two levels, one referring to knowledge and one to belief. The two
fragments are, as we would expect, the logic KD45 for belief and the logic S5 for knowl-
edge. The last three axioms represent the interactions between knowledge and belief. The
first and the third of these make knowledge stronger than belief, the second regulates the
introspection over beliefs. It is worth noting that 


 


(respectively 


 

 


)
corresponds12 to property 1 (respectively 2) of the relation above.
Other studies for interaction between knowledge and belief have been proposed; see for
example [FH94], [MS93], and [Voo92].
11But here we are using

.
12In the sense of Theorem 1.19.
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1.3.2.3.2 Case 2: Knowledge and time. MAS evolve over time. Hence MAS theories need
to specify the temporal evolution of the aspects of agency under investigation. In the second
part of Section 1.3.1.4, we saw how to use the semantics of interpreted systems to model
temporal evolution. In Section 1.3.1.1 we also saw the use of this semantics to model epis-
temic states of a MAS. Here we briefly present how these two formal tools can be merged
together to provide a model for epistemic change. This can serve as a specification of static
knowledge of a MAS about a changing world, as a model for MAS dynamic knowledge of
a static world or, more generally, as a specification for dynamic epistemic states of a MAS
about a changing world. The work reported here is presented in [HV86], [Mey94], [FHV92],
and the recent [HMV97], where some logics that formalise a class of agents whose knowl-
edge changes over time are discussed. The complexity of some of these logics is studied in
[HV89].
There are obviously many ways in which knowledge and time can interact. Interpreted
systems are more suitable for modelling intuitive properties of MAS, because of the explicit
way of representing local and global states. This becomes particularly useful in the case of
knowledge and time where intuitive classes of MAS can be modelled in terms of interpreted
systems.
Recall from Section 1.3.1.4 that a set of global states of an interpreted system (Defini-
tion 1.4) can also be seen as a set of pairs






, where 



is a run and


 
is a time
instant. If we define knowledge on this structure as we did in Section 1.3.1.1 for the static
case, we obtain the following. Two global states
















of an interpreted systems are
equivalent to agent

(formally
















) if

’s local state is the same in the two s-
tates, i.e. if 



 







. In other words in this way we build the generated model of the
interpreted system, similarly to what we did in Definition 1.6 for the static case.
Halpern and colleagues identify important classes of multi-agent systems with respect
to the relation between the agents’ knowledge and time. Here we mention (a-)synchronicity,
perfect recall, unique initial state, and no learning; a few other examples can be found in
their papers.
An interpreted system  is synchronous if for all agents

, and points



















if
















then
 


. This is a standard assumption in many real systems and
what it amounts to is that the agents have access to a shared clock, actions being taken in
rounds. Equivalently we can say that it is common knowledge among the agents that the
system is synchronous.
Another interesting class is made by those agents that enjoy perfect recall. Intuitively
perfect recall agents never forget the local states they have been in; in particular, once they
know something they will never forget it. Formally, define agent

’s local state sequence at
point






to be the sequence of local states that

has gone through in run up to time
. We can then say that an interpreted system  has perfect recall if for all agents

, and
points

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
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
then the agent

has the same local state se-
quence in
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

and








. It can be argued that (see [FHMV95] page 130) perfect recall is
a reasonable assumption for real MAS operating over short periods of time.
A further characteristics of temporal evolution of knowledge is no learning. Intuitively
no learning is the dual of perfect recall and is the condition of agents never ruling out previ-
ously considered possible epistemic alternatives. Formally, define agent

’s future local state
sequence at point






to be the set of local states that

will go through at run starting
from the point






. An interpreted system  has no learning capabilities if for any pair
of points points
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
has the same future local state
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sequence at
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
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
.
The last important case we report here is of interpreted systems having a unique starting
state. Formally, we say that an interpreted system has a unique starting state if for all runs








, we have




 

 





 

.
The language used by Halpern and colleagues to axiomatise these semantic conditions
is a modal language for knowledge plus two operators to represent time: until (

) and next
(). Indeed it is the union of the languages we employed for the study of knowledge in
Section 1.3.1.1 and in the second part of Section 1.3.1.4.
Let us consider the logic system S5 with respect to a family of modal operators repre-
senting knowledge 




and the axiomatic system presented on page 28. Call S5

 the
the combination between the two.
The authors investigate completeness with respect to the following list of axioms:
1.  


 


,
2.  
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3.  
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

 



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 


 




 




,
4.  


 



.
The important result that we cite here is the following:
Theorem 1.31. [HMV97]
1.  


 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to the class of asynchronous systems,
synchronous systems, systems with a unique initial state and synchronous systems with unique
initial state.
2.  


 + 2 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems with perfect recall and
systems with perfect recall with a unique starting state.
3.  


 + 1 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems with perfect recall and
synchronicity and systems with perfect recall, synchronicity and unique initial state.
4.  


 + 3 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems with no learning.
5.  


 + 2 + 3 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems with no learning
and perfect recall.
6.  


 + 4 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems with no learning and
synchronicity.
7.  


 + 1 + 4 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems with no learning,
perfect recall and synchronicity.
8.  


 + 1 + 4 +

 



 



is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to systems
with no learning, synchronicity and unique initial state and with respect to systems with no
learning, synchronicity, unique initial state and perfect recall.
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All the logics defined above are also decidable and results on their complexity are pre-
sented in [HMV97].
The above is an important class of results for interactions between knowledge and time.
By adding group properties of knowledge it is possible to enrich the axiomatisation. It
should be noted though that in some cases by adding common knowledge completeness
may be lost and an accurate analysis is required.
1.3.2.3.3 The BDI framework. The BDI framework [RG91, Rao96, RG98] is a rich and
powerful logical framework that has been developed for more than five years mainly by
Anand Rao and Michael Georgeff at the Australian Artificial Intelligence Institute. The BDI
model focuses on three components of an agent: its beliefs, desires and intentions.
The BDI framework is defined on the branching time logic CTL . For the purposed of
this work here we only describe the static fragment of BDI logics, so no temporal evolution
will be present (for further references see [RG98]).
The language is a propositional modal language with three families of modal operators
 



 










. The belief operator is the one described in Section 1.3.1.2, the intention
operator

is the one described in Section 1.3.1.3. Formulae 

are read as “agent

desires
to bring about

”.
The semantics is given through standard Kripke frames. Three families of accessibility
relations are defined, one for belief,

 


, one for intention,




, and one for desire,




.
The binary relations
 
are Euclidean, transitive and serial, the relations for intention

and
desires

are serial.
Although Rao and Georgeff suggest that axioms need to be tailored to the specific appli-
cation, they do suggest a family of logics for which they prove completeness. All these are
based on a logic that contains a KD45 fragment for belief and two KD fragments for desire
and intention. The key assumption of the BDI framework are that:
“Intentions are stronger than desires and desires are stronger than beliefs”.
([Rao96], page 7)
The three families of relations are linked by the following two conditions:
1. For any




 



;
2. For any








.
Interpretation is defined in the usual way described in Section 1.2.
The following is a sound and complete axiomatisation of the modal logic with respect to
the class of frames described above:
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It would be reductive to say that BDI logics are confined to the above framework. In fact
for the static case many more logics are studied in [Rao96], where more interaction axioms
are studied. [RG98] contains sound and complete axiomatisations for the dynamic case,
where the authors allow for the syntax to express temporal CTL -style as well as mentalistic
operators. We do not discuss this issue here.
1.4 Knowledge sharing among a community of agents
In the previous section we reviewed some of the best known MAS theories and we stressed
the need of expressing interactions between mental attitudes of the agents. We observed
that in order to build fully-fledged MAS the different mental attitudes of agents cannot be
specified as being independent from each other as we need to express interactions between
belief and knowledge (as in case study 1 of Section 1.3.2.3.1), between desire and intention
(as in Section 1.3.2.3.3 for example), etc.
All the examples of interactionwe reviewed in Section 1.3.2.3 were heterogeneous in type
and homogeneous in subject. What I mean by that is that all the interactions (in the sense
of Figure 1.5) involved were between different mental attitudes of the same agent. But there is
another type of interaction that we have not discussed yet which is homogeneous in type
and heterogeneous in subject. This is an interaction that involves the same mental attitude of
different agents. An example will clarify the issue.
Consider a group of agents whose abilities involve some sort of communication13. Surely,
communication involves information passing among the agents involved. In any scenario in
which agents are co-ordinating towards a goal to be accomplished (for example selling and
buying goods in an electronic commerce scenario as in [CM96]), the intentions of one agent
change depending on the intentions of the others. Put it in different words, an interaction
between the agents’ intentions is present and so we need capture it.
We have a choice here. We could either use a fine grain of abstraction and implement
every message passing activity (using the formal model presented in Section 4 of [FHMV95]
for example) that produces the interactions between the intentions in the system, or, instead,
we could take a high level approach and limit ourselves to express the relation that origi-
nates from this between the agents’ intentions. Each approach has different advantages and
disadvantages; by choosing the former we have more expressivity, by following the latter
we can avoid being bogged down with too many details and it will be easier to examine
properties of intention.
13Communication has been represented formally in [CP79], [CL90]; the key idea of these works is that com-
municative utterances are actions (indeed that idea can be dated back to [Aus62]). Automated massage passing
systems, a class of communicating MAS modelled by a variant of interpreted systems based on actions, have
been formalised in [FHMV95] as in other papers by Halpern and Vardi. For the purposes of this introduction we
need not discuss these issues.
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Whatever grain of detail we decide to employ, which should ultimately depend on what
of these aspects we value most, we need to be able to specify this kind of heterogeneous
interaction.
1.4.1 Degrees of knowledge sharing
Above we have seen an informal example of interaction between the intentions of differ-
ent agents. For similar reasons, studies of interactions between other mental attitudes are
equally in need.
This thesis is a study of interactions between the knowledge of agents in a MAS.
In practical AI the importance of interaction of the knowledge of agents is quite evident
as we need theories able to express scenarios in which the agents are conceptually different.
For example, consider a distributed system composed by a group of agents and the two
following situations:
One agent knowing everything the others know. An agent
 
is the central processing unit
of a distributed system of agents whose non-specialised entities transmit their knowl-
edge to a central unit
 14.
Linear order in agents’ private knowledge. Several processes with the same information at
disposal but different computational power are running the same program. Under
certain assumptions, it is reasonable to assume that the knowledge of the agents, seen
as knowledge bases, increases with the order of computational power at disposal.
These are only two of the many scenarios we can think of in which general pattern of inter-
actions are needed to specify knowledge in a MAS. As we shall see in this thesis, the theme
of interaction between knowledge of agents is also theoretically quite interesting.
If there is interaction of knowledge in the group, it means that knowledge is effectively
being shared in the group of agents. By this I do not mean that agents have exactly the same
data structures and that they do not have a private core of personal knowledge because if
this happened they would no longer be autonomous and so they would not comply with the
definition of agent we gave on page 10. What I mean is that they share some information
about the environment. As we will see there are many degrees to which knowledge can be
shared in a MAS.
1.4.2 The content of this thesis
In this work I will present some results to the problem of modelling knowledge sharing by
taking different perspectives.
Given our discussion so far, there are three main approaches that we could take to model
a MAS in which knowledge is being shared:
1. Specify the evolution of the system,
2. Give an axiomatic account of the logic describing the system,
14For example, this conceptual scenario has been successfully used to obtain encouraging preliminary results
on the problem of collective map making for robotic agents [dMAE

97].
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Chapter 5
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 4
Chapter 6
Figure 1.6: The chapters of this thesis classified according to their content.
3. Give a semantical account of the logic describing the system.
Figure 1.6 classifies the chapters of this thesis according to this classification (some chapters
span over more than one of the classes).
The first approach is quite low-level. It involves formally describing the evolution of the
MAS, for example by describing any form of communication that takes place and spelling
out how this affects the knowledge of the agents in the system. From our previous analysis
good candidates for this are variants of the framework of interpreted systems that we de-
scribed in Section 1.3.1.4: the formal tool developed in [Mey96] and the notion of context in
[FHMV95] seem good choices here. This is a dynamic model, i.e. rules for state transition
will have to be specified.
The axiomatic approach is radically different, as it completely ignores how knowledge
sharing is achieved but it only focuses on what logic describes the system at any time point.
Differently from above, here we have the choice of whether or not to implement time ex-
plicitly. We can either specify the temporal evolution of knowledge or focus on its static
properties. In this work we will follow this second option; given the discussion carried out
so far, it is clear that extensions of the logic S5 with opportune interaction axioms are a good
choice here.
The semantic approach sits in the middle of the two. It offers a description which is
quite low level but avoids all the details of the full descriptive approach. Again, we have the
choice of modelling temporal epistemic change (along the lines of [EV98] and [HMT94] for
example) or focus on the static property of knowledge. In accordance to the previous point
we will opt for a static analysis. Two candidates seem promising here: Kripke models and
static interpreted systems.
There certainly is an interconnection between these three approaches, but it should be
stressed that it is not the case that any description of a MAS carried out in one of the three
formalisms above can be translated into one in another class. For example, there are cer-
tainly many evolution descriptions of the distributed-AI scenarios described above, quite
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simply because the knowledge could be sent and processed in many different ways while
still producing the same macroscopic phenomenon.
Therefore if one were to investigate theoretically a MAS and would like to be able to
identify descriptions of it in all the three classes (in order to provide a formal basis for val-
idation and verification), he would quite simply be left with the question of which class to
use initially to describe the MAS before attempting to translate the obtained specification in-
to the another class. Is it better to employ a logic, a semantic, or a more low-level evolution
description? I will not answer this general question in this thesis, but we will analyse the
three cases.
Still, in this work one successful investigation is carried out where we will be able to
identify representatives of a MAS specification in each of these classes. Crucially this will
be possible by starting from the semantics of the MAS in analysis. Indeed in Chapter 2 we
will study the semantics of a class of MAS (that we call hypercubes) for which this corre-
spondence can be drawn. In Chapter 3 we will give their corresponding logic system by
presenting their complete and decidable axiomatisation and in the last section of the same
chapter we briefly present part of some joint work with Ron van der Meyden, University
of Technology (Sydney) on a description of hypercubes in a low-level formal language that
allows us to represent actions and communication. By drawing this correspondence we will
observe that hypercubes are MAS that share information in a peculiar way (Chapter 3), and
that this is the result of the agents being able to send information (and therefore to exchange
knowledge) by doing broadcasting (Section 3.8).
The axiomatisation of hypercubes developed in Chapter 3 will itself raise more question-
s about other interaction axioms of agents sharing information. We will answer many of
these questions in Chapter 4 by proving completeness and decidability of many other class-
es of MAS. Chapter 4 is therefore to be regarded as both in the logic and in the semantics
conceptual classes.
Having done this, in Chapter 5 we will leave the proof theory and go back to a more
descriptive analysis of how to represent and update epistemic scenarios of MAS. A key ex-
ample here will be again about communication and how knowledge is shared following
communication acts, including an analysis of how common knowledge is affected.
We will conclude in Chapter 6 by going back to logic and semantics and discuss on a
much higher level whether in the future methods to produce complete and decidable ax-
iomatisation of MAS that rely on abstract results about combination of logics, will become
available and if so what impacts this will have on the area. This will mainly be a review of
the literature in the area and I will propose my personal view.
The chapters of this thesis can be ordered according to the level of abstraction (see Fig-
ure 1.6). The last chapter is indeed the most abstract of all in this document since it is about
techniques according to which logic specification can be produced. Following this order,
Chapters 4 and 3 (being mainly about logic systems) would then follow; Chapters 2 and
Chapters 5 are progressively more low-level.
There is a last but still quite important point I would like to make before moving to the
technical core of this work. Although set in the cultural framework of MAS theories, most
of the formal tools employed here are from modal logic and I would like to think this thesis
as having a contribution to the field of modal logic itself.
In fact, by taking a radically different perspective we can see these pages as a formal
investigation on some properties of multi-modal logics. For some reason this theme has not
really received the attention it really deserves, even if Dana Scott nearly 30 years ago wrote
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the following important passage:
[The exclusive study of mono-modal systems] is what I consider one of the
biggest mistakes of all in modal logic: concentration on a system with just one
modal operator. The only way to have any philosophically significant results
in deontic or epistemic logics is to combine those operators with: tense opera-
tors (otherwise how can you formulate theories of change?); the logical operators
(otherwise how can you compare the relative with the absolute?); the operators
of historical or physical necessity (otherwise how can you relate the agent with
its environment?); and so on and so on.
([Sco70], page 161).
Indeed it could be said that this thesis is about extensions of the multi-modal logic S5 .
Chapter 3 contains some axiomatisation problems for several special classes of equivalence
frames and an example of a same modal system being complete and decidable with respect
to many different classes of Kripke frames. The logic we will study there resembles the log-
ic S4.2 and indeed it refers to a class of frames that will remind us of convergent frames.
In Chapter 4 a systematic study of interaction axioms for extensions of S5 is carried out,
providing some insights into how far we can push S5 before it collapses into the logic Triv.
Chapter 5 can be seen as an investigation on multi-modal Kripke semantics itself and com-
pares the effectiveness of Kripke frames to Kripke trees and provides a formal algorithm
for performing updates on Kripke trees. In Chapter 6, although we review general tech-
niques of combining logics, the focus will be on their potential for proving completeness
and decidability in the multi-modal case. Finally, Chapter 2 can be seen an investigation into
the relation between interpreted systems and Kripke models, the two commonly preferred
semantics on which S5 is defined.
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Publication note. Except where acknowledged, all the results presented in this thesis
constitute original research carried out by the author. Many of these results appear in pro-
ceedings of international journals, conferences or are in preparation for submission.
More specifically, the correspondence between hypercube systems and Kripke models
presented in Chapter 2 appeared in [LR98d] in the Proceedings of the AI97 Workshop on
Theoretical and Practical Foundation of Intelligent Agents, Perth (Western Australia).
The main results of Chapter 3 on the axiomatisation of hypercube systems was presented
as full paper [LR98b] at the European Conference of Artificial Intelligence in Brighton (UK)
in August 1998; a longer version of that paper, inclusive of all the mathematical proofs,
appeared as technical report [LR98a] of the School of Computer Science of the University of
Birmingham. A journal submission [LMR99] focused on the characteristics of homogeneous
broadcasting systems is in preparation.
The results concerning the spectrum of knowledge sharing reported in Chapter 4 will
also appear, in a much shortened version, in a research paper [LR99b] in the Proceedings of
the Sixth International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-
99). An extended version of that paper with decidability results is in preparation ([LHR99]).
A preliminary approach on the issues of refining and updating Kripke models, which
largely constitute Chapter 5, was presented in [LR98c]. An extended version [LR99a] of that
work, whose technical content is largely similar to the above mentioned chapter, appeared
in April 1999 in the Journal of Artificial Intelligence for Engineering Design, Analysis and
Manufacturing.
Finally, Chapter 6 builds upon one of the author’s progress reports [Lom97] and parts
of it appear in a forthcoming journal submission [Lom99] to the International Journal of
Knowledge Engineering Review.
Chapter 2
Hypercube systems
2.1 Introduction
In Section 1.4.2 we motivated the need for investigating classes of MAS whose knowledge is
related by interaction patterns. In the same section we argued that there are three conceptual
areas in which we can carry out an investigation: by means of a low-level description of a
system, by specifying its semantics or, more intuitively, by giving an axiomatisation. In
section 1.3 we have explored some possibilities.
As we argued, it is not clear whether for a given system we can find an appropriate
description for it in each of these categories. What is clear is that having one-to-one cor-
respondences between different formalisms expressing the same MAS at different level of
abstraction would be an advantage. This is so because it would enable us to choose the ap-
propriate level of description depending on the kind of properties we want to specify, verify
or, simply, reason about. Consider for example a case of agents communicating to acquire
knowledge about the environment. If we wanted to check some properties of their knowl-
edge, we would be inclined to reason on their axiomatisation, but if we needed to examine
the sequence of communication actions being performed, we would instead reason on the
low-level description of the system.
In this and in the following two chapters we will study hypercube systems, a particular
kind of ideal agents of knowledge (Section 1.3.1.1), for which these correspondences can be
drawn. We will achieve this result by starting from the semantics1 that describes them, i.e. a
variant of static interpreted systems.
In this chapter our only task is to understand how hypercube systems relate to Kripke
models. The reason why we will do this is the following. Recall from Section 1.3.1.1 that
two semantics are available for the case of knowledge in MAS: Kripke models and interpre-
ted systems. The latter present the advantage of being more intuitive (as shown in the case
study of Section 1.3.2.3.2), the former come with an heritage of techniques (summarised in
Section 1.2.4) which are extremely useful to prove properties of the formalisation. Because
of this observation, the ideal scenario of investigation is one in which we anchor our specifi-
cation to interpreted systems but retain the possibility of proving properties about them by
means of the more technically explored Kripke models.
We prepare the grounds for this investigation in this chapter where we formally relate
1Indeed this is the most commonly used method in Computer Science to define a class of systems. This is so
because it is conceptually close to the system, while it already has the advantage of being formal.
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interpreted systems
Static
models
Equivalence
Semantics
Figure 2.1: The content of this chapter. The arrows represent the correspondence that is
drawn between particular classes of equivalence models and static interpreted systems.
hypercube systems to a special class of Kripke models (see Figure 2.1). The main result here
is to find the semantic equivalents of hypercube systems in the class of equivalence Kripke
models. This will allow us to continue our study in Chapter 3 where, by axiomatising the
corresponding class of Kripke frames, we will show that hypercube systems constitute a
semantic class of agents that share part of their knowledge.
The methodology employed here could possibly be extended for mapping other classes
of interpreted systems to Kripke semantics, but it is worth stressing that the analysis carried
out here only applies to the case of hypercube systems.
2.2 Definition of hypercube systems
Recall from Section 1.3.2.3.2 the definition of interpreted system. These are defined to give
an account of the temporal evolution of a system by defining runs over global states. If we fix
the time of an interpreted system to analyse static properties of its global states, we simply
obtain a pair of global states with an interpretation, i.e. what we called static interpreted
systems (Definition 1.5). In Section 1.3.1.1 we discussed how to represent knowledge in
a static interpreted system. This essentially involves generating an equivalence model by
using the construction given in Definition 1.6 for the case that the predicate




is the
equality on local states for agent

, as we discussed in more detail on page 24.
In order to introduce hypercube systems we discuss an example of a static interpreted
system. Figure 2.2 shows the underlying structures of a static interpreted system and its
corresponding generated model2. As expected, we find that two global states are related for
agent

if agent

has the same local state in the two global states. In the example we can see
that at any state no agent knows the local state of the environment. In fact, for any global
state each agent considers the possibility of another global state in which the environment
2For simplicity the reflexive links are not illustrated. Also in Figure 2.2 the relations are the transitive closure
of the ones depicted.
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Figure 2.2: An example of the underlying structure of a static interpreted system and its
corresponding generated frame. For simplicity the reflexive links are not illustrated and
intended to be the transitive closure of the ones depicted.
has a different local state. This is not surprising at all, as we assumed that agents know only
about their local states. Local states can encode some information about the environment
but this has to be considered not totally observable.
More importantly, in the global state












, the top left state in the figure, agent 1
considers two global states possible:












and












. In both of these global states
agent 2’s configuration is the same. So in that global state agent 1 has complete information
about agent 2, i.e. when in the system is in that global state agent 1 knows agent 2’s local
state.
The converse of this situation is when an agent has no information at all about another.
This happens in the example for agent 2 in the global state












. In this case not only
agent 2 considers the possibility of another global state where agent 1 is in the local state

, but also agent 1 has no information about possible dependencies between agent 1’s local
state and the environment’s. As it can be verified in the example all the global states of
the Cartesian product






, where the local states are defined in the figure, are
effectively present.
Hypercube systems are static interpreted systems in which all the agents at all global
states are in the situation of agent 2 at












. Interestingly, although they have no infor-
mation about each other’s local states, we will note at the end of Chapter 3 that they still
share some knowledge. Formally, hypercube systems result by considering the admissible
state space of the MAS to be described by the full Cartesian product of its sets of local s-
tates. This means that every global state is in principle possible, i.e. there are no mutually
exclusive configurations between local states. With hypercubes systems we are imposing a
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further simplification on the notion of static interpreted system presented in Definition 1.5:
in the tuples representing the configuration of the system we do not consider a slot for the
environment. The presence of the environment in the notion of Fagin et al. [FHMV95] is
motivated in order to keep track of the changes in the system and in general to represent
everything that cannot be captured by the local states of the single agents (most important-
ly messages in transit, etc.). This restriction is equivalent to analysing tuples in which the
environment is constant. We will reintroduce the environment in Section 3.8 where we will
discuss a low-level formal model for hypercube systems, in which we will introduce actions
for the agents and the environment.
So, the following are our formal definitions for hypercube system.
Definition 2.1 (Hypercube states). A hypercube state, or hypercube, is a Cartesian product 
 






 , where

 are non-empty sets of local states. The class of hypercube systems
is denoted by.
Definition 2.2 (Hypercube systems). A hypercube system is a static interpreted system  
 

 




, where is a hypercube state. The class of hypercube systems is denoted by

.
Static interpreted systems were defined in Definition 1.5.
2.3 Maps between hypercubes and equivalence frames
The aim of this section is to relate semantically hypercube systems to Kripke models. More
specifically, we would like to identify the class of Kripke models that satisfy exactly the
same formulae satisfied by hypercube systems. Given the notion of validity of formulae on
static interpreted systems and Kripke models of Definitions 1.7 and 1.3, it is appropriate to
compare the two underlying semantic structures: hypercube states and Kripke frames.
We noted in Definition 1.6 that static interpreted systems can be seen as a special class of
Kripke models. In Section 1.3.1.1 we noted that for the case of knowledge, these generated
models are equivalence models. Since hypercube systems are a special case of static inter-
preted systems for knowledge, it is reasonable to think that they also generate a special case
of equivalence Kripke models. In order to clarify the relationship, we define and analyse
mappings between the two underlying structures. Specifically we proceed as follows.
We define a map
 
from hypercubes to equivalence Kripke frames.
We define a map

from equivalence Kripke frames to hypercubes.
We analyse the compositions of the mapsand.
We isolate the images ofin.
Hypercubes and frames are always defined over a setofagents, which we assume as
given.
Every hypercube generates a frame [FHMV95]:
Definition 2.3 (Hypercubes to frames). The function 

that maps the hypercube 
onto the Kripke frame

 

is defined as follows:
If 
 






 ,

 

 







 








 

, whereis defined as:







 












 

if and only if


 

.
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Definition 2.3 basically expresses the construction we saw in Definition 1.6 for non-
interpreted structures in the case of knowledge (






	being a family of equality predicates
on the local states of the agent in question as discussed above). It is clear from the defini-
tion that 

 

is an equivalence frame. What is less obvious is that it is a very particular
equivalence frame. In fact the following holds.
Lemma 2.4. If is a hypercube, and 

 

 










 

is the frame defined from it by
Definition 2.3, then
1.  	
 


;
2. For any

 in

there exists a worldsuch that,

 




.
Proof. For 1, Consider any two elements 
 







 





 









 

in

such that


 


	





. Then for all

in,







 












 

. Therefore by definition, for all

in,


 

, that is
 


.
For 2, consider any 
 









 






 









 





 
 


 





 
 

. Let

 














 
 

. By Definition 2.3, the elementis in

and for each

,.
This shows that the Kripke frames that we build from hypercubes by means of the stan-
dard technique (Definition 1.6) constitute a proper subset of all the possible reflexive, sym-
metric and transitive Kripke frames. To relate the two semantic classes, we have to analyse
the two properties expressed in Lemma 2.4.
The first one says that in a frame generated by a hypercube there cannot be two distinct
states related by all the equivalence relations. This follows from the fact that the environment
is constant in our formalism.
The second property reflects the fact that hypercubes are full Cartesian products. The
property expresses the circumstance that for every pair of points in thedimensional space
of the images of the hypercubes, there are

ways to connect them in two steps. Indeed, we
can change

coordinates inpossible ways and change the last one in the last step.
Given these differences between the class of hypercubes and equivalence frames, it is
likely that the two semantic structures satisfy different formulae. We will come back to this
point in the next chapter.
It is also possible to generate a hypercube from a frame:
Definition 2.5 (Frames to hypercubes). The function

maps a frame 
 










 

onto the hypercube

 

 










 .
We now have defined maps between the two semantic structures. Our aim is to use them
to identify the class of equivalence frames that are semantically equivalent, i.e. that satisfy
the same formulae, to hypercubes. In order to do so, we introduce a notion of isomorphism
onand. Many notions (such as p-morphisms or bisimulations for frames) may be ap-
propriate for this task, but for our aimswe need a strong equivalence between the structures.
Consider two MAS. If we can draw a bijection between the agents of the MAS such that
the local states of the corresponding agents are themselves in a bijection, then in a way we
can think that one MAS can simulate the other, and so the two MAS can be thought as being
equivalent. We formalise this as follows:
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Definition 2.6 (Isomorphism of hypercubes). Two hypercubes 
 






 , 

 








 are isomorphic ( 
 
 
 

) if 
 



for

 




.
To reason about equivalent frames we take the standard notion of isomorphism (Defini-
tion 1.11).
We can prove that the maps we defined preserve isomorphisms:
Lemma 2.7. If 
 
 
 

, then

 


 
 


 


.
Proof. Let 
 






 , and 

 








 . Since 
 
 
 

there is a family of
bijections
 






. Consider
   




 
 . The function
 
is a bijection, and therefore
the universes of the frames

 

and

 


are in a bijection.
Consider now
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such that




 , and
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
 

. Consider
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
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. Since, by definition,
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 

, then
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
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
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

and therefore
 
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
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
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
.
Let now be
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





 




. Then, by definition
 





  






and then


 

, that implies





.
Lemma 2.8. If 
 
 
 

, then

 


 
 


 


.
Proof. Consider two isomorphic frames  
 





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
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


 
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 

and
consider the induced bijection
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

between

and


. We want to prove that
there is a family of bijectionsbetween the components of

 

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 is well defined. In fact, let 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 is injective. 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The function is surjective. Consider 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Figure 2.3 shows the preservation of isomorphisms under and between frames and
hypercubes as proved Lemmas 2.7 and 2.8. Since we want to import and export results from
one structure into the other, this is the result we need.
2.4 Composition of maps between hypercubes and Kripke frames
We now investigate the extent to which the composition of with(respectivelywith )
results in a hypercube (respectively frame) which is isomorphic to the one we started with.
We do this for two reasons. First we want to check whether by going back and forth between
the two class of structures we lose information, i.e. the structure we obtain satisfies different
formulae from the original one. Secondly, this will help us to prove a general the result on
the correspondence between hypercubes and equivalence frames. We operate as follows.
Given a hypercube 
 






 , consider the image under of 


 

. Let
 
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

 be the image underof

 

. We want
to investigate the relationship between and 

.
Theorem 2.9. For any hypercube in, 
 
 

 


 

.
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Figure 2.3: Preservation of isomorphisms under the maps.
Proof. We prove that
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










 



 













 


.
See also Figure 2.4. In other words, if we start from a hypercube , and consider the
generated Kripke frame

 

, it is still possible to extract all the information from the frame
by applying the functionthat produces another system 

, which is in a bijection with the
original .
Corollary 2.10. For any hypercube inand formula



, 
 

if and only if 

 


 

.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.9, Definition 1.7, Lemma 2.7 and Lemma 1.12.
We now investigate the other side of the relation. Consider a frame  and its image
under , 

 

. If we take the image under of 

 

, that frame will satisfy the properties
stated by Lemma 2.4 and therefore will not in general be isomorphic to .
What we can prove is the following (See also Figure 2.4):
Lemma 2.11. If is a frame such that there exists a hypercube , with 
 
 


 

, then 
 
 

 


 

.
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Figure 2.4: Compositions of maps between frames and hypercubes as in Theorem 2.9 and
Lemma 2.11.
Proof. By Lemma 2.8,  

 


 
 


 

. By Theorem 2.9 and transitivity

 


 
 
 . Con-
sider now and 

 

: by Lemma 2.7, 

 


 
 

 


 

. But by hypothesis, 

 


 
 
 ,
therefore 
 
 

 


 

.
Similarly to the situation on hypercubes, we have the following.
Corollary 2.12. If is a frame such that there exists a hypercube , with 
 
 


 

, then for any


we have that 
 

if and only if 

 


 

.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.11 and Lemma 1.12.
We now proceed to identify what are these frames for which Lemma 2.11 holds. For
example, consider a frame 
 










 

such that 	
 


. The frame 

 

is not in general be isomorphic to . As an example, consider:
 
 

















































We need to restrict our attention to both the properties inherited from the mapping from
hypercubes.
Theorem 2.13. If 
 










 

is a frame such that:

 



 


,








 



such that,

 




;
then 
 
 

 


 

.
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Proof. Consider the frame  

 

 











 










 

built according to
Definition 2.5 and Definition 2.3. Let now

be a mapping














 ,
defined by




 















. We prove that

is a bijection.
Injective: suppose





 




, i.e.
















 
















. There-
fore, for all

, 







, but since 
 


, it must be
 

.
Surjective: consider any element












 




in










 . By hypothe-
sis on , there exists a worldin

, such that 



 





, for each

 




. Therefore











 




 














 



.
Nowwe prove thatin if and only if













in 

 

. Suppose

, that is 



 





; by definition of, this is equivalent to





































.
This proves that and 

 

are isomorphic.
Theorem 2.13 and Lemma 2.4 allow us to characterise the frames that are images of some
hypercube. In fact, let us call the class of frames that satisfy property 1 and 2 of Lemma
2.4.
Definition 2.14. Let be the class of equivalence frames that satisfy properties:
1.  	
 


;
2. For any

 in

there exists a pointsuch that,

 





We can now prove that:
Theorem 2.15. Given a frame , the following are equivalent:
1.  


 ,
2. there exists a hypercube , such that 
 
 


 

.
Proof. 1 implies 2: Under these conditions by Theorem 2.13, 
 
 

 


 

. That is:  
 


 

.
2 implies 1: By Lemma 2.4 the frame

 

has the properties expressed by proposition 1.
But is isomorphic to 

 

and therefore it has those properties as well.
Theorem 2.15 characterises the frames that we obtain by applying the map to the class
of hypercubes. Every member of this class of frames is isomorphic to a system and a frame
not included in this class is not.
Given Definition 1.7, we can now prove that:
Theorem 2.16. For all formulae

,
 

if and only if 
 

.
Proof. From right to left. If 
 

, then, since 




 , 




 

. So, by Definition 1.7

 

.
From left to right. Assume
 

, i.e. 




 

, we want to show that for any 


 ,
 
 

. By Theorem 2.13 and Definition 2.14, 
 
 




 

. But then 
 

if and only if




 


 

. But

 



, and so



 


 

, and so 
 

.
We finally have the result we aimed for, i.e. we have found the semantical class that
corresponds to hypercube systems.
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Corollary 2.17. The class of hypercube systems and Kripke models built on the class  of Kripke
frames are semantically equivalent.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose


 

and 


 

, where is the class of models
built on the class of frames. By Definition 1.7, 
 

, where is the class of models
generated by

. But by hypothesis there is a modelbuilt on a frame 


 such that



 

. So, 


 

. So, by Theorem 2.16


 

. Therefore



 

which is absurd.
For the other direction, suppose



 

and 
 

, where is the class of models
built on the class of frames. So there is a hypercube system  such that the generated
model(see Definition 1.6 and Definition 1.7) is such that


 

. Therefore by
Definition 1.7 there is a hypercube 


such that 


 

. So by Theorem 2.16 there is a
frame 


 , such that 


 

. Therefore we have 


 

and so 


 

, which is contrary
to our assumption.
Theorems 2.15 and 2.16 together with Corollary 2.17 completely characterise hypercube
systems.
We can now benefit from this result by axiomatising the class of Kripke frames which
are technically more explored in the literature. By Corollary 2.17 this will also be an axioma-
tisation for hypercube systems.
Chapter 3
Axiomatisation of hypercube systems
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we introduced the class of hypercube systems as an interesting special case
of static interpreted systems. We argued that hypercube systems represent MAS in which
agents have no information about each other’s state. The main result of Section 2 was con-
tained in Theorem 2.16 and Corollary 2.17, in which we proved that hypercubes and hy-
percube systems are semantically equivalent to special classes of Kripke frames and Kripke
models respectively.
We can now take stock of this position and ask the following question. What proper-
ties of knowledge do hypercube systems satisfy? Of course we would like to answer this
question in a precise way, i.e. by presenting an axiomatisation. Now that we have the coun-
terparts of hypercube systems in the class of Kripke models (i.e. the class of models built on
the class of frames) we can ask that question in this semantic class; indeed this is the topic
of this chapter as shown in Figure 3.1. This has the advantage of being a standard axiomati-
sation problem known in modal logic for which we can use some of techniques presented in
Section 1.2.4.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we will examine the correspondence
problem (as defined in Theorem 1.19) for the class of frames  of Definition 2.14. In Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4 we will prove completeness for a logic system with respect to this class of
frames. In Section 3.5 we will prove decidability. In Section 3.6 we will provide alternative
axiomatisations by subsequently proving completeness with respect to three different logics.
In Section 3.7 we will use these axiomatisations to understand how hypercubes share part
of their knowledge. Finally in Section 3.8 we will report a result that explains the low-level
mechanism that produces the results discussed in the rest of the chapter.
Assume a set of agents. We recall that is the class of equivalence frames satisfying the
two properties of Definition 2.14 that, independently from equivalence relations, we define
as follows:
Definition 3.1 (I). A frame  
 










is an I frame (or  has the identity-intersection
property) if 	


 


.
Definition 3.2 (D). A frame  
 










is an D frame (or  is -Directed) if for all






 



there exists a point



such that


for

 




.
It is immediate to observe the following:
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Semantics
 
  S5WD 
Logics
Figure 3.1: The content of the main part of this chapter. The solid arrowed line between 
and the logic


 represents the completeness result that we will achieve in this chapter.
The dashed arrow line between the classes andrepresents the equivalence we proved
in the previous chapter.
Lemma 3.3. If a frame isD, then it is alsoD, for any

.
A few conventions. We sometimes will say that is a D frame to mean that it is anD
frame, whereis exactly the number of the relations of . A DI frame is a frame which
is both D and I. Now that we have names for the properties of the class of frames , in the
followingwewill use themore immediate symbol
 
to represent . Since wewill only be
referring to knowledge, we can also switch back to the usual notation for modal operators,
i.e.for .
3.2 Correspondences
When facing the problem of axiomatising a class of frames (as in this chapter) it is often
useful to try and understand whether the semantic constraints of the frames in study cor-
respond to the validity of certain axiom schemas. So, a promising start would be for us to
prove correspondence results of the shape of Theorem 1.19. Should we achieve this, those
axioms would be our first bet to prove completeness.
In this case, unfortunately the two semantic properties have no modal correspondences
at all.
Lemma 3.4. Ifis not a singleton, then no modal formula corresponds to property I, even in the
case of equivalence frames.
Proof. Suppose the opposite and assume there is a formula

that corresponds to property
I, i.e. 
 

if and only if is I. Consider the frame 

in Figure 3.2. The frame 

is an I
frame, so 


 

. Consider now the frame and a function

 

 such thatmaps
points in according to the names in the Figure. It is easy to see thatis a p-morphism
(Definition 1.13) from 

to . Since p-morphisms preserve validity on frames (as reported
in Lemma 1.14), we have that 
 

. But is not an I frame and we have a contradiction.
Since 
 

are equivalence frames, the second part follows too.
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a 1,2
b 1
2 2  

b
b
 
a
a 1
Figure 3.2: Two p-morphic frames used in the proof of Lemma 3.4.
a b
 
1 2 dc
 

Figure 3.3: Two equivalence (the relations are intended to be reflexive) directed frames such
that their disjoint union is not directed as in Lemma 3.5.
A similar result can be proven for property D.
Lemma 3.5. No modal formula corresponds to n-directedness.
Proof. Suppose the opposite and assume there is a formula

that corresponds to n-directed-
ness, i.e.  
 

if and only if is D. Consider two disjoint frames,  
 










and
 

 












,




 

, such that both and 

are n-directed (for example see the
two equivalence frames based on two relations of Figure 3.3). Since by assumption 
 

and 


 

, then 

 


 

. But, then

is valid on a frame, which, in general, is not
n-directed, which is opposite to what we assumed at the beginning.
As an aside, we note that these results may not hold in some extension of the formal
language. For example, consider the operator of distributed knowledge as described in Sec-
tion 1.3.2.2. Recall that a formula 	

is interpreted by associating the relation
 
 


	


to the operator 	.
Lemma 3.6. An equivalence frame is I if and only if 
 

 
 
	

.
Proof. Left to right. Letbe a model based on such that
 



. Since
 
 


	


 


, then
 


 
	

. Analogously, suppose
 


 
	

. Since 

 


	





implies

 


, then
 



.
Right to left. Suppose 
 

 
 
	

and that for all






. Take a valuationsuch
that



 




. Since

 





 




 
 
	
and

 





 



, we have

 





 



 
	
and
so 

 


	
. But since



 




, it must be that
 

.
This lemma is a quite surprising result: in hypercube systems the notion of distributed
knowledge collapses to the truth of the formula. Note that this relies on the simplification
to consider global states that do not represent the environment. Notwithstanding this, the
same result would have been achieved had we considered a MAS whose environment is
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constant, i.e. set of states for the environment composed by a singleton. We now return to
the basic language defined in Section 1.2.1 without the operator 	.
So far, we proved that there is no correspondence to be found neither on D frames nor on
I frames. Note that this also applies to the intersection of these two classes, i.e. to DI frames.
In fact the proof of Lemma 3.4 can still be used in this case, as the frame 

in Figure 3.2 is
actually a DI frame, while the frame is not (quite simply because it is not an I frame). In
other words, we have the following.
Corollary 3.7. No modal formula corresponds to property D and I, even in the case of equivalence
frames.
This might mean that equivalence DI frames can be axiomatised quite simply by S5 ,
that would imply that the modal syntax we are using is unable to distinguish between e-
quivalence and equivalence DI frames. In turn, this would imply that the properties of
knowledge that hypercubes enjoy are nothing more than the ones of ideal agents (discussed
on page 1.3.1.1).
We can prove that the above is not the case, as directed frames validate more formulae
than just S5 . To see that, consider the following:
Lemma 3.8. If is an equivalence D frame, then 
 
 







 


, where



 






 











 
 





.1
Proof. For a contradiction suppose that 


 
 







 


. Then there exists a point
and a valuationsuch that

 





 


 








 


. Therefore theremust exist two points

andsuch thatandand

 





 






and

 





 


	




. But by
Lemma 3.3 there exists a pointsuch thatand. Since

 





 






, we
have

 





 



, but this contradicts

 





 


	




that requiresto satisfy

.
It is easy to check that the axiom in Lemma 3.8 is not generally valid on the class of equiv-
alence frames. In Figure 3.4, the modeldoes not satisfy in the point the formula
 







 
 . Indeed we can also notice that also the formula of Lemma 3.6 is also not
valid in general on equivalence frames (see the point in the modelshown in Fig-
ure 3.4).
So, agents modelled by semantic structures that have properties D satisfy the axiom of
Lemma 3.8. This axiom says that if the agents described by hypercubes have the property
that if agent

considers possible that agent
 
knows

, than agent
 
knows that agent

considers

to be possible. This is a constraint on the agents’ knowledge because it implies
that two agents

and
 
cannot be in a situation in which

considers that
 
might know a fact
and
 
considers that

might know the negation of the same fact.
We are now in the position in which no correspondence can be found for property D
(Lemma 3.5), still we know that D frames satisfy some formulae that are not generally valid
on equivalence frames (Lemma 3.8). We need to look at a property weaker than D.
1In the proof of Lemma 3.8 we do not use the assumption that the frame is an equivalence frame. Indeed
the lemma holds even without this assumption and property D imposes the frame to validate the axiom in
Lemma 3.8. In order not to interrupt the flow of the analysis of equivalence DI frames I find it more appropriate
to present it in this way. For equivalence frames the cases  

or

are already theorems of S5because in
that case the axiom is equivalent via Lemma 1.30 to the schema



which holds because of axiom T.
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Figure 3.4: Equivalence models not satisfying formulae in Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.8.
Definition 3.9 (WD). Let be the set of all the permutations of







without fixed-points,
i.e. if

	




	
 




 , then	

 

.
A frame 
 










is n-weakly-directed (WD) if for all points


 in

, such
that







 




and for all

	




	
 

in there exists a pointsuch that



, for
all

 




.
See Figure 3.5. Whenis clear from the context we just refer toWD just as WD. The
propertyWD for
 

(sometimes called “convergence” or “Church-Rosser”) is discussed
in, among others, [Pop94], [Cat88] and [Bal98];WD is a generalisation of it2. Note that 2WD
resembles the property of convergence for the mono-modal case;WD is a generalisation of
it both with respect of the number of pointsdeparts to and with respect to the labels.
Indeed WD is weaker than D.
Lemma 3.10. If a frame is directed then it is weakly-directed.
Property WD is particularly interesting because, differently from property D, this has a
well-defined correspondence. In fact, consider the axiom3:








	


 









 
 








 





 
 




 







 


We have the correspondence result:
2We will discuss later in Section 3.6 that the restriction oncan be lifted. For the moment it is easier to
introduce it as generalisation of the known properties above.
3Note that for

the axiomWD expresses the formula in Lemma 3.8.
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


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

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

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Figure 3.5: The propertyWD.
Lemma 3.11.  
 



if and only if is weakly-directed.
Proof. Suppose 
 



and consider


points


 of , such that







 




. Fix a permutation

	




	
 




 and consider a valuation, such that




 










for

 







. By construction we have

 





 


 









 
 








 



Then by WD,

 





 



 
 




 








, so

 





 


 




 








. So there is a world,
such that

 





 



 






. But, by construction of the interpretation, this implies



,
for

 




.
For the reverse, consider a permutation

	




	
 




 , a model

 




, and a point
, such that

 





 


 









 
 








 

. We have

 





 







, where








 







. Wewant to prove

 





 



 
 




 








, i.e. that for any point ,
such that

 

 ,

 





 


 




 








. But, since the frame is weakly-directed, there
exists a point, such that



, for

 




. But then

 





 



, for

 






,
that is

 





 




 








. So

 





 


 




 








.
3.3 Completeness of equivalence D frames
In the previous section we have proved that properties D and I have no modal correspon-
dences. To prove completeness with respect to equivalence DI frames we will proceed as
follows.
We first prove completeness of the logic4 


 
 
S5 + WD with respect to equiva-
lence WD frames (Theorem 3.12). This and Lemma 3.13 will let us prove Theorem 3.14 that
expresses completeness of the logic S5WD with respect to equivalence D frames.
4This notation was introduced on page 16.
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We start by showing that the logic S5WD is complete with respect to equivalence WD
frames5.
Theorem 3.12. The logic S5WD is sound and complete with respect to the class of equivalence WD
frames.
Proof. By Theorem 1.24 the logic S5 is sound with respect to equivalence frames. By the
second part of Lemma 3.11 we also know thatWD is valid on the class of WD frames. From
these two facts soundness follows.
To prove completeness we use the canonical model technique. We know from Theo-
rem 1.24 that S5 is complete with respect to equivalence frames. In particular S5 is canon-
ical, i.e. the canonical frame for S5 is an equivalence frame. By using arguments employed
in the literature (for example [HC96], pages 119-121, it is therefore easy to prove that the
frame 
 
 


 
 










of the canonical model for S5WD is an equivalence frame. We
show that the frame 
 
 


  is also WD. Consider


maximal S5WD -consistent sets,









 , such that, for

 




, and any permutation

	




	
 




 , we
want to prove the existence of a pointsuch that, for

 




. By definition
of the accessibility relations on the frame of the canonical model (Definition 1.21), we only
need to prove that the set


 
 















is S5WD -consistent (since, by the maximal extension lemma (Lemma 1.10) there is a max-
imal extension, which is S5WD -consistent and therefore, the frame is WD). Suppose

is not S5WD -consistent, then there are













 





 


, with


























 




 






 





 , such that

 
 


















 





 



Let us now call
 








. We have:

 
 


 










  (3.1)
which, by taking contrapositives and by necessitating bybecomes:

 
 

 



 













 
 (3.2)
Observe now that since











are in, then










is in, i.e.is
in; in general









 (3.3)
Then by construction we have 


, for

 




. So, sinceis


 -maximal
consistent, the axiom



is valid and so  


 










. So, 


 











 . So,
5The same result would follow by using Sahlqvist theorem [Sah75] and computing the resulting first-order
condition by using Kracht’s theorem [Kra91, Kra93]. Here we rely on more traditional methods.
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by maximal consistency and Equation 3.2,  



 , which by Equation 3.3, implies
that is inconsistent, contrary to the assumption. Therefore
cannot be inconsistent and
in the frame of the canonical model there must exist a pointwhich is a


 -maximal
extension of
. Therefore the frame 
 
 


  isWD.
We now strengthen the result above by showing that S5WD is sound and complete with
respect to equivalence and directed frames.
Before we can prove this result we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.13. If is an equivalence, n-weakly-directed and connected frame than it is n-directed.
Proof. In the following we assume

 
. If
 

the proof is considerably simpler and
we do not report it here. So, assume connected, n-weakly-directed and made by equiva-
lence relations. To prove that is directed we only need to prove that consideringpoints,






 in , there is a pointsuch that


 




.
a) Since is connected, reflexive, symmetric and transitive, then for every pair of points
	


	, there is chain that connects them with no repeated links: 	













 

	,
where

 


 
.
b) We prove that every chain connecting two points can be replaced by a chain of length 2
inwhich one of the relations can be chosen arbitrarily. Consider the chain	











	, connecting	to	; we want to reduce it to a chain of length 2, in which	is connected by

. Consider	

, and

reflexive relations on	. By WD there exists a pointsuch
that	







, where 	

 

. Consider now	





	

. If 	
 

we can
apply transitivity and apply what follows to 


. So, consider 	

 

, then by WD there
exists a point, such that
	

, where	

 

; by transitivity	. After at
most


similar steps we have	
 





 







	, where	
 


 

.
c) We now prove that given any two points	
	we can find a point that connects them
by two different arbitrary relations. Consider	and	, we want to connect them viaand

. By point b) there exist a pointsuch that	
	, in which

 
 
. Suppose

 

,
and apply WD to this triple by considering

relations on: there exists a pointsuch
that	
	. If 
 

we still have the result by constructingin the same way
and applying transitivity to
	.
d) Consider now the points

 , by b) and c) we have the existence of

points,






 

, such that

 



 
, for

 







. So, by transitivity,
 



 
. Consider nowand the reflexive relations on. By WD there exists a point

, such thatand, with
 
 










. Note that, by transitivity, 

















. By transitivity we also have ; consider now , by
applying WD we have the existence of a point such that, and connected to 
by all the equivalence relations but. Then , for
 
 






 



. Continuing the
construction throughout the chain
 , we identify points, such that, for

 




 


. The point  is the point, that we are interested in. In fact we have








 




. This proves that the frame is directed.
Lemma 3.13 allows us to prove that S5WD is complete with respect to equivalence D
frames.
Theorem 3.14. The logic 


 is sound and complete with respect to the class of equivalence
directed frames.
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Figure 3.6: A representation of the class of equivalence WD, D and DI frames.
Proof. Soundness follows straightforwardly by considering Lemma 3.10.
For completeness, it is sufficient to show that if a formula

is not a theorem of S5WD 
then it is not valid on a reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and directed frame. So, suppose


 
 



, then it has to exist a pointin the canonical model
 
 


  , such that
 
 


 


 



. Consider now the model
generated byfrom
 
 


  (Definition 1.17). By Lem-
ma 1.18 we have



 



and, by Theorem 3.12 the frame of
is reflexive, symmetric,
transitive and weakly-directed. But, since
is connected by construction, by Lemma 3.13
the frame is also directed and so

is not valid on the class of reflexive, symmetric, transitive
and directed frames. Therefore S5WD is complete with respect to this class of frames.
Theorem 3.14 is our first important result in order to achieve completeness of the class

 
of frames.
3.4 Completeness of equivalence DI frames
Section 3.3 ends with an important result: the logic S5WD is complete with respect to equiv-
alence directed frames, that we call ED frames from now on. This is somewhat surprising
because in the same sectionwe proved that the logic S5WD is also sound and complete with
respect to the bigger class of equivalence WD frames (or EWD frames). In this section we
will push this result even further by proving that the very same logic is sound and complete
with respect to equivalence DI (or EDI) frames as well. Indeed this is an interesting example
of the modal semantics being able to express much more than what we can axiomatise by
using modal operators. Figure 3.6 shows the classes of WD, D and DI frames in the class of
equivalence frames. Note that in terms of static interpreted systems the difference between
DI and D frames can be seen as whether in the tuples the environment is constant or not (see
Figure 2.2 and the observations we drew from it).
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Figure 3.7: An EDI frame mapping an ED frame via a p-morphism (the relations are the
reflexive and transitive closure of the ones illustrated).
In order to prove that S5WD is sound and complete with respect to equivalence DI
frames, we show that the class of equivalence D and equivalence DI frames are semantically
equivalent. To do so, in turn, we prove that any D frame can be seen as the target of a p-
morphism from a DI frame; the result will then follow in view of the fact that p-morphisms
between frames preserve validity and that DI frames are special D frames.
Consider any D frame defined onequivalence relations on its support set

. Write
for the relation 

 

; since each of the is an equivalence relation, so is. The
frame can then be viewed as the union of equivalence classes of the relation, which we
call clusters. Clusters containing more than a single point are sub-frames in which property
I clearly does not hold; in general a cluster may be infinite in size.
If we want to construct a DI frame that maps to a particular D frame by a p-morphism,
we can think of replacing every cluster of the D frame with a sub-frame that is DI but that
can still be mapped into the cluster. In Figure 3.7 it is shown the relatively simple case of a
frame composed by three points

 


connected by all the relations:
, in this case;
 clearly is D but not I. The frame 

on the right of the figure is a DI frame; the names of its
points represent the targets of the p-morphism from 

onto . So, for example the top left
point of 

is mapped ontoof ; the relations are mapped in the intuitive way. It is an easy
exercise to show that is indeed a p-morphic image of 

and will therefore validate every
formula which is valid on 

.
The aim of the following is to define precisely how to build, given any D frame, a new
DI frame in which every cluster is “unpacked” into an appropriate structure so that a p-
morphism between the two structures can be defined (see Figure 3.8).
In order to achieve the above, we present two set theoretic results. In Lemma 3.15 we
show that every infinite setcan be seen as the image of a product
 
under a function.
Intuitively this lemma will be used by taking the setas one of the clusters of a DI frame
 , the functionas the p-morphism and the product
 
(whereis the number of relations
on the frame) as the sub-frame that will replace the cluster in the new frame 

. Lemma 3.16
extends the result of Lemma 3.15 to guarantee that even if the clusters differ in size it is
always possible to find a single sub-frame that can replace each of them. The two lemmas
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Figure 3.8: A visualisation of the process of cluster explosion of Theorem 3.18, Lemma 3.15
and Lemma 3.16. Given an equivalence frame D frame that contains clusters

of
points that do no satisfy property I, a new frame 

that maps by a p-morphism is defined.
In the frame 

the clusters have been properly exploded into sub-frames that enjoy property
I while still being D frames. Theorem 3.18 proves constructively how to do so in a way that
ensures that the frame 

as a whole is an equivalence DI frame.
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will then be used in Theorem 3.18 to show that a p-morphism with these properties can be
defined.
Lemma 3.15. Given any infinite set, there exists a function


 
such that the following
holds.
Let










. For all 
	


, there are 	

	
	
 




	
 




, such that


	




	
 

 
.
Proof. Consider the set 
 






	


	




of the transpositions of, i.e. functions 




where	
	


, and such that 





 
	if 
 
	; 





 
	if 
 
	; 





 

otherwise. We have 

 



. But by set theory ([Lan84] page 701 for example)

 


, and so 
 
 . So, by induction, we have 
 



 

 
 . Call the
bijection


 


 , and define

	




	
 

 


	




	
 



	
 

. To prove the lemma
holds we consider two cases:


 
and

 
.
For


 
, assume any 


, and any 	


. Take any 	

 











;


	




	
 



is a transposition of. So, there exists an	 


such that 

	




	
 




	
 

 
. So

	




	
 

 
.
For

 
, assume again any 


, and any 	 


. Consider the transposition




; we have 



	
 

 
. But 


 


	




	
 



for some 	

	 


. So


	




	
 

 
.
Lemma 3.15 induces a similar result for sets whose cardinality is smaller than.
Lemma 3.16. Given any infinite set, and a set

 

, such that 

, there exists a function



 
such that the following holds.
Let










. For all 	








, there are 	

	
	
 




	
 




, such that


	




	
 

 
.
Proof. Consider a set  such that 

 andhave the same cardinality, and let be a
bijection fromto



 

. Then there is a function





 

 




 

, satisfying
the property expressed by Lemma 3.15. Define now a function 





 

, such
that 


	

 
	if	


, otherwise 


	

 
, where is any element in . Define the
function


 
by

	




	
 

 








	







	
 

. The following shows that
has the property required. For, let










and take any	


and


. Then


	







 

, and so by Lemma 3.15 there exist



 





 




 , such that
















	






 





 

 
. Define	
 







for
 











. We then
have

	




	
 

 



















	






 





 

 





 
since


.
We rely on the two results above to define a functionthat maps tuples 
	

	 

into , where is a cluster and	


, for some appropriate set. The functionis defined
as in Lemma 3.16 but it has an extra component for the cluster.
Corollary 3.17. Let be a set of nonempty subsets of a set

. Then there exists a setand a
function




 


such that
1. for all tuples 
	

	 

we have





	




	
 



, and
2. for all 


, for all


, for all

 


, and for all	


, for each
 









there exists	


, such that





	


	
 

 
.
3.4. COMPLETENESS OF EQUIVALENCE DI FRAMES 65
Proof. Letbe an infinite set with cardinality at least as great as the cardinality of any


.
This can be constructed by taking the union of these sets 


or by considering the set of
the natural numbers
 
 
if all the sets 


are finite. For each 


, let 


 


be the function promised by Lemma 3.16. Define




 


by




	




	
 

 

 

	




	
 

. It is immediate that this function has the required property.
Theorem 3.18. Given any equivalence D frame , there exists an equivalence DI frame 

, and a
p-morphism, such that

 


 
 .
Proof. Let 
 










 

be a frame withrelations on its support set

. Writefor
the relation 



 

. Since each of theis an equivalence relation, so is. Since the set
of worlds

of the frame is non-empty, it can be viewed as the union of the equivalence
classes of the relation, which we call clusters. Call the set of clusters of . Consider
the infinite setand a functionas described in Corollary 3.17, and define the frame 

 













 

as follows:



 



 
,





	




	
 








	




	
 

if	
 
	
and there exists worlds


and



such
that.
We can prove that:
1. The frame 

is an equivalence DI frame.
Proof. a) 

is clearly an equivalence frame.
b) We prove 

satisfies property I. Write

for 



 


. Suppose 
	

	 







	




	
 

. Then for all

 


we have that	
 
	
, and there exist


and





such that. Since and

are equivalence classes of, it follows from the
latter that, and consequently that 
 
. Thus, 
	

	 

 




	




	
 

.
c) We prove 

satisfies property D. Considertuples 
	





	

 






 


	
 




	
 
 

in


. For each

 


let be a world in cluster . Since has property
 , there exists a worldsuch that for each

 


. Let be the cluster
containing. Then, by construction, for each

 


we have 
	





	
 
 









	





	

 

.
2. The functionis a p-morphism from 

to .
Proof. That the functionis surjective follows from property (2) of Corollary 3.17.
Next, we show that is a frame p-morphism (i.e. it satisfies properties (2) and (3)
of Definition 1.13). Consider two tuples 
	

	 

, 



	




	
 

in


such that




	




	
 








	




	
 

. Then there exists


and



such that. By
property (1) of Corollary 3.17, we have





	




	
 



and





	




	
 



. Sinceis an equivalence relation, it follows that





	




	
 









	




	
 

.
To show the backward simulation property, consider a tuple
 




	




	
 

, and
assume 





for some world of  . Let

be the cluster containing . By
Corollary 3.17(2), there exist	for
 

 

such that if
 




	



	





	



	

 



	
 

,
then



 
. Since





by Corollary 3.17(1), it is immediate that


.
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By defining a p-morphism between the two classes of frames we can prove their seman-
tical equivalence.
We call
 
the class of equivalence D frames; recall that
 
denotes the class of
equivalence DI frames.
Theorem 3.19. For any formula

,
 


 

if and only if
 


 

.
Proof. From left to right. Clearly
 



 
so if a formula

is such that
 


 

, then

 


 

.
From right to left. Consider a formula

, by contradiction suppose
 



 

. Then there
exists a D frame such that 


 

. But by Theorem 3.18 there exists a DI frame 

such that
 is a p-morphic image of . Since is a p-morphic image we have that for any

such that
 


 
implies 
 
. So we have that 



 

, so
 



 

, which is what we needed to
prove.
Corollary 3.20. The logic S5WD is sound and complete with respect to the class of hypercube
systems.
Proof. FromTheorem 3.14, the logic S5WD is complete with respect to equivalenceD frames
but by Theorem 3.19 it follows that this logic is complete with respect to equivalence DI
frames. But by Theorem 2.17 equivalence DI frames are semantically equivalent to hyper-
cubes, and therefore the result follows.
Corollary 3.20 expresses the axiomatisation of hypercube systems that we aimed for. It
is now clear that the hypercube systems model a special class of ideal agents of knowledge.
Still, they not only satisfy all the properties of ideal agents of knowledge discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3.1.1, but also satisfy the property represented by axiomWD.
We will discuss how hypercube systems share knowledge in Section 3.6; before doing
that we will prove decidability.
3.5 Decidability
Recall from Section 1.2.4, Definition 1.25 of decidability. As we saw in Theorem 1.26 a suffi-
cient condition for proving decidability is that the logic has the finite model property (Def-
inition 1.27) and is finitely axiomatisable. In our case, the logic S5WD is clearly finitely
axiomatisable, so all we need to show in order to prove decidability is that it has the fmp.
In order to prove that S5WD has the fmp, we use filtrations. The idea of filtrations is the
following. If a logic is complete, we know that if a formula

is a non-theorem of (i.e. if

is -consistent), then

is invalid on some modelfor . The modelmight be infinite.
Filtrations enable us to produce a model

from, such that

is finite. If we can further
prove that

is also a model for (and therefore does not validate

), then we have proved
that the logic has the finite model property.
Formally we proceed as follows. Given a formula

, consider the set	 , composed by
formulaesuch thatis a well-formed sub-formula of

or the negation of a well-formed
sub-formula of

. The set	 is obviously finite for any formula

.
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Definition 3.21. Consider a model. Two points





are equivalent with respect to 	 
(written as 

or simply

if it is not ambiguous) if for any


	
 we have
 



if and only if
 



.
We can now define filtrations as follows.
Definition 3.22. Given a formula

and a model
 













, a filtration through	 is a
model

 
















built as follows:



 



 
, where is the equivalence relation defined by Definition 3.21.
For each



the relation


is suitable, i.e. it satisfies the two properties:
1. For all 











, if there exists a point



such that


and, then











6.
2. For all 











, if 








, then for all formulaesuch that


	
 , we
have that if
 





, then
 


	
.
For any


,




 












.
Note that

as defined above is finite because the set	 is.
It can be proved by induction (see for example [HC84] page 139) that if all the relations


are “suitable” then the following holds.
Theorem 3.23. Given a model, and any formula

, a filtration

ofthrough	 is such that
for any point



and and for any formula


	,


 




holds if and only if
 



We now proceed to the case of interest here: the logic S5WD .
Consider the canonical modelfor S5WD , we know (see Theorem 3.12 and Lemma
3.13) thatis an equivalence model and that if we consider the model generated by any
point of it, this is directed. Consider any formula

and the model

defined as follows:
Definition 3.24. Given a model
 













and a formula

define the model

 
















by:



 



 
, where is the equivalence relation defined by Definition 3.21.












if for all formulaesuch that


	
 , we have
 





if and only if

 


	


.
For any


,




 












.
Indeed the model

defined by Definition 3.24 is a filtration as the following shows
(stated in [HC84] page 145 for the mono-modal case).
Lemma 3.25. Given an equivalence modeland a formula

, the model

as described in Defini-
tion 3.24 is a filtration.
6Note that this condition is actually equivalent to




implies










. Here we follow the definition
given in [HC84].
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Proof. All we need to prove is that the relations

are suitable.
Property 1. Consider worlds 











and a world



such thatand



. We need to prove that 








, i.e. that for all formulaesuch that


	
 ,
we have
 





if and only if
 


	


. We prove it from left to right; the other
direction is similar. Note that
 





if and only if
 







becauseis an
equivalence model; butand so
 



. But


	and, so
 


	


,
which is what we wanted to prove.
Property 2. Consider worlds 











such that 








. This means that for
all


	, we have
 





if and only if
 


	


. Sinceis an equivalence
model it follows that
 


	
.
We now prove that the filtration defined above produces models for S5WD .
Lemma 3.26. Ifis an equivalence directed model, then for all

such that  

, the model


 
















as defined in Definition 3.24 is such that


 

.
Proof. We prove that 

 












is a frame for


 , i.e. it is an equivalence directed
frame. The relations

are clearly equivalence relations. All it remains to show is that 

is directed. To do that, consider any 






 





. Sinceis directed, there exists




such thatfor

 




. But each

is suitable and so, by a consequence
of property 1 of suitability we have that 







, for

 




. Therefore the frame 

is directed.
We are finally in the position to prove fmp.
Theorem 3.27. The logic


 has the finite model property.
Proof. Suppose



. Since by the proof of Theorem 3.12 the logic 


 is canonical, the
canonical model
 













for


 is an equivalencemodel, it is weakly-directed
and there is a point



, such that
 




. Consider the model
generated (accord-
ing to Definition 1.17) byfrom; by Lemma 1.18 we have

 




. The model
is
clearly an equivalence model and, since it is connected, by Lemma 3.13, it is also directed.
Consider now the filtration

of
through 	 according to Definition 3.24; by Lem-
ma 3.26,

is an equivalence directed model and it is finite by construction because	 is a
finite set. But

is a filtration, and by Theorem 3.23,


 






, which is what we needed
to prove.
Corollary 3.28. The logic


 is decidable.
Proof. 


 has the fmp and it is finitely axiomatisable. The result then follows from
Theorem 1.26.
3.6 The logic S5WD 
In the previous two sections we have explored hypercubes from a logical point of view. Our
results can basically be summarised by Corollary 3.20 and Corollary 3.28. Corollary 3.20
states completeness of the logic S5WD with respect to hypercube systems, while Corol-
lary 3.28 guarantees its decidability. What we did there is a technical analysis of the logic,
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but we should remember that wewere unable to describe in an intuitive waywhat constraint
the axiomWD imposes on hypercube systems in terms of knowledge.
In this section we try and explore the logic S5WD , with this aim in mind. In particular
we study an equivalent formulation that can be interpreted more easily in terms of agents of
knowledge that share part of the information they hold.
Let us start by analysing the type of constraint imposed by



on the community of
agents in the case
 

:
 







 





We do not need to make the other conjunct explicit, as this can be obtained by taking the
contrapositive of



.
Axiom



can be read as “If agent 1 considers possible that agent 2 knows the fact,
then agent 2 knows that agent 1 considerspossible”. In other words, axiom 



rules
out a situation in which agent 1 considers possible that agent 2 knows , while agent 2
considers possible that agent 1 knows not. We can say that axiom



imposes a sort of
homogeneity on the knowledge considered possible by other agents.
It is interesting to note that this constraint is logically equivalent to message passing of
possible knowledge between agents. To see this, suppose that every time an agent considers
possible that the other agent knows, it broadcasts this information state, and this message
is always safely received by the other agent. We also consider the communication to be
always truthful. We have the axiom:

 







 







 







 










In S5, the two axioms are equivalent.
Lemma 3.29.   	
 









and  	
 









Proof. First conjunct. Suppose 



 
 , and assume . But then, since by
Lemma 1.30 we have for any



, we obtain . So, by applying
axiom 2WD with argument, we obtain . Analogously, we can prove 



 


 , by assuming , and axiom 2WD.
Second conjunct. Suppose




and . Then by




, we have . Con-
sider now the instance of T

. By applying twice Lemma 1.29 we have 



 
 . But then we have 



 
 .
So, in the case of
 

, the logic S5WD specifies ideal agents of knowledge with an
interaction between the two agents’ knowledge that can be simulated by truthful communi-
cation of possible knowledge between the agents.
Let us now analyse the case
 
 
. We have:

 






 








 










 






 








 







 


The reading of the first conjunct of axiom 3WD is “If agent 1 considers possible that agent
2 knowsand agent 2 considers possible that agent 3 knows, then agent 3 knows that
agent 1 considersandpossible”.7
Considering the first conjunct with the special cases of
 





 





 


, it can
be checked that axiom 3WD implies the formulae: 



 
 , 



 
 , and
 







 
 . More generally, it is easy to see that
7We will discuss in Section 3.7 the reading of an axiom equivalent toWD for the general case.
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
 
 
 
 




 







 



where



 















 

By Lemma 3.29 we have that these axioms can be rewritten in shape similar to




and so
could be seen as specifying a kind of broadcasting of information.
Notwithstanding this, the intuition is that, differently from the case
 

, the axiom
3WD is stronger than the simple conjunction of all these axioms. In fact, the semantic condi-
tion on the frames that corresponds to 



 

is weaker than property
 

 .
We have the following already known result [Pop94, Cat88]8.
Lemma 3.30.  
 
 







 

if and only if is such that for all

, such that




and



, there exists a pointsuch that

 and


.
Now, while we can prove that the property 3WD implies the property 2WD (the general
case is proven later in Lemma 3.35), the opposite does not hold. Given the fact that by
Theorem 3.12 all these logics are canonical we cannot have 

 







 







,
where



 















 

.
In other words, it is unlikely that we can see the constraint imposed by 3WD on the
private knowledge of the agents as the result of a relatively simple broadcasting of possible
knowledge among the agents.
If we consider the case for arbitrary, it is indeed quite hard to have a clear picture of
the meaning of the constraint imposed by the axiomWD or to see why agentshould play
a special role in the group; still this does impose a constraint on the knowledge they hold.
Intuitively, given the symmetry of property D, there must be a way of expressing axiomWD
in a symmetric way. To understand better the implications of the logic S5WD we axiomatise
it in a slightly different way. We proceed as follows.
In Definition 3.9 we considered to be the set of all the permutations

	




	
 

with-
out fixed-points	
 

. In the following we show that it is possible to extend the results of
the previous section and prove correspondence and completeness for the case of arbitrary
permutations. It can then be observed that any permutation can be obtained by a sequence
of swaps between two elements. By exploiting this observation it will be possible to de-
fine a logic which is still equivalent to S5WD , and therefore complete with respect to the
same class of frames, but whose interaction axiom canmore easily be understood in terms of
knowledge. We proceed as follows: let be the set of permutations of







including
those with fixed-points.
Definition 3.31 (WD ). A frame 
 










isWD if for all points


 in

,
such that







 




and for all

	




	
 

in , there exists a pointin

such that





, for all

 




.
Whenis clear from the context, we just use we refer toWD just as WD .
Definition 3.31 is matched by the axiom:








	



 









 
 








 





 
 




 







 


 
We have the two following results.
8This can also be shown to follow from Lemma 3.11.
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Lemma 3.32.  
 



 if and only if is WD .
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.11.
Theorem 3.33. The logic S5WD is sound and complete with respect to the class of equivalence
WD frames.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.12. The assumption of the permutations having
no fix points can be relaxed with no harm.
We now investigate how the logics


 and


 are related to each other. Since it
contains more axioms, the logic S5WD is stronger than S5WD , so we have:
Lemma 3.34. If  

, then  


.
It is interesting to note that the two logics are equivalent. Before showing that, we need
the following:
Lemma 3.35. If a frame is reflexive, transitive andWD, then it is alsoWD, where

.
Proof. a) Suppose
 



. Note that 

 
. Assume 

 


 
 




. Consider


 





 
on , for any permutation

	




	





, there exists a permutation in

	




	
 




 such that 	
 
	




 




, and

	

 




	
 






 


 
, where



 


 
is a permutation without fixed-points of the set









. So, byWD there
exists a pointsuch that







 



and




 
 






.
b) Suppose
 



. Consider

 


 
 




and a permutation

	




	





. By a) there exists a point, such that







 
 







. Consider














, byWD there exists a point such that















. By transitivity








. Consider now



, for each








	






	


, and






, byWD
there exists a pointsuch that



, andrelated toby all the relations but


. So,
by transitivity






 
 




.
Lemma 3.36. If an equivalence frame isWD, then it isWD .
Proof. Consider


points


 such that


 




, and

	




	
 



 , we want to prove that there exists a pointsuch that


 




. Without
loosing the generality of the problem assume that

	




	
 

 

	




	











,
where

	




	





, i.e. only the first

elements are fix-points free. Since the frame is
WD, then by Lemma 3.35, it is also

WD, i.e. there exists a pointsuch that, for
 
 





. Consider

 



 
together with

reflexive links on(note
that 	
 


 



by construction), by WD and considerations on the equivalence relations
(similar reasoning for the case
 
 
is reported in Figure 3.9) there exists a point, such that











 



 


. By transitivity . Consider now
,

relation on ,
and; byWD and transitivity we have the existence of a pointsuch that
 



and related toby all relations but
 
. Note that

 
 










 



 
.
By transitivity we also have
 

. Consider
 

and

relations on; by WD
there exists a pointsuch that
 


, andrelated toby all the relations but
 
.
Note that 
 



 







 



 






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
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 
 




. Note that now we can similarly
apply WD to 
 

. By continuing this construction we identify the point
 

 


 

such that
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
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
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.
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Figure 3.9: Applying property 3WD in the case of equivalence frames as in the proof of
Lemma 3.36. By considering a 3-reflexive link on the point, the point

can be proven
connected tonot just by relation 1 but also by relation 2.
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Figure 3.10: Scheme of proof of Theorem 3.37.
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The previous lemma allows us to prove:
Theorem 3.37. If  


, then  

.
Proof. See Figure 3.10. Suppose  


, by Theorem 3.33, we have
 



 

, where

 

is the class of reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and WD frames. By Lemma 3.36,

 



 

, where
 
is the class of reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and WD
frames. So,
 


 

, and by Theorem 3.12 we have  

.
We therefore have the following.
Corollary 3.38. The logics S5WD and S5WD are equivalent.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.37 and Lemma 3.34.
This means that hypercubes can be axiomatised by considering the WD -extension of
S5 , rather than the one obtained by WD. The difference in not ruling out fixed points in
the axiom is that some of the conjuncts in the antecedent of the axioms can be replaced by
knowledge operators. In fact we have the equivalence (Lemma 1.30)   
 



and substitution of equivalents hold.
For example, in the case
 

, the following formulae are derivable from



 :















 











(3.4)
and





 






 
 



 











(3.5)
Formula 3.4 simply says “agent 4 considers possible the conjunction of the facts known by
agents 1, 2 and 3”; in fact, we can substitute for

the conjunction of all the atoms known by
agent 1, analogously for agent 2 and 3. This is not a surprising result; it is actually a theorem
of S5 , actually even T proves it as it follows from reflexivity. So, if we limit our attention
to formulae that do not contain nested modal operators, the logics S5WD and S5WD do
not add anything new to S5 .
On the contrary, Formula 3.5 is not provable in S5 : it is an instance of



 which
follows by taking the permutation

	



	



	



	


 




 







. It can be read as “The conjunct
and

and

is consistent with the knowledge of agent 4, where

is a fact known by
agent 1,

is a fact that agent 2 thinks may be known by agent 3, and

is a fact that agent 3
thinks may be known by agent 2”. Intuitively S5WD -agents do not just consider possible
conjuncts of facts known by some agents, but also facts that are considered possible to be
known by some other agent. The aim of the rest of the section is to clarify this intuition.
In defining the axiom



 we have been very liberal in allowing as many fixed-points
in the permutations as we wanted. Can we simplify the axiom



 by fixing the number
of fixed points in the permutation without weakening the logic?
Observe that an instance of



 with
 
fixed points in the permutations translates into
 
conjuncts composed by a single modal operator. This kind of axioms in turn correspond to
the propertyWD with
 
fixed-points in the permutation of indices of the relations connect-
ing the points to the worldin Definition 3.31. Observe now that any of these permutations
can be achieved by considering a sequence of permutations in which only two elements are
exchanged (swapped). We formalise these observations as follows.
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Figure 3.11: The propertyWD  .
Definition 3.39 (WD  ). Let  be the set of permutations
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See Figure 3.11
Consider now the following axiom:
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Intuitively, when working with equivalence models, axiom WD  corresponds to prop-
erty WD  . The proof is analogous to the ones presented in Lemma 3.11 in which the
assumption of working on equivalence models is used.
Lemma 3.40. Consider an equivalence frame . 
 



  if and only if is WD  .
Proof. From left to right. Consider an equivalence frame and suppose 
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. By construction we have
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is an equivalence model (by Lemma 1.30 and soundness of S5 ) we have that
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From right to left. Consider any three distinct indices
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i.e. that for any point, such thatwe have
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Consider any such point, since the frame isWD  , by considering the permutation that
swaps
 
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Completeness also follows.
Theorem 3.41. The logic 


  is sound and complete with respect to the class of equivalence
WD  frames.
Proof. Only a sketch of the proof is given as it is very similar to the one presented for Theo-
rem 3.12. By reasoning by contradiction and employing the same construction on the canon-
ical modelgiven on that proof we can rearrange Equation 3.1 into
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As in the proof of Theorem 3.12 but for the case of  we have now that
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struction, since the canonical model is an equivalence model, we have that
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So by applying axiomWD  we have that
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which together with Equation 3.6 gives a contradiction on the set  exactly as in Theo-
rem 3.12.
Actually the logics


  ,


 , and


 can be proven to be equivalent. To see
it, first observe thatWD  is a special case ofWD and so:
Lemma 3.42. If  


, then  


We can also prove:
Lemma 3.43. If an equivalence frame isWD  , then it isWD .
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
. We can now applyWD  keeping	fixed
and swapping 2 with	, if necessary. By systematically applyingWD  , aftertimes at
maximum, we obtainsuch that
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Lemma 3.43 allows us to prove:
Theorem 3.44. If  


, then  


.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.37.
We have therefore proved that:
Corollary 3.45. The logics


 , and


  are equivalent.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.44 and Lemma 3.42.
Corollary 3.46. The logics


 ,


 , and


  are equivalent.
Proof. It follows from Corollary 3.38 and Corollary 3.45.
We have now come to the conclusion that formally the logic 


  is just as good as



 to represent MAS modelled by hypercube systems. From a mathematical point of
view it looks as if the logic


 should be preferable as it seems to convey better the in-
formation about the underlying semantics. Notwithstanding this, the equivalence result we
have achieved is still useful. Indeed we will use it in the next section to give a more concrete
meaning of how MAS modelled by hypercube systems share part of their knowledge.
3.7 Knowledge sharing in hypercube systems
In this chapter we have proven soundness, completeness and decidability for the class of
hypercube systems that we explored semantically in Chapter 2. In section 3.6 we observed
that our first result, the logic S5 enriched by the axiomWD, seems to suggest an asymmetric
property of the agents of the group, with agenthaving a special role.
This is counter-intuitive since the semantic properties of hypercube systems are symmet-
ric and all the relations play the same role in defining properties D and I. This observation
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lead us to the study of Section 3.6 in which we proved that the logic S5WD is equivalent
to the logic


  (Corollary 3.46). To achieve this result we had to prove an intermediate
equivalence with the logic


 (Corollary 3.38).
The advantage of enriching S5 by using the axiomWD  rather thanWD orWD is that
its meaning is more immediate in terms of the knowledge of the agents. In fact, axiomWD  
specifies a class of knowledge agents with the following property:
Observation 3.47 (Knowledge sharing in hypercubes). Let
 







be a community of
agents and consider any three agents,
 






. Then agent

thinks that the conjunction of
anything that
 
thinks may be known by,
anything thatthinks may be known by
 
,
anything known by any other agent,
is possible.
MAS modelled by hypercube systems share knowledge among themselves following
Observation 3.47. They are ideal agents of knowledge (as described on page 24, but they
also consider possible facts known by some agents, or regarded by some agent to be possibly
known by some other agent. Observation 3.47 specifies how private knowledge is shared in
such community of agents.
Bymeans of Observation 3.47 we can now see that that hypercubes are homogeneous; i.e.
there is no distinction in capabilities of the agents, differently from the examples presented
in Section 1.4.2. Still, the axiom



  does indicate an interaction among the agents. What
kind of interaction does



  model? We answer this question in the next section.
3.8 Homogeneous broadcasting systems
3.8.1 Introduction
In the last section we presented a relatively intuitive explanation of the extent to which a-
gents modelled by hypercubes share part of their knowledge. This is quite valuable because
that formulation was also proved to be sound and complete with respect to hypercubes.
Still, even that axiomatisation does not give us many hints about what kind of process
hypercubes model. In Section 3.6 we did try to explore this question, but our analysis was
successful only for the case of 2 agents. To produce a more meaningful result we have to
abandon the proof-theoretical level and go back to the semantics. More precisely, we would
really like to have a low-level description language able to model the processes of the agents.
Given the fact that hypercubes share part of their knowledge, communication seems to be a
key aspect that we would like to model. In doing so, we would also like to be able to re-
introduce a mechanism able to represent the temporal evolution of hypercubes, so that, if
appropriate, we could analyse whether hypercube systems model a class of agents with one
of the characteristics (perfect recall, no learning, etc.) that we discussed in Section 1.3.2.3.2.
We present an answer to this question in the rest of this chapter. Ultimately, we will
present a result showing that hypercube systems represent a special class of synchronous
agents with perfect recall that exchange information only by broadcasting and that start
their configuration in a state of complete ignorance of each other’s local states.
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The section is organised as follows. In Section 3.8.2 we present the low-level semantic
formalism of environments, that we will use to model hypercubes. In Section 3.8.3 we will
introduce additional constraints on it that will let us characterise hypercubes as broadcasting
agents.
Note. The material presented in this section is joint work with Ron van der Meyden,
University of Technology (Sydney) and the results are sketched here only because of the
relevance they have with the rest of this chapter. The interested reader is referred to [LMR99]
for a more detailed exposition.
3.8.2 Environments
Although interpreted systems (Section 1.3.1.1) are certainly a very expressive formalism for
expressingMAS systems, one could argue that they are perhaps a bit too general to represent
certain classes of distributed processes. One example for which they seem to be inadequate
is the case of protocols. Intuitively, in practical applications we are not interested in the set
of all possible runs of a system, but only in the ones that follow some constraints. Indeed
in certain cases we would like to be able to express explicitly these constraints regulating the
transitions from a state to another.
This is the reason why Fagin and colleagues introduced the formalism of contexts (see
[FHMV97, FHMV95]), in which the notion of protocol is explicitly present. In the following
we use a variant of contexts, called environments, presented in [Mey96]9. The interested
reader can find more details and motivations in [Mey96]. The aim of the following is to
show that executing a protocol in an environment determines a Kripke frame that describes
states of knowledge of the agents. In Section 3.8.3 we will discuss under what assumptions
these evolutions generate exactly a class of agents which is modelled by the same logic as
hypercubes.
Differently from the rest of this thesis, we work with a set
 

 








of agents.
Agent 0 is intuitively the environment of interpreted systems and it will play the special role
of modelling the architecture of the systems.
Definition 3.48 (Actions). For any



the non-empty set
 


is the set of actions for agent

. A joint action is a tuple







 

, where


 


is an action for agent

. The set
 


is
the set of joint actions.
Actions of agent 0 correspond to nondeterministic behaviour of the context in which the
agents are situated. The fundamental notion of this model is the definition of environment.
Definition 3.49 (Environment). An interpreted environment is a tuple of the form
 

 

















where the components are as follows:

 is a set of states of the environment. Intuitively, states of the environment may encode
such information as messages in transit, failure of components, etc.

is a subset of , representing the possible initial states of the environment.
9For convenience, we use a variant of it already encoding perfect recall.
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
is a function, called the protocol of the environment, mapping states to
subsets of the set
 


of actions that can be performed by the environment. Intuitively,



represents the set of actions that may be performed by the environment when the system is in
the state .

is a function mapping joint actions 


 


to state transition functions 




 
 . Intuitively, when the joint action is performed in the state , the resulting state of the
environment is





.


is a function from  to

 
for some set

of observations. For each




 




, the
function

mapping 


 to the

th component of




, is called the observation function
of agent

. Intuitively,





represents the observation performed by agent

in the state .






is a valuation for the atoms.
The definition above defines transitions over states. Given an environment, sequences of
states related by transition functions define a trace.
Definition 3.50 (Traces). A trace of an environmentis a finite sequence of states such
that 


and for allsuch that
 
 




there exists a joint action
 







 

such
that 
 

 

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

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
and






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
. Given a trace
 




,



 

is the final state of
the trace.
The intuition is that a tracerepresents a finite history of the system.
Note that in the transitions above, agent 0 follows its own protocol. This is not the
case for the other agents that in principle can perform any possible action. In practice we
would like to specify what protocol these agents follow. In the context of this work we will
assume the agents follow a perfect recall protocolwhich is defined as follows:
Definition 3.51 (Perfect Recall). Given an environmentand a trace 
 




on it, the
perfect recall local state of an agent













in a traceis defined as the sequence




 













of observations made by agent

in the trace.
A perfect recall protocol for agent







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



is a functionmapping each sequence
of observations in

 to a non-empty subset of
 


. A joint perfect recall protocol is a tuple

 
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





 

, where for every agent

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
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




is a perfect recall protocol for agent

.
Protocols specify the actions that are allowed for the agents. More precisely, we say that
given a trace on an environmentand an agent













, an action


 


is
enabled with respect to a joint protocol
 






 

if









. We also say that an
actionof the environment is enabled atif










. A joint action
 







 

is enabled atwith respect to a protocolif each of its componentsis enabled at.
If all the agents follow their protocol by executing enabled actions we obtain a consistent
trace. More precisely, given an environmentand a joint protocol, a trace 
 





onis enabled if for each
 
, there exists a joint actionenabled at with respect
to, such that






 


 
.
All the enabled traces define the intended evolutions of the environment according to
the joint protocol. Similarly to what we saw in the case of interpreted systems it is possible
to ascribe knowledge to agents following a perfect recall protocol. Since agents perform
observations it is meaningful to assume two states to be indistinguishable for an agent if the
series of observation she has performed in the two states are the same. So, once again we
can define a Kripke model from a low-level description.
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Definition 3.52 (Perfect recall frame derived from a protocol and environment). Let be
an environment and letbe a joint protocol. The perfect recall frame derived fromandis
the structure 
 

	
 










 

, where


is the set of all traces of the environmentconsistent with the protocol,
For every













, the relation




is defined by

if




 




.
It is also possible to derive a Kripke model by considering the same valuationof the
environmentin question.
From the way the relationsare defined, it is clear that every agent has perfect recall
and it is common knowledge that the environment they are operating in isand that the
joint protocol is.
By taking other accessibility relations one can encode different phenomena (for exam-
ple one could define two states to be indistinguishable if their latest observation is equal).
The assumption of perfect recall is widely used in computer science because it amounts to
assuming that the agents use all the information they acquired in an ideal way.
3.8.3 Homogeneous broadcasting agents
Above we have briefly described the machinery of interpreted environments and observed
these generate a Kripke frame in a way which is similar to interpreted systems. But environ-
ments offer more expressive potentialities than interpreted systems, because of the expres-
siveness they offer.
From the definitions of the previous section it is possible to define a subclass of environ-
ments, called homogeneous broadcasting environment in [LMR99] that enjoy special properties.
The details are not fully reported here and we refer the reader to that paper.
Briefly, a homogeneous broadcasting environment is an environment with the following
additional constraints.
Actions consist of pairs of internal and external actions,
The states of the environment consist of tuples incorporating the external actions being
performed on that state together with the private states of the agents;
In initial states no external action is present and agents are ignorant of each other’s
state and of the state of the environment;
Agents observe their own private states and the external actions performed by the
other agents;
Every agent updates its private state depending on its own private state and on the
external actions performed by the agents;
The protocol of the environment depends only on its own internal state and on the last
performed external action; the agents run a perfect recall protocol.
Under these assumptions, it was proven in [Mey98] that the class of perfect recall frames
generated by homogeneous broadcasting agents has the following interesting property.
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Theorem 3.53 ([Mey98]). The logic 


 is sound and complete with respect to the class of
perfect recall frames generated by homogeneous broadcasting agents.
Theorem 3.53 provides a characterisation of hypercubes on a low-level semantics like the
one of environments. The broadcasting activity that they perform is the act responsible for
the sharing of knowledge that they exhibit (Observation 3.47).
We have now completed our analysis of hypercube systems. We defined them as a special
class of interpreted systems, we found a semantic correspondence in the class of Kripke
frames, we provided some complete and decidable axiomatisations for them and in this
section we reported a low-level description of their communication ability.
Chapter 4
A spectrum of degrees of knowledge
sharing
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we explored the axiomatisation of hypercube systems and proved that the log-
ic S5WD is sound and complete with respect to that semantic class. The logic S5WD is
axiomatised by extending S5 with the axiomWD.
For the case
 

the axiomWD becomes the formula:
 







 





which can be read as “If agent 1 considers possible that agent 2 knowsthen agent 2 must
know that agent 1 considers possible that is the case”. In Section 3.8 we showed that
this logic can be seen as modelling a particular class of MAS that exchange information by
broadcasting.
Axiom 2WD is an interaction axiom that models a particular class of agents of knowl-
edge; but surely there must be other interesting classes of interactions between agents that
can be modelled by extensions of S5 . For example, on page 38 we presented two other
examples of agents sharing knowledge.
In the first example we described a collective map making scenario from [dMAE 97] in
which an agent
 
is told any knowledge of any other agent

and therefore knows everything
that is known by any other agent. Assuming all the agents being ideal, this scenario can be
represented by S5 enriched by the interaction axiom:






; for all





The second scenario of page 38 concerns a MAS whose agents have computation capa-
bilities that can be ordered. If the agents are executing the same program on the same data,
then it is reasonable to model the MAS by enriching the logic S5 by:






;


 

for all



 




The relation

expresses the linear order in the computational power at disposal to the a-
gents. In this as in the previous case some information is being shared among the agents of
the group.
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It is easy to imagine other meaningful axioms that express interactions between the agents
in the system; clearly there is a spectrum of possible degrees of knowledge sharing. At one
end of the spectrum is S5 , with no sharing at all. At the other end, there is S5 together with



 


; for all



 





saying that the agents have precisely the same knowledge (total sharing). The three exam-
ples mentioned above exist somewhere in the (partially ordered) spectrum between these
two extremes.
Our aim in this chapter is to explore the spectrum systematically. We restrict our attention
to the case of two agents (i.e. to extensions of S5), and explore axioms of the forms
 


 

 


  

  


 

  


  

where each occurrence of
 
is in the set

 







 






.
Technically we will prove correspondence properties and completeness for extensions
of S5with axioms of these forms. Naturally, this will not give the complete picture: there
may be interesting axioms of other forms than those listed above. However, analysis of the
literature certainly suggests that most axioms studied for this purpose are of one of these
forms. They are sufficient for expressing how knowledge and facts considered possible are
related to each other up to a level of nesting of two, which is about themaximum that human
intuition can grasp. Note also that the examples above, including the case of bi-dimensional
hypercubes, are included in the axiom patterns.
Although our analysis is limited both from considering the case of two agents and from
considering only interaction axioms of the shape above, we will see that some non trivial
technical problems are present here. Indeed, we will leave two completeness problems as
open.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 we analyse and discuss
interaction axioms of the form
 


 
. We will then extend these results in Section 4.3
where we discuss the case of the consequent being composed by two modal operators. In
Section 4.4 we will analyse the interaction axioms resulting from two nested modalities both
in the antecedent and in the consequent. Finally in Section 4.5 we present the lattice gener-
ated by the logics and discuss our results.
This chapter is devoted to extensions of S5and so in the following we will use the prov-
ability symbolfor  	. Given this context we will always be working in the class
 
of
equivalence frames 
 











built on two equivalence relations on

. Many of these
results can be translated for the system K; given that the chapter is devoted exclusively to
knowledge agents we will not discuss this.
4.2 Interaction axioms of the form 

 

In this section we study extensions of S5with respect to interaction axioms that can be
expressed as:
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Interaction Axioms Completeness Lemmas of reference Notes





 — – –




 
 — – 

 












 4.1 and 4.2 –




 

 — – 

 


 






 


 4.3 and 4.4 –
 


 
 — – –
 







 


 


 4.5 and 4.6 –
 


 





 4.7 and 4.8 –









 4.7 and 4.8 –




 
 — – 

 







 — – –




 

 — – 

 


 







 


 


 4.5 and 4.6 –
 



 





 4.1 and 4.2 –
 








 


 4.5 and 4.10 –
 



 

 — – –
Figure 4.1: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.1.
 


 

, where each occurrence of
 
is in the set









 



 


 (4.1)
The axiom schema 4.1 expresses a relation between knowledge or epistemic possibility
of a fact. It expresses a first basic type of interaction between mental attitudes.
In Section 4.2.1 we prove the correspondence and completeness results for the logics ob-
tained by adding to S5axioms derivable from Formula 4.1. In Section 4.2.2 we will discuss
these results.
4.2.1 Correspondence and completeness
Figure 4.1 shows all the interaction axioms that are expressible as Equation 4.1 together with
the results proven in this section. If equivalence frames already provide a sound and complete
semantic class for the logic no relation is given in the corresponding column.
By going through the table we see that half of the axioms are already theorems of the
logic S5; the proofs for these are trivial. We now analyse the ones which are not provable in
the logic S5.
4.2.1.1 




Lemma 4.1.  
 





if and only if is such that


.
Proof. From right to left; consider any modelsuch that


and a pointsuch that

 



 . So, for every point

such that

we have
 



. But 


	






and so we have
 




.
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For the converse, suppose

on a frame , such that 
 






; it remains
to prove that 

. Consider a valuation 



 




. So

 





 


 

, but then

 





 


 
 , and so, since

is the only point in whichis satisfied we have

.
Lemma 4.2. The logic S5









is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames
such that


.
Proof. Soundness was proven in the first part of Lemma 4.1.
Consider the canonical model
 














for the logic S5









. We
know by Theorem 1.23 that S5is canonical, i.e. the frame underlyingis an equivalence
frame. We prove that the extension S5










is also canonical.
Suppose

, with





; it remains to show that

. For this, by Defini-
tion 1.21, it suffices to prove that there is a consistent set











 



 





for if that is the case by the maximal extension lemma (Lemma 1.10) there exists a point in
the canonical modelthat contains those formulae. By contradiction assume this is not the
case; then we can choose some



 




 
 such that









 




 
 

.
Call
 





and
 
 

 



 
. So


 
, i.e.
 


. But
 



, for

 





and so
 


; for similar reasons we have




. Since





, we have
 


.
But then by axiom T we have
 




and so it has to be




. But then it would be





which is absurd.
So the set











 



 





has to be consistent and there is on the canonical
model a point 

such that 

. By canonicity the logic S5









is then
complete with respect to this class of frames.
4.2.1.2  




We now investigate the formula 



. Since in S5 we already have

 
 , the
above entails validity of the formula


 . In the mono-modal case the formula



is sometimes known as Triv, because it causes the collapse of modal formulae onto their
propositional calculus transforms, obtained simply by removing any modal operator from
a formula (see Section 1.2.3 and [HC96], page 66 for details). In the multi-modal case this
behaviour will be implied only for the modal fragment that the formula refers to. We can
prove the following.
Lemma 4.3.  
 
 




if and only if 
 











is such that
 


.
Proof. From left to right. Consider a frame and suppose there exist two points





such that

. Consider a valuationsuch that



 




. We have

 





 


 
 .
Then

 





 




, and since is reflexive this implies that

 





 


, which is absurd
unless
 


.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence model
 














such that
 


 
 . Then there exists a point




such that

and
 



. But since
 


,
then it must be that
 


and so
 



 .
Completeness also follows.
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Lemma 4.4. The logic S5


 





is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames
such that
 


.
Proof. Soundness was proven in the second part of Lemma4.3.
We prove that the logic S5


 





is canonical. Consider the canonical model
and suppose, by contradiction, that

 


on the canonical frame. So there exist two
points





such that there is at least a formula


such that











and





. So we have
 


 
 , and then by 


 we have
 



 . But this
is absurd becauseis reflexive and we have



. So,
 


and therefore the logic is
canonical.
Note that in the logic S5


 





any modal operators for agent 1 can be ef-
fectively removed from a formula of the language. In fact it can be easily proved that

 
 
	
 

 








 
 
 and   	
 

 







 

 

 . We will discuss this point in
more detail in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1.3  




Observe that the converse of this formula expresses the same property with swapped index-
es. Since in S5we already have reflexivity, this formula is powerful enough to make the
whole system collapse into Triv as we prove in the following:
Lemma 4.5.  
 
 




if and only if 
 











is such that
 


 


.
Proof. From left to right. We prove that it cannot be that

 


; the proof for the other
relation is equivalent by using the contrapositive of the axiom. Suppose there exist two
points 





on a frame such that 

and consider a valuation such that




 




. We have

 





 


 
 . Then

 





 




, and since is reflexive this
implies that

 





 


, which is absurd, unless
 


.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence model
 














such that
 


 
 . Then there exists a point




such that

and
 



. But since
 


 


, then it must be that
 


and so
 




.
The logic S5


 






is also complete with respect to the class of frames above.
Lemma 4.6. The logic S5


 






is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames
such that
 


 


.
Proof. Soundness was proven in the second part of Lemma 4.5.
We prove that the logic S5


 






is canonical. Consider the canonical model
and suppose, by contradiction, that

 


on the canonical frame. So there exist two
points





such that there is at least a formula


such that











and





. So we have

 
 
 , and then by 



we have

 


. But this is
absurd becauseis reflexive and we have



. So,
 


. In a similar way, we can
prove thatis also the identity on

is also the identity on

. The logic is then canonical
and complete with respect to the frames above.
Indeed, the logic S5


 






is equivalent to Triv. In fact, it can be proven
straightforwardly that  	
 

 




	



 
 
 ,  	
 

 




	


 

 

 ,  	
 

 




	




 
 

and  	
 

 




	


 


 


.
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4.2.1.4 Remaining axioms
We now examine the interaction axiom  

 

. In Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 we
examined the axiom for the two indexes swapped. So without repeating the proofs we can
simply state the following:
Lemma 4.7.  
 






if and only if is such that.
Lemma 4.8. The logic S5









is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames
such that.
The next formula we analyse is 



. We examined this axiom with respect to
agent 1 in Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4. So, without repeating the proofs we report the two
results:
Lemma 4.9.  
 
 





if and only if 
 











is such that
 


.
Lemma 4.10. The logic S5


 







is sound and complete with respect to equivalence
frames such that
 


.
4.2.2 Discussion
In Section 4.2.1 we showed that out of 16 possible interaction axioms of the form of Equa-
tion 4.1 only 5 of them lead to a different proper extension of S5. For these 5 logics we
proved correspondence and completeness. In particular since all the logics were proven to
be canonical we have the more general result.
Theorem 4.11. All the logics S5




, where

is the conjunction of formulae expressible as E-
quation 4.1 are complete with respect to the intersection of the respective classes of frames.
The logics are ordered as in Figure 4.2.
Proof. It follows from all the canonicity results proved in Section 4.2.1. Proving the relation
between the logics is straightforward.
Figure 4.2 shows the relations between all the logics discussed in Section 4.2.1 and the
logic S5




 




that can be obtained by taking the union of S5


 


 



and S5


 



 


. The lines in the figure represent set inclusion between logics,
i.e. the logics are ordered in terms of how many formulae they contain. For example it
is straightforward to prove that if   	
 

 








then   	
 

 




	



. The pictured
relations between the logics are reflexive and transitive.
In Figure 4.3 the relation between the different classes of frames that we examined in this
section is shown.
Although possibly never presented systematically, the results of Theorem 4.11 and of
Section 4.2.1 are quite well known. The most important logic is probably the one that forces
the knowledge of an agent to be a subset of the knowledge of another. In Section 1.4.1 we
have discussed two agent scenarios in which this can be proven useful. By combining two
axioms of this kind for both agents we obtain the logic 






 




, in which both
agents have exactly the same knowledge base. Note the central position of this logic in
Figure 4.2 reflecting the symmetry of the group of agents in this case.
Stronger logics can be defined by assuming that the modal component for one of the
agents collapses onto the propositional calculus. When this happens we are in a situation in
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A
 


 











	
 











	
 













	
 












	
 












	
 












	
Figure 4.2: The proper extensions of S5that can be obtained by adding axioms of the shape
of Formula 4.1.
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

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
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
Figure 4.3: The classes of frames corresponding to the proper extensions of S5obtained by
adding axioms of the shape of Formula 4.1.
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which “being possible according to one agent” is equivalent to “being known” and this in
turn is equivalent to “being true”. It is clear that this is indeed a very strong constraint which
limits the expressivity of our language. Still these logics can be proven to be consistent.
The strongest consistent logic is Trivthat can be defined from S5by adding the axiom
 




to S5or equivalently by adding both 


 and 



. In this
logic the two agents have equal knowledge that is equivalent to the truth on the world of
evaluation.
4.3 Interaction axioms of the form 

  

In section 4.2.1 we have studied a relatively simple class of interactions. We noticed that there
are only 5 interaction axioms that we can add to S5without collapsing to the uninteresting
system logic system Triv, in which knowledge of a fact collapses to the truth of the fact.
In this section we study logics that can be defined by adding to S5more complex inter-
action axioms of the shape:
 


  

, where each occurrence of
 
is in the set









 



 


 (4.2)
Equation 4.2 expresses





 
 

different formulae.
4.3.1 Correspondence and completeness
We need to examine the correspondence and completeness problem for 32 different axioms
(those with an antecedent referring to agent 1); results for the remaining 32 can be inferred
from these by consideration of symmetry. We further sub-divide these axioms in two classes.
The first class of axioms contains  as antecedent, the second .
A quite surprising result that we will find in the following sections is that most of the
logics obtained from

by adding axiom schemas of the shape of Equation 4.2 are actually
equivalent either to

itself or to one of the logics explored in Section 4.2.1.
Proving that these logics are equivalent is sometimes not obvious; still it would be some-
what tedious to report all of them in the main track. What we will do is to discuss of them
in this chapter and leave the proofs for the other equivalences in the Appendix A. The same
applies for the correspondences.
4.3.1.1 Interaction axioms of the form 

  

We begin by analysing all the formulae that follow from Equation 4.2 by using  as an-
tecedent of the formula. We have the table of Figure 4.4 in which the results of this section
are summarised.
Theorem 4.12. For all the axiom schemas

in Figure 4.4 we have that 
 

if and only if 
satisfies the corresponding property in the figure.
Proof. In this chapter we only proof the correspondence for the axiom 

 


 (see
Lemma 4.14). All the other proofs are standard and can be found in the Appendix in Sec-
tion A.1.1.
The second result is that we have completeness for all the logics of Figure 4.4.
4.3. INTERACTION AXIOMS OF THE FORM
 


  
 91
Interaction Axioms Completeness Lemmas of Reference Notes
 


 





 


 4.3 and 4.4 
 
 



 


 






 


 A.1 and A.2 –
 


 

 
 — –  
 
 

 

 


 

 

 — – 

 


 








 


 4.3 and 4.4 
 




 









 


 


 A.3 and A.4 –
 




 
 — –  
 


 

 




 





 A.5 and A.6 –
 


 





 


 4.14 and 4.15 –
 


 






 


 


 4.5 and 4.6 
 
 




 


 

 
 — – 

 


 


 

 





 4.7 and 4.8  
 
 

 


 








 


 


 A.7 and A.8 –
 









 


 


 4.5 and 4.6 
 





 




 





 A.9 and A.10 –
 




 





 4.7 and 4.8  
 


 


Figure 4.4: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.2 in the case the
antecedent is equal to  .
Theorem 4.13. All the logics in Figure 4.4 are sound and complete with respect to the class of equiv-
alence frames satisfying the corresponding property.
Proof. Soundness can be checked straightforwardly.
For completeness, consider any logic 






, where

is an axiom in Figure 4.4. We
have two cases.


 
 
	

. In this case, we obviously have that 






is equivalent to 

and so the
completeness of the logic






with respect to equivalence frames follows.
Showing that axiom

can be proven in 

is immediate in most cases by using the
notes in Figure 4.4.



 
 
	

. In this case, although the logic






is a proper extension of

, it can be
proven equivalent to a logic






for some axiom
1 examined in Section 4.2.1. The
equivalence between






and






, i.e. that  	
 

 

if and only if  	
 

 

, follows once we have  	
 

 


and  	
 

 


; in fact in this case any proof of
in one logic can be repeated in the other. All the proofs for these equivalences between
axioms can be found in the Appendix (in Section A.1.1) and they follow the numbering
given in Figure 4.4. As an interesting example the proof for  	
 

 



 
	




 



 and  	
 

 







 


 



is given in Lemma 4.15 in this chapter.
Now, since






was proven complete with respect to equivalence frames satis-
fying property (the results are in Figure 4.1), the completeness of 






with
respect to equivalence frames also follows.
1The axiom

can be found in the corresponding lemmas of reference.
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4.3.1.1.1  

 


 . As a sample of the proofs of Section A.1.1 of the Appendix, the
correspondence proof and the axiom-dependent part for the completeness proof of Theo-
rem 4.13 for axiom 

 



are reported here.
Lemma 4.14.  
 
 


 



if and only if 
 











is such that
 


.
Proof. From left to right. Suppose there exist two points 





such that 

.
Consider a valuationsuch that



 




. We have

 





 


 
 . Then

 





 



 



, and sinceis true only at

, which is related toby relation, then it must be
that 



 



.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence model
 














such that
 


 
 . Then there exists a point




such that

and
 



. But since
 


,
we have
 


. So
 




and so
 


 



.
For completeness all it remains to show from Theorem 4.13 is that the logic is equivalent
to a logic sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames such that
 


. It is
enough to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.15.   	
 

 



 
	




 



 and  	
 

 







 


 


 .
Proof. First part. Suppose 

 


 ; so 



. Substitute the term







foruniformly in the axiom above; we obtain 















. We prove
that the antecedent of this formula is a theorem of S5. In fact we have 


 so
by Lemma 1.30 we have 

 



. Now since, as it can easily be verified, diamond
distributes over logical or, we have 








, which by necessitating by leads to


 








. So, it follows that







, which gives



. Now, from this
formula it follows from Lemma 1.29 that 

 


 , which is equivalent to 


 .
Second part. Suppose 


 . By the axiom T we then obtain 

 


 .
4.3.1.2 Interaction axioms of the form

  

We now move to the study of instances of Equation 4.2 where the antecedent is of the form

 . Given the strength of the antecedent we do not have many results to prove in this
subsection. In fact, most of the axioms are already theorems of S5.
As in the previous section, here we only prove the results for one interesting axiom and
refer the reader interested in others to the proofs given in the Appendix.
We have the following two theorems.
Theorem 4.16. For all the axiom schemas

in Figure 4.5 we have that 
 

if and only if 
satisfies the corresponding property in the figure.
Proof. In Lemma 4.18 we prove the result for the axiom

 



. All the others can be
found in Section A.1.2.
Theorem 4.17. All the logics in Figure 4.5 are sound and complete with respect to the class of equiv-
alence frames satisfying the corresponding property.
Proof. In Lemma 4.19 we prove canonicity of the logic 







 





. The rest of
the theorem can be proven similarly to Theorem 4.13. All the relevant proofs of equivalence
between axioms are in Section A.1.2.
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



 



 — –  
 






 






















	





 4.18 and 4.19 –




 

 
 — –  
 
 

 





 

 

 — – 

 










 — – 
 

















 A.11 and A.12 –






 
 — –  
 


 







 

 — – 

 






 



 — – 

 






 








 4.1 and 4.2  
 
 








 

 
 — – 

 






 

 

 — –  
 
 

 















 A.13 and A.14 –













 4.1 and 4.2 
 











 





 A.15 and A.16 –






 

 — –  
 


 


Figure 4.5: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.2 in the case the
antecedent is equal to.
4.3.1.2.1 

 



. This axiom generates a class of frames that we have not seen
before. We start by proving correspondence.
Lemma 4.18.  
 




 



if and only if is such that


















	





.
Proof. From right to left; consider any modeland a pointin it such that
 



 . So,
for every point

such that

we have
 



. But, by assumption, there exists a
point







such that 



	





. So,holds at any point of the equivalence class





	, and so
 





. Therefore
 


 



.
For the converse, suppose the relational property above does not hold. Then there exists
a frame and a pointin such that for any







we have 



	






, i.e. we
have the existence of a point








	such that








. Consider a valuationsuch
that



 










. We have

 





 




and

 






 



. So

 






 





. So
we have

 






 


 



which is absurd.
Completeness with respect to the same class of frames also follows.
Lemma 4.19. The logic S5






 





is sound and complete with respect to equivalence
frames satisfying the property


















	





.
Proof. Soundness was proven in first part of Lemma 4.18.
For completeness we prove that the logic S5





 





is canonical. In order to
do that, suppose, by contradiction, that the frame of the canonical model does not satisfy the
relational property above. Then, it must be that there exists a pointsuch that:




















and






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Call







 

 the points in 


, and

 the point in 




	such that





;

 






. Recall from Definition 1.21 that

is defined as











implies






; 





is defined as











and 





. So we can find some
formulae





 






such that 
























 






Call

 

 



; we have 





 






. So


. But








 






.
So 




for every

in









. So 


, i.e. 


. But



and

 



, sowould be inconsistent. Therefore the canonical framemust satisfy
the property above and the logic is complete with respect to equivalence frames satisfying
the property


















	





.
4.3.1.3 Interaction axioms of the form 

  
and

  

We can now take stock of the position we have achieved in Section 4.3.1.2 and Section 4.3.1.1
and present the completeness results for Equation 4.2 in the case the first modal operator is
indexed by 2. The proofs are completely equivalent to the ones we have seen before, so we
just present the final tables in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 that will be useful later on.
In Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 some of the lemmas cited do not refer to the axiom in analysis
but to one with the indexes uniformly swapped. These have been analysed in the previous
section and we do not repeat here the proofs.
Corollary 4.20. For all the axiom schemas

in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 we have that 
 

if and
only if satisfies the corresponding property in the figure.
Corollary 4.21. All the logics in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 are sound and complete with respect to
the class of equivalence frames satisfying the corresponding property.
4.3.2 Discussion
In this section we have analysed the class of interaction axioms expressed by Equation 4.2.
This represents the interactions between the state of knowledge of one agents and the knowl-
edge of an agent referred to the knowledge of the other agent. We have proved correspon-
dence properties and completeness for all the logics above.
Given the fact that all the logics were proven to be canonical we have the general result:
Corollary 4.22. All the logics S5




, where

is the conjunction of formulae expressible as
Equation 4.2 are complete with respect to the intersection of the corresponding classes of frames shown
in Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7.
Proof. It follows from the canonicity proofs that compose Theorem 4.13, Theorem 4.17 and
Corollary 4.21.
Among all these axioms, the most intuitive ones in terms of knowledge are probably






 and its “dual”





, representing scenarios in which agent 1 knows
that agent 2 knows something every time this happens to be the case. It is interesting to
see that this is equivalent to agent 1 knowing everything known by agent 2. The reader can
explore other interesting equivalences from the table above and refer to the appropriate cited
lemmas for the proofs.
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 



 






 




 4.5 and 4.6 
 
 



 



 






 


 4.14 and 4.15 –
 



 

 





 4.1 and 4.2  
 
 

 

 



 

 

 — – 

 

 










 


 


 4.5 and 4.6 
 




 










 


 


 A.7 and A.8 See 





 





 





 4.1 and 4.2  
 


 

 





 





 A.9 and A.10 See 



 

 



 






 


 A.1 and A.2 –
 



 






 


 4.9 and 4.10 
 
 




 



 

 
 — – 

 

 



 

 

 — –  
 
 

 


 










 


 


 A.3 and A.4 See 






 










 


 4.9 and 4.10 
 





 





 





 A.5 and A.6 See 



 


 





 

 — –  
 


 


Figure 4.6: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.1 in the case the
antecedent is equal to .
Interaction Axioms Completeness Lemmas of Ref. Notes




 






 –  
 






 



 — – 

 





 

 
 — –  
 
 

 





 

 

 — – 

 












 4.7 and 4.8 
 
















 A.13 and A.14 See












 
 — –  
 


 







 





 A.15 and A.16 See



 





 














	












	 4.18 and 4.19 See

 








 



 — – 
 
 








 

 
 — – 

 





 

 

 — –  
 
 

 













 A.11 and A.12 See














 — – 
 











 
 — – 

 







 

 — –  
 


 


Figure 4.7: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.2 in the case the
antecedent is equal to.
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A more subtle, independent axiom expressed by Equation 4.2 is the formula



 






which reads “If agent 1 knows, then he considers possible that agent 2 also knows”. The
above is an axiom that regulates a natural kind of “prudence” assumption of agent 1 in terms
of what knowledge agent 2 may have. This is meaningful in MAS in which agents have
similar characteristics. In these scenarios when an agent knows a fact, it may be appropriate
to assume that the other agent, by acquiring the same information from the environment
and by following her same reasoning, could have reached the same conclusion. Note that
very often humans act as if they followed this axiom.
For the moment we do not add the two new logics to the figure of the previous section;
we will discuss the general picture of the logics after proving the results for two modal
operators from either side of the implication. Note that axioms of the shape
  


 
are
simply the contrapositive of the ones we analysed here, so they do not need being studied.
4.4 Interaction axioms of the form  

  

We now discuss the last class of interaction axioms we will see in this chapter, i.e. extensions
of S5with interaction axioms expressible as:
  


  

where each occurrence of
 
is in the set

 







 







4.4.1 Correspondence and completeness
Equation 4.4 generates 256 different axioms. 64 of them have both operators indexed by
agent 1 in the antecedent, 64 by agent 2. Both of these, by Lemma 1.30 are equivalent to
one of the axioms we examined in Section 4.3. The remaining 128 can in turn be divided
between the ones with a 1-2 sequence and those with a 2-1. In this chapter we analyse only
the former; results for the latter can be obtained by swapping the indexes uniformly in an
axiom and referring to the results we prove in this section.
Among the remaining 64 axioms there are two non-trivial axioms for which a complete-
ness proof is not given here. I will leave these as open problems, conjecture that these logics
are not canonical. Still, a frame-correspondence for the axioms is presented.
Given the number of axioms in analysis, and differently from what we have done so far,
in this section wewill mostly focus on completeness results (given their importance) without
analysing the correspondence problem.
4.4.1.1 Interaction axioms of the form

  

We begin the study of this class of interactions by examining the case of the strongest an-
tecedent in Equation 4.4, i.e. a sequence of two modal boxes. The results of all these interac-
tion axioms are summarised in Figure 4.8. It can be noted that all but one axiom are already
theorems of S5; this is because of the strength of the antecedent.
Theorem 4.23. All the logics in Figure 4.8 are sound and complete with respect to the class of equiv-
alence frames with the exception of the logic
















, which is sound and complete
with respect to equivalence 2WD frames.
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





 


 — –  
 









 



 — – 

 







 

 
 — –  
 
 

 







 

 

 — – 

 











 — – 
 















 — – –








 
 — –  
 


 









 

 — – 

 








 


 — – 

 








 



 — –  
 
 










 

 
 — – 

 








 

 

 — –  
 
 

 











 2WD 4.24 –










 — – 
 













 
 — – –








 

 — –  
 


 


Figure 4.8: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.4 in the case the
antecedent is equal to.
Proof. It can easily be checked that all the axioms of Figure 4.8 but 





are
already theorems of

. Therefore any extension of

with those axioms is still sound and
complete with respect to equivalence frames.
The completeness proof for the logic
















follows from Lemma 4.24,
the considerations presented in the proof of Theorem 4.13 and Lemma A.20.
4.4.1.1.1 





Lemma 4.24.   	
 




	



	




 







 
 and  	
 

 


	



	
 













.
Proof. First part. Suppose




 . First we prove that this axiom implies





. In fact we have  

 

 

 

; but by using Lemma 1.29 on the contrapositive
of the assumption we have   

 

 

 
 ; so we have  

 

 
 . So the
axiom is symmetric; we now use this intermediate result to prove that the axiom implies
 







 
 .
By Lemma 1.30 we have  

 

 



. But by what we proved above we have
 

 





 

 



. So by Lemma 1.30 and transitivity we obtain 



 

 



.
But by assumption and Lemma 1.29 we have   



 

 



. So 



 



. So by applying axiom T we obtain the result 



 
 .
Second part. Suppose 



 
 . We have  

 

 

 
 and since 



 
 we also have  

 

 



 
 . From the previous formula by applying our
working hypothesis in the instance  for, by taking the contrapositive and necessitating
bywe obtain  

 



 

 
 . This in turn, thanks to the equivalence 
 

 brings us to  



 

 
 . Now by applying Twe finally obtain  

 

 
 ,
which by contraposition and substitution leads to the formula





. Now by a
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 





 






 A.6  
 



 





 



 — – –
 





 

 
 — –  
 
 

 

 





 

 

 — – 

 


 












 A.6 
 





 













 A.17 –
 







 
 — –  
 


 

 







 





 A.18 –
 





 






 4.26 –
 





 







 A.10 

 




 





 

 
 — – 


 





 

 





 A.16  

 

 


 












 A.19 –
 













 A.10 






 







 
 2WD A.20 —
 







 





 A.16  

 


Figure 4.9: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.4 in the case the
antecedent is equal to .
proof analogous to the one presented in the first part of this lemma we can get




 , which is what we needed to prove.
4.4.1.2 Interaction axioms of the form 

  

We analyse here interaction axioms of the form of Equation 4.4, whose antecedent is made
by one diamond indexed by 1 followed by one box indexed by 2. The results of all these
interaction axioms are summarised in Figure 4.9. Note that for some axioms the reference
lemmas refer to axioms with the indexes swapped. For example for the last axiom 



 

, which by the observation in the note is equivalent to 

 

. The reference
lemma is relative to the axiom



 
 , which is the contrapositive of that formula
with indexes swapped. It should be clear that by swapping the indexes in that proof for that
axiom we obtain a proof for 

 

.
Once again we will go through only one result and we will leave all the others in the
Appendix in Section A.2.1.
Theorem 4.25. All the logics in Figure 4.9 are sound and complete with respect to the class of equiv-
alence frames satisfying the corresponding property.
Proof. Equivalent to the proof for Theorem 4.13. All the relevant proofs (except the one for
axiom 

 


 , which is presented below) are in the Appendix in Section A.2.1.
4.4.1.2.1  

 




Lemma 4.26.   	
 

 


	


 
	









 and  	
 


	






 





 


 .
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Interaction Axioms Completeness Lemmas of Ref. Notes
 

 



 





 


 


 A.4  
 



 

 



 






 


 A.21 –
 

 



 

 





 A.12  
 
 

 

 

 



 

 

 — – –
 

 









 


 


 A.4 
 





 

 










 


 


 A.22 –
 

 





 





 A.12  
 


 

 

 





 





 A.17 See 






 

 



 





 


 A.23 –
 

 



 






 


 


 A.8  
 
 




 

 



 

 
 2WD A.24 See






 

 



 

 





 A.14  
 
 

 


 

 









 


 


 A.25 –
 

 










 


 


 A.8 
 





 

 





 





 4.28 –
 

 





 





 A.14  



 


Figure 4.10: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.4 in the case
the antecedent is equal to  .
Proof. First part. Suppose 

 


 . By axiom T we have 

 

 

, which, by
Lemma 1.30 is equivalent to 

 



 

. Now, by applying our hypothesis with in
place of, we have  

 



 

. So we have 

 



 

. But by an instance
of T and Lemma 1.30 we have  

 

, which with the above gives us 

 

.
Second part. Suppose


 . By Lemma 1.29 we have 

 


 , which is
equivalent to 


 . But then by an instance of axiom T we obtain 

 


 .
4.4.1.3 Interaction axioms of the form  

  

We now analyse interaction axioms of the form of Equation 4.4, whose antecedent is com-
posed by two diamonds. The results of this section are summarised in Figure 4.10. In the
table the reference lemmas for the axioms whose consequent can be reduced to an operator
indexed by 2 are the ones with labels swapped. For example, the axiom  

 

 


gives completeness with respect to equivalence frames such that; the reference lem-
ma shown in this case is Lemma A.14. This refers to the axiom




 , which gives
completeness with respect to equivalence frames such that


. Again, any proof given
for the latter can be repeated for the former simply by swapping the indexes.
Once again we only discuss one of the axioms here and refer the reader interested in a
particular axiom to Section A.2.2 in the Appendix.
We have completeness for all the axioms in the figure.
Theorem 4.27. All the logics in Figure 4.10 are sound and complete with respect to the class of
equivalence frames satisfying the corresponding property.
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

 



 





 


 A.1 and A.2  
 





 



 



 ?


















	
 




4.32 Only conj.


 



 

 



















	





 4.18 and 4.19  
 
 

 



 



 

 

 — – 

 



 









 


 A.1 and A.2 
 







 










 


 A.21 –


 





 



















	





 4.18 and 4.19  
 


 



 





 

 — – –


 



 


 ?Either
 


or
 



2 4.35 Only conj.


 



 






 


 4.14 and 4.15 
 
 






 



 

 
 — – –


 



 

 

 — –  
 
 

 




 









 


 A.23 –


 










 


 4.14 and 4.15 
 







 





 





 4.26 –


 





 

 — –  
 


 


Figure 4.11: An exhaustive list of interaction axioms generated by Equation 4.4 in the case
the antecedent is .
Proof. Equivalent to the proof for Theorem 4.13. All the relevant proofs (except the one for
axiom  



 
 , which is presented below) are in the Appendix in Section A.2.2.
4.4.1.3.1   



 

Lemma 4.28.  	
 

 

 
	



	
 









and 	
 






	


 

 





 
 .
Proof. First part. Assume  



 
 . So, we have 

 

 
 . But by Lemma 1.30
we have 

 



 
 . So by using the contrapositive and substituting  for, we
obtain 





 
 . So by applying axiom T twice we obtain 

 
 .
Second part. Assume 

 
 . By substituting for in the above we obtain
 





 



, so by Lemma 1.30 


 . But from



we also have (by
Lemma 1.29 and Lemma 1.30)





. So by transitivity we have 





,
which gives the result.
4.4.1.4 Interactions of the form 

  

Finally, we examine the interactions generated by an antecedent composed by the term


 

in Equation 4.4. These axiom schemas are intrinsically harder than the ones stud-
ied so far. All the axioms in this class except two can be rewritten into one of shapes we
have already examined by taking the contrapositive of them. The results for these axioms
are therefore to be found in the preceding sections.
2On connected sub-frames.
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Theorem 4.29. All the logics of Figure 4.11 except those referring to the axioms 

 




and 

 


 in Figure 4.11 are sound and complete with respect to the class of equivalence
frames satisfying the corresponding property.
We now analyse in more details the two axioms that we left out from the theorem above.
These axioms cannot intrinsically be rewritten in terms of the axioms analysed so far and
remind us of the famous McKinsey axiom (for the mono-modal case)
 


 
  


which so much attention has received in the past. It is known [Ben75, Gol75] that the Mc-
Kinsey axiom in itself (i.e. when analysed on the class of arbitrary Kripke frames) does not
correspond to any first-order condition on the Kripke frames. Still, when added to the logic
S4, it generates a condition sometimes called finality:























 



 


On the one hand, it is well-known [Lem77] that S4 + McK is sound and complete with
respect to reflexive transitive frames satisfying the condition 

3. On the other hand it has
been proved in [Gol91] that the logic K + McK (for long time one of the open problems of
modal logic) is not canonical, although still complete4.
What follows suggests that in a bi-modal context the extensions of

with multi-modal
versions ofMcK seem to behave similarly to K +McK rather than S4 +McK. In fact, at the
end of this section we conjecture that some of these systems are not canonical.
In order to analyse these two interaction axioms we will find it convenient to use the
concept of dead ends5.
Definition 4.30. A point



is called an

-dead-end if for all




we have

implies

 


.
We have the lemma:
Lemma 4.31. Given a frame 
 











and a pointon it,is an

-dead-end if any only if
for any valuation, we have

 





 






.
Proof. From left to right. Suppose
 


whereis an

-dead end. Then 



 



. So

 




.
From right to left. Supposeis not an

-dead-end and so there is a point


 
such
that

. Consider then a valuation



 



. It is easy to check that we then have

 





 


and

 






 




.
3Note that the axiomMcK has little meaning in the context of the logic S5, because in that case the modalities
collapse producing the logic Triv.
4It is also been proven that K +McK is not compact [Wan92].
5“Dead ends” are sometimes referred to as points with no links out of them, i.e. pointssuch that there is no


with




for the given relation

. In the context of reflexive frames, as in this section, no point can be a
dead-end. Our definition is the “intuitive” notion of dead-end when using reflexive frames.
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1
1
1,2
1,2
1
1
2
 

 




 


Figure 4.12: A model not satisfying the property of Lemma 4.32.
4.4.1.4.1  

 




Lemma 4.32.  
 


 



 



if and only if is such that every pointis related by relation
1 to a 2-dead-end; i.e. for all



there exists a




,

such that 



	
 




.
Proof. From right to left; consider any modelsuch that every point sees via 1 a 2-dead-
end. Suppose
 




 

; so for every point

such that

we have that there must
be a

such that





and
 



. But by assumption one of the

is a 2-dead-end,
so we have the existence of a point






such that (by Lemma 4.31)
 




. Then

 


 



.
For the converse, consider any equivalence frame , such that 
 


 



 



and
suppose by contradiction that the property above does not hold. Consider the set
 




,
the equivalence relation
 




and the quotient set

. Consider now the set

constructed by taking one and only one representativefor each class 

in

. Consider
a valuation



 

and consider the model
 














. By construction we have

 




 

(see also Figure 4.12). Then by our assumption we also have
 


 



. So
there must be a point

such that

such that
 





. But since

by assumption
is not a 2-dead-end, the equivalence class 



	must contain more than 

itself and by
constructionis true only at one point in that class and false for every 	



. So we have



 





for every







and so


 


 



, which is absurd. So for every point




there must be a 2-dead-end accessible from it.
Lemma 4.32 gives us hope that the logic 






 



 





is complete with
respect to the class of frames above. Unfortunately a completeness proof for that systems
does not seem to be so straightforward. In the following we can offer a sufficient condition
for canonicity and this problem remains open.
Observation 4.33. If  	
 



 
	


 


	


 















, then the logic S5




 



 





is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames such that every point is related by
relation 1 to a 2-dead-end; i.e. for all



there exists a




,

such that 



	
 




.
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Proof. Soundness was proven in the first part of Lemma 4.32.
For completeness, we prove that, under the assumption above, the logic S5




 



 





is canonical, i.e. that the underlying frame of the canonicalmodel
 














has the property that for all



there exists a




,

such that 



	
 




.
By Definition 1.21 and Lemma 4.31 we have that a characterising condition for 2-dead-ends
on the canonical model is that the formula







is in the world for any


. So given
any point



to prove canonicity, all we need to prove is that the set









 


 






is consistent. For that to be the case by Lemma 1.10 we have a point in the canonical model
that satisfies the property above.
We prove it by contradiction. Suppose the set above is not consistent; then it means that
we can find some
 




 
 with
 









 
 


and some

such that



 




 
 






















Call now
 
 

 



 
; by operating some re-writing we have:

 
















which by applying Lemma 1.29 gives:


 


















Now, it can be observed that, since
 









 
 


, we have



 





 
 



.
So
 


. Therefore it must be that
















, i.e. 
















. But this is impossible because by assumption we actually have 














,
and sowould be inconsistent if it contained that formula.
Note that we do have

 
 
	
 



 
	


 


	


 








as that follows from

 
 
	
 



 
	


 


	





 




which is clearly true. Unfortunately after some work on this issue it seems to me that the
hypothesis of Observation 4.33 does not hold. Actually I conjecture a result stronger than
the above.
Conjecture 4.34. The logic






 



 




is not canonical.
4.4.1.4.2  

 




The situation is similar to the one above. We do have a correspondence result but we lack
a completeness proof.
Lemma 4.35.  
 


 



 


 if and only is such that if in every connected sub-frame
either
 


or
 


.
Proof. From left to right. This part of the proof is structured as follows:
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Figure 4.13: A model not satisfying the property of Lemma 4.35. Note that 




 



and




	

 



.
1. We prove that 
 


 



 



implies that any point



either sees via 1 a
2-dead-end, or the pointsees via 2 a 1-dead-end.
2. We prove that if on a frame such that 
 


 



 



and there is point
which is an

-dead-end, then
 


on the whole connected sub-frame generated
by; where









.
3. The two facts above together prove that if 
 


 



 



, then in every con-
nected sub-frame either
 


or
 


.
1) By contradiction, consider any connected equivalence frame , in which a



does
not see via

any
 
-dead end, i.e.


















 








 
 





 








; we prove that
 


 


 



 



. To see this, consider the set
 










	



, the equivalence
relation
 




and the quotient set

. Consider now the set

defined by taking one
representative	for every equivalence class 	






: the set

is such that

	



	




we
have 	




	



 

and	


 
. Consider now the model
 

 




, by taking
the valuation



 

. By construction, in the modelfor any 	


, there is a point
accessible from	viawhich satisfies, and since by hypothesisis neither a 1-dead-end
nor a 2-dead-end (as otherwise it would see itself as dead-end) we have
 




 

. So
by the validity of the axiom we also have
 


 


 , i.e. there must be a







	,
such that
 




 , but this is impossible because by hypothesis 





 




, and by
constructionis true at just one point in 










	, and false at every point not in.
See Figure 4.13.
2) Consider now a connected frame such that 
 


 



 



and suppose for
example thatis a 1-dead-end, we want to prove that
 


on the connected sub-frame
generated by6. Ifis also a 2-dead-end, then
 


 


on the generated frame which
gives us the result. If not, suppose that 

 


; so there must be two points 







6Ifis a 2-dead-end then the argument is symmetric.
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




 


, such that





. So, since the frame is connected, without loss of generality
assume

. Consider now valuation



 

	

	






	


	

 








and the
model
 

 




built on from. So, we have
 




 
 , and so, by validity of the
axiom, we also have
 


 



. So we must have
 




, which is a contradiction
because
 




.
So we have that if the axiom is valid, then in every connected component one of the two
relations is the identity.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence modelwhose underlying frame satisfies
the property above and suppose that
 




 

.
Suppose
 


and
 




 

, so there is a







	, such that
 



. But
since
 


on the connected part, we also have
 




 . So
 



 


 . Suppose
now
 


and
 




 

. So for every







we have
 



. But then we
also have
 


 


 .
Considerations similar to the ones presented for the axiom of Section 4.4.1.4.1 lead to the
following.
Conjecture 4.36. The logic






 



 




is not canonical.
4.4.2 Discussion
In Section 4.4.1 we proved that with the exception of two logics that we discussed above,
all the interaction axioms of the shape of Equation 4.4 when added to the logic

produce
complete extensions of 

. Once again it is quite interesting to note that, considering the
relatively large number of axioms that we have examined, we did not find many new inde-
pendent logics. Indeed the only independent extension that we had not met in the previous
sections of this chapter is the logic 







that we had discussed in its more general
form (i.e.


 ) in Chapter 3.
Corollary 4.37. All the logics S5




, where

is the conjunction of formulae expressible as
Equation 4.4 but not the axioms of Section 4.4.1.4.1 and Section 4.4.1.4.2, are complete with respect
to the intersection of the corresponding classes of frames given in Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10,
Figure 4.11.
The logics are ordered as in Figure 4.14.
Proof. It follows from the canonicity proofs of Theorem 4.23, Theorem 4.25, Theorem 4.27,
Theorem 4.29. Proving the relation between the logics is straightforward.
If we consider all the logics examined so far in this chapter except the two McKinsey
style logics we have the general picture of Figure 4.14. In the figure, the logics are ordered
strength-wise. So, the strongest logic is of course Triv(represented as S5


 






),
the weakest simply S5. In between we have a few logic systems, the weakest of which
are the logic 


 and the ones generated by the two axioms that we examined in Sec-
tion 4.3. Note that these three logics are independent. Stronger extensions include logics
in which the knowledge of an agent is included in the knowledge of the other and com-
bination of these. In the figure we can note that logics which are positioned on either one
of the two wings of the lattice represent scenarios in which the agents have different capa-
bilities, typically one having introspection over the other’s knowledge. Note that the logic
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Figure 4.14: The independent extensions of S5that can be obtained by adding the axioms
studied in this chapter. The logics for which results are only conjectured are not included in
the figure.
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




 







 


is placed in the centre of the diagram reflecting the homogeneity
of hypercube agents.
The equivalences we have proved in this section are also quite interesting. For example
we have seen that in the case of 2 agents axiom 2WD, sometimes known as Catach’s axiom,
is equivalent to




 , whose meaning in terms of knowledge is more intuitive.
This axiom basically says that the knowledge of facts that are known to be known by one
agent is effectively shared. In fact, note that in Lemma 4.24 we also proved that the axiom









also follows from



.
4.5 Conclusions
In Section 1.4.1 we motivated the need for formal models of agents that share part of their
knowledge. Hypercubes form one of these classes; in fact, as we have seen in Chapter 3,
agents modelled by hypercubes share part of their knowledge following the logic


 .
In Chapter 3, although we were able to see the axiom



in a more intuitive form, we
were still left with the question of how the logic 


 was related to the logic S5 and
to its neighbours. We conducted this analysis in this chapter for the case
 

were we
examined all the interactions axioms that can be written as an implication expressing the
fact that knowledge and facts considered possible are related to each other up to a level of
nesting of two.
A spectrum of degrees of knowledge sharing has emerged. For the case
 

, the logic



 was shown to be the weakest symmetric extension of

, but other logics, meaning-
ful in epistemic settings have emerged.
Although not analysed in this chapter the finite model property for all the canonical
logics should follow and with it decidability. Unfortunately, results for the two McKinsey-
style axioms remain conjectured at this stage. These seem to be quite non-trivial to obtain
but if proven they would provide very interesting examples of non-canonical extensions of


, something that to my knowledge has not been shown before.
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Chapter 5
Refining and checking knowledge
structures
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we have analysed hypercube systems at various conceptual
levels. We have seen that hypercubes are modelled by the logic S5WD and represent agents
with no a-priori information about each other’s local states and whose evolution is linked to
information broadcasting and no private message-passing.
In particular in Section 3.8 we discussed how to adapt the formal model of contexts to
account for the evolution of hypercubes. We used internal and external actions explicitly in
order to model the change that broadcasting actions impose on the local states of the agents.
In that model Kripke structures (although “generated” by the formalism) are not present
explicitly in the definition of change in the local states. In this chapter we discuss whether
Kripke semantics can be proven useful to model the update of knowledge states.
More specifically, this chapter can be seen as addressing the following question. We
already know that Kripke models are good tools for representing static private and common
knowledge. Suppose we have a modelrepresenting a snapshot of the knowledge of a
MAS and further suppose that a broadcasting act is performed. The broadcasted message
will affect the status of knowledge of the agents. Is it possible to refine the modelso
that the new model takes into account the changes in the knowledge of the agents following
the receipt of the message? This chapter proposes a method for performing this operation.
Actually this chapter tries to go beyond that as it is also closely related to the more general
question of which approach (proof-theoretical or semantical) is best suited to reason about
knowledge in a MAS.
From the discussion of page 22 it follows that the standard approach to using the formal
machinery provided by the logic S5 is to describe a situation as a set of formulae
and to
attempt to show that the situation satisfies a property

by establishing
  

or

 
 


.
Establishing


involves finding a proof in S5 of

from
, while establishing

 
 


involves reasoning about all (usually infinitely many) equivalence Kripke models satisfying

to show that they also satisfy

. The completeness of S5 shows that these two notions are
equivalent. However, the complexity of the validity problem for the logic 

 was proved
to be PSPACE-complete and that goes up to EXPTIME-completeness for the case of 

 

 
(see [HM92a] for details).
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In order to overcome the intractability of this approach, Halpern and Vardi have pro-
posed to use model checking as an alternative to theorem proving [HV91]. In the model
checking approach, the situation to be modelled is codified as a single Kripke model
rather than as a set of formulae
. The task of verifying that a property

holds boils down
to checking thatsatisfies

, written
 

. This task is computationally much easier than
the theorem proving task, being linear in the size ofand the size of

(see [HV91] for
details).
Halpern and Vardi informally illustrate their approach by modelling the muddy chil-
dren puzzle. In that puzzle, there are children and atomic propositions 


 
representing whether each of the children has mud on their faces or not. Various announce-
ments are made, first by the father of the children and then by the children themselves. The
children thus acquire information about what other children know, and after some time the
muddy ones among them are able to conclude that they are indeed muddy. We will discuss
the problem in greater detail in Section 5.2.1.
Halpern and Vardi propose the following way of arriving at the modelto be checked.
They start with the most general model for the set of atomic propositions at hand. In order
to deal with the announcements made, they successively refine the model with formulae
expressing the announcements made. This refinement process consists of removing some
links from the Kripke model. At any time during this process, they can check whether child

knows(for example), by checking whether the current model satisfies. This method
is illustrated in the paper [HV91] and the book [FHMV95], but a precise definition of the
refinement operation is not given.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we visit the idea of model refinement
and show the intrinsic problems with the idea of refining Kripke models. In Section 5.3 we
introduce a structure derived from a Kripke model, which we call a Kripke tree, and define
the refinement operation on Kripke trees. We illustrate this notion using the muddy children
example in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5 we prove the properties of refinement of Kripke trees
and we then conclude in Section 5.6 with some conclusions and general remarks. First in
Section 5.1.1 we fix the syntax and semantics used in this chapter.
5.1.1 Syntax and semantics
In this chapter we will make use of slightly different syntax and semantics from the ones
introduced in Section 1.2.1.
The first change from Section 1.2.1 is that we use a finite set of variables for the proposi-
tional atoms. Given the more applied nature of this chapter this is not a serious technical
limitation1 but it will help us with the machinery. The set of agents is unchanged from Sec-
tion 1.2.1 and it is any finite set
 






.
Here we will use the extended syntax introduced in Section 1.3.1.1. In particular we will
have operators for “Everybody knows” and common knowledge. Formally, it suffices to
define formulae as:

 















where


and



. As usual the formula

represents the situation in which the
agent

knows the fact represented by the formula

, while 

means that

is common
1Any real world example can be coded with a finite set of atoms.
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knowledge in the group2. The other propositional connectives can be defined in the usual
way. The modal connectives ,and are defined as:
 


means 



means



	



 

means 

The formula 

means “it is consistent with agent

’s knowledge that

”,

means that
everyone knows

. The operator is the dual of. Although not particularly useful intu-
itively, we will need it for technical reasons.
It is worth noting that an announcement of

results in common knowledge of

among
the hearers, because as well as hearing

they also see that the others have heard it too
(we assume throughout that all the agents are perceptive, intelligent, truthful). If one agent
secretly informs all the others of

, the result will be that everyone knows

, but

will not
be common knowledge.
We will also need the following definitions.
Definition 5.1. A formula is universal if it has only the modalities

and no negations out-
side them. Formally take 
 
















and define a formula

to be universal if it follows the following syntax:


 





















Definition 5.2. A formula is safe if it is universal and noand noappears in the scope of

.
Formally take 
 
















and define a formula

to be safe if it follows the following syntax:


 















Definition 5.3. A formula is disjunction-free if it is universal and has no

. Formally take

 










and define a formula

to be disjunction-free if it follows the following syntax:


 















In this chapter we proceed in a slightly different setting. As we know a Kripke model
describes a set of possible situations (worlds). In this chapter we sometimes need to be able
to identify which is the “actual” world among all the possible ones that themodel represents.
Formally this is the definition of equivalence model local to this chapter.
Definition 5.4. Given a setof agents, an equivalence Kripke model
 












is given
by:
1. A set

, whose elements are calledworlds;
2Note that, differently from Section 1.3.1.1, we assume

here.
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2. An-indexed family of relations
 






	. For each




, is an equivalence
relation on

(




), called the accessibility relation;
3. A function




, called the interpretation;
4. A world



, the actual world.
We will use satisfaction for the basic modal language as defined in Definition 1.2, and
satisfaction for the operators of common knowledge and “everybody knows” as in Sec-
tion 1.3.2.2.
The actual world of the model represents the situation captured by the model and it is
where the formulae will be checked for satisfaction. In this chapter we do not use the notion
of validity as we are only interested in truth of formulae, especially at the actual world.
Definition 5.5. Given a model
 












we say that

is true at,
 

, if
 



.
Recall Definition 1.15 about points being reachable from each other. The following fact
(reported in [FHMV95]) is useful for understanding the technical difference betweenand
.
Theorem 5.6.
1. 
 




if and only if for all	that are reachable from	insteps, we have
 


.
2. 
 



if and only if for all	that are reachable from	, we have
 


.
5.2 Refining Kripke models
Halpern and Vardi propose to refine Kripke models in order to model the evolution of
knowledge. They illustrate their method with the muddy children puzzle. This example
is a variant of another puzzle presented in [GS58] and is particularly important in the liter-
ature. The version we discuss is the one given in [Bar81] and discussed in [FHMV95]; we
report it in the following.
5.2.1 The muddy children puzzle
There is a large group of children playing in the garden. A certain number (say ) get mud
on their foreheads. Each child can see the mud (if present) on others but not on his own
forehead. If 


then each child can see another with mud on its forehead, so each one
knows that at least one in the group is muddy. The father first announces that at least one of
them is muddy (which, if 


, is something they know already); and then he repeatedly
asks them ‘Does any of you know whether you have mud on your own forehead?’ The first
time they all answer ‘no’. Indeed, they go on answering ‘no’ to the first

questions; but
at theth those with muddy foreheads are able to answer ‘yes’.
At first sight, it seems rather puzzling that the children are eventually able to answer the
father’s question positively. The clue to understanding what goes on lies in the notion of
common knowledge. Although everyone knows the content of the father’s initial announce-
ment, the father’s saying it makes it common knowledge among them, so now they all know
that everyone else knows it, etc. Consider a few cases of.
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
 

, i.e. just one child has mud. That child is immediately able to answer ‘yes’, since she
has heard the father and doesn’t see any other child with mud.

 

, sayand
 
have mud. Everyone answers ‘no’ the first time. Nowthinks: since
 
answered ‘no’ the first time, he must see someone with mud. Well, the only person I
can see with mud is
 
, so if
 
can see someone else it must be me. So answers ‘yes’
the second time.
 
reasons symmetrically about, and also answers ‘yes’.

 
 
, say

 


. Everyone answers ‘no’ the first two times. But nowthinks: if it was just
 
and with mud, they would have answered ‘yes’ the second time. So there must be
a third person with mud; since I can only see
 


having mud, the third person must
be me. Soanswers ‘yes’ the third time. For symmetrical reasons, so do
 


.
And similarly for other cases of.
To see that it was not common knowledge before the father’s announcement that one
of the children was muddy, consider again 
 

, say 

 
. Of course and
 
both know
someone is muddy (they see each other), but, for example,doesn’t know that
 
knows that
someone is dirty. For allknows,
 
might be the only dirty one, and therefore not be able to
see a dirty child.
5.2.2 An engineering example
The muddy children puzzle, together with its many variants like the three wise men puzzle,
etc. is popular among computer scientists. The reason is that it encodes subtle properties
about reasoning, while also being applicable to real life scenarios. We can imagine an ex-
ample in which an engineering system could benefit from being able to cope with muddy-
children-like situations.
Consider a factory in which similar robots collectively manufacture an object while mov-
ing in group in a large space. The robots can roughly be thought of being made of two
components: the reasoning module and the mechanical actuators, effectively operating on
the object. We want to design a fault detection system for the actuators. Given the large
area the robots can be in, the installation of cameras to monitor the operational status of the
robots’ arms is not an option.
Let us suppose that the robots have a visual system directed towards the other robots
that can detect faults in their mechanical arms. Note this is quite a reasonable assumption,
since it is often problematic to have visual systems that can do self-monitoring as well as
monitoring the environment. Suppose now that the factory has a quality control mechanism
that can detect if something went wrong during the production of the object and assume this
device broadcasts an alarm every time it notices a defect in the production.
This robotic scenario complies with the muddy children example: the children are now
robots, the role of the father is taken by the fault detection system. Note that the assumption
of communication being common knowledge is not violated because messages are assumed
to be broadcasted to all the agents. The task of the robots is then to reason about their status
and stop their operation in case they come to know that their mechanical arm is faulty. The
evolution of their knowledge proceeds exactly as the case of the muddy children example
where we assume the robots to operate synchronously.
Assuming the robots have a reasoning module able to handle the muddy children prob-
lem, the group of robots is then effectively able to do collective diagnosis.
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Figure 5.1:: The Kripke model for the muddy children puzzle with
 
 
.
In the following we refer our discussion to muddy children, but the above scenario can
serve equally well.
5.2.3 Halpern and Vardi’s formulation
Suppose
 






and
 







 

; means that the

th child has mud on its
forehead. Suppose
 
 
. The assumption of this puzzle is that each child can see the other
children but cannot see itself, so each child knows whether the others have mud or not, but
does not know about itself. Under these assumptions, Halpern and Vardi propose the Kripke
structure of Figure 5.1 to model the initial situation.
Letbe anyworld inwhich there are at least twomuddy children (i.e.is one of the four
upper worlds). In, every child knows that at least one of the children has mud. However,
it is not the case that it is common knowledge that each child has mud, since the world at
the bottom of the lattice is reachable (cf. Theorem 5.6).
To model the father’s announcement, Halpern and Vardi refine the modelin Figure
5.1, arriving atin Figure 5.2 (these figures also appear in [HV91], [FHMV95]). The refine-
ment process is not precisely defined in [HV91], [FHMV95], though arguments in favour of
the transformation fromtoare given.
Suppose now that the father asks the children whether they knowwhether they are mud-
dy or not, and the children answer simultaneously that that they do not. Halpern and Vardi
argue that this renders all models in which there is only one muddy child inaccessible, re-
sulting in(Figure 5.3).
If there are precisely two children with mud (i.e. the actual world is one of the three in
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Figure 5.2:: The Kripke structure after the father speaks.
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Figure 5.3: : The Kripke structure after the children announce that they don’t know
whether they are muddy.
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the second layer), then each of the muddy children now knows it is muddy. For suppose the
actual world is the left one of those three, i.e.with



 








. We easily verify that



 





and
 





.
If all three children are muddy, i.e. the actual worldis the top one, then we are not yet
done, for we do not have
 





for any

. The father again asks each of the children if
they know if they are muddy, and the model is refined again according to their answer “no”,
resulting inwhich iswith the last remaining links removed. (is not illustrated.)
We can easily check that
 





for each

.
In summary, the method proposed by Halpern and Vardi for solving muddy-children-
type puzzles is the following. Start with a suitably general modelreflecting the initial
set-up of the puzzle. Refine it successively by the announcements made. At the end of the
announcements, check formulae against the refinedmodel. In the example above, we refined

first by


 











(the father’s announcement), and then twice by


 













































which corresponds to each of the three children announcing that they don’t know whether
they are muddy or not.
Halpern and Vardi do not precisely define what refinement by a formula means. The
intuition they give is that refinement removes a minimal set of links of the model, so that
the model satisfies the formula at the actual world. Removing links means that epistemic
possibilities are removed, that is, knowledge is gained, so this seems intuitively the right
thing to do.
5.2.4 Problems with refinement of Kripke models
Let us write 

to denote the result of refining the modelby the formula

. Thus, in
the example above,
 


 

, etc.
The muddy-children example discussed above naturally lead us to the question of whe-
ther it is possible to make precise the notion of refinement of a Kripke model by a formula,
and of what properties this would have. Essentially any refinement procedure will remove
the links to the states that are responsible for the non-satisfaction of the formula we are
refining with. However, some unexpected problems of any natural procedure operating on
Kripke models can be found.
Consider the following examples.
Example 5.2.1. Let be the Kripke model illustrated in Figure 5.4, with the left-hand world
the actual world, and consider refining by . However we implement the revision of the model, it
would look as though the resulting model should be the model(see figure). What happens is that
agent 1 gains the knowledge of, and so must eliminate the epistemic possibility ofby removing
the link.
The counterintuitive property of this example is that  
 




 
 , while


 




 
 .
Thus, in , agent 3 knows thatis consistent with 1’s knowledge. But after agent 1 learnsfor
sure in, agent 3 no longer knows this!
Example 5.2.2. Figure 5.5 shows a model and (the only) two outcomes one could consider for its
refinement by





. One must remove either the 1 link or the 2 link in order to prevent the
1–2 path to the world exhibiting





. The choice is which link to remove. Both outcomes reveal
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Figure 5.4: and(Example 5.2.1).
2
3
3
1
2

3
1















Figure 5.5: Two outcomes for refinement of the top model by





(Example 5.2.2).
undesirable properties of the refinement operator. In the first case, removing the 1 link adds too much
to 1’s knowledge (he learns), while the second case gives us a situation in which a model satisfies


 


but its refinement by





does not. It is counterintuitive that 3’s knowledge should
change in this way when we refine by





.
The second case at least has the desirable property that a minimal change of the knowledge of
agents at the actual worldis made, since the set of reachable states fromis maximised (cf. Theo-
rem 5.6).
Example 5.2.3. Refinement by universal formulae (Definition 5.1) ought to be cumulative, and such
formulae ought to commute with each other (i.e. 

 

= 

 

). However, another example
shows that this will be hard to achieve. Consider the model shown at the top of Figure 5.6, and let
 


and
 









. Whatever way one thinks about defining the refinement operation,
the result in the left-hand branch seems clear. Note that  already satisfies





and
therefore    





 

 
 

 .
An argument for the stated result of  





was given in Example 5.2.2, and further
refining by leaves little room for maneuver. However, the resulting models differ on whether they
satisfy (for example) .
Example 5.2.3 shows that even universal formulae, do not enjoy commutativity in any
reasonable refinement setting. However, commutativity for universal formulae seems in-
tuitively correct: the order in which ideal agents acquire information should not matter.
Non-universal formulae are a different matter, since they can express absence of knowledge,
and this will not commute with the acquisition of new knowledge.
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Figure 5.6: Two evolutions of (Example 5.2.3), showing that 

 


 

 

 

.
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5.3 Refining Kripke trees
Some of the problems exhibited by the three examples at the end of the preceding section
seem to be due to the following fact: when we remove a link in a Kripke model in order
to block a certain path, we also block other paths that used that link. To overcome this
problem, we would like to unravel Kripke models into trees, in which each link participates
in just one path. At first sight this looks like it will destroy the finiteness of our models, a
feature on which effective refinement operators andmodel checking operators rely. To retain
finiteness, we will need to limit in advance the maximum nesting of boxes that is allowed,
and construct a tree to depth greater than this number. Semantic structures similar to Kripke
trees have been defined in [HC84]. Our definition differs in detail from the one in [HC84],
but it largely agrees with it in spirit.
In this section we define the notion of Kripke tree, show a translation of equivalence
Kripke models into Kripke trees and define an algorithm for refining knowledge structures.
5.3.1 Kripke trees: basic definitions
Definition 5.7 (Kripke tree). A Kripke tree 
 

 







is
a set
 
; elements of
 
are called vertices;
an-indexed family
 






	of edges

 

 
, such that the structure

 




forms
a tree, that is,
– there is a unique vertex 


 
such that for all 


 
and



,










. The
vertexis called the root of .
– for every vertexthere is a unique and finite path from the root to, i.e. unique sequences













and









such that







 








(
 

 
 
) and
 
.
a function




, called interpretation.
We write to mean the transitive closure of the union of relations in, i.e.









 if there is
a path fromto

, i.e. sequences













and









such that







 








, with
 

 
 
,
 
and
 


.
We also allow the empty tree









which we write as. It has no root.
Definition 5.8 (Generated Kripke tree). Let
 













be an equivalence Kripke model.
The Kripke tree 
 

 







generated byis given as follows:
The set of vertices is the set of paths in:
 
 






































 












 

 
 




is an -indexed family of edges. For 




 
, there is an

-edge between 


, writ-
ten










, if 

equals extended by an

-link, i.e. 
 





















 



















for some.
The valuationis defined by



 


























.
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The vertex


 
is the root of the tree.
When the modelis clear from the context or not relevant we will simply indicate the
tree as .
Generated Kripke trees are irreflexive, intransitive, anti-symmetric, anti-convergent and
serial.
If the modelhas at least two distinct worlds related by some relation, then the tree
 
is infinite. For our purposes of model refinement, we usually want to deal with finite
trees. The tree 

is the tree with paths truncated at length . Obviously by truncating
the tree we will lose seriality.
Definition 5.9 (Truncated tree of depth). Given a tree  
 

 







, the truncated tree of
depthis defined as 

 

 










, where

 

 




 
the distance offrom the root is less or equal than

.



 


 is the restriction ofto
 

,



 



 is the restriction ofto
 

.
Infinite and finite trees satisfy modal formulae in the expected way:
Definition 5.10 (Interpretation). Let

be a formula, and a tree. The satisfaction of

by at
vertex, written 
 
 

, is inductively defined as follows:

 
 
 
if






;

 
 
 


if not 
 
 

;

 
 
 



if 
 
 

and 
 
 

;

 
 
 



if for all



 
,










implies 
 
 


;

 
 
 


if for all



 











 implies 
 
 


.
The tree satisfies

, written 
 

, if it satisfies

at its root. The empty treesatisfies no formula.
An infinite tree is semantically equivalent to its generating modelas the following
shows:
Lemma 5.11. Let
 













be an equivalence Kripke model and  
 

 







its
associated Kripke tree. Let 
 
















be any vertex ending in, and

any formula.
Then:

 



if and only if  
 
 


Proof. By induction on the structure of

. The result holds for atoms by construction. For the
inductive case observe that there is a one-to-one correspondence between paths infrom
and extensions of the path represented by vertex.
In particular, Lemma 5.11 applies to valuations at the root of the tree, corresponding to
the actual world of the model.
Corollary 5.12. 
 

if and only if 
 

.
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For the case of truncated trees, Lemma 5.11 is not valid. However, we can prove a related
result for formulae up to a certain level of modal nesting.
We inductively define the  

of a formula as follows:
Definition 5.13 (Rank of a formula). The rank  




of a formula

is defined as follows:

 




 

, whereis a propositional atom.

 





 
 




.

 








 


 







 





.

 








 


 







 





.

 



	


 
 







.

 





 
.
The rank of a formula

intuitively represents themaximumnumber of nestedmodalities
that occur in

. If an operator occurs in

we take the value of  




to be infinite.
The rank of a formula reflects the maximal length of any path that needs to be explored to
evaluate

on an infinite tree. In other words, to evaluate a formula

of rank atwe
need not examine worlds whose distance fromis greater than.
Lemma 5.14. If  






,
 

if and only if 



 

.
Proof. By corollary 5.12,
 

if and only if 
 

, but, by induction, the evaluation of a
formula of  






does not involve the evaluation of nodes of depth greater than. So
 


 

if and only if 



 

, which gives the result.
In the following we shift our attention from an equivalence Kripke model to its truncated
generated tree. Truncated generated trees satisfy S5 -axioms provided that the rank of the
formulae is sufficiently small compared to the size on the tree. The following clarifies under
which circumstances S5 -axioms are satisfied at the root of the tree and that S5 -inference
rules are sound.
Lemma 5.15. Letbe an equivalence model and 

its generated tree truncated at.
1.  



 

, where

is a tautology, and  






.
2.  



 















, where

 






 









.
3.  



 





, where  









.
4.  



 









, where  








.
5.  



 
 





 


, where  








.
6. If for every vertex


 
of 

, 



 
 

, then for every


 
, 



 
 



, for any



.
7. If for every vertex


 
of 

, 



 
 

, and 



 
 



then 



 
 

.
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Proof. We prove item number 4; the others can be done similarly. Suppose  




 









, where  








. Since 

is generated by, and  



	



	

	




,
then by Lemma 5.14 we have


 









. But by hypothesisis an equivalence
model. This is absurd.
Before we proceed further, we introduce a few basic definitions and operations on sub-
trees.
Definition 5.16 (Rooted-subtrees). Let  

 

 










,  
 

 







be trees with roots






. The tree 

is a rooted subtree of  , written 


 , if 


 



 


 
,
 


,
and
 


.
Definition 5.17 (Intersection of trees). Let  

 

 










and  
 

 







be trees such
that 
 





 
. The intersection of and 

is 

 

 

 


 













 


.
It is easy to see that definition 5.17 (when applicable) defines a tree.
Definition 5.18 (Restriction of trees). Let 
 

 







be a tree with root, and
 

a subset of
 
. The restriction of to
 

, written , is the largest rooted subtree of generated by whose
vertices are in
 

. If the root of is not in
 

, then 
 
.
5.3.2 Kripke trees: refinement
In Section 5.2.4, we discussed the difficulties that arise when using equivalence Kripke mod-
els as knowledge structures for refinement. Example 5.2.3 showed that any straightforward
procedure to refine an equivalence Kripke model will be non-commutative even for univer-
sal formulae, i.e. there will be universal

 
, such that  
 



 
 
 
.
Commutativity for universal formulae can be achieved by shifting to Kripke trees. Before
we can show this, we must define refinement on Kripke trees.
The typical working scenario in which we operate is the same one as that advocated
by [HV91], except that we refine 

instead of. It can be described as follows: we are
given an initial configuration of a MAS, and a set of formulae









that represent
the update of the scenario. The question is whether the updated configuration will validate
a set of formulae









. We assume every

to have finite rank, i.e. we cannot check
a formula containing the operator of common knowledge. There is no restriction on the
formulas

s.
Our method operates as follows:
1. Start from the most general equivalence Kripke modelthat represents the MAS.
2. Generate the infinite tree , as given in Definition 5.8.
3. Generate from 

, the truncated tree of depth, for some sufficiently large.
4. Sequentially refine 

with









.
5. Check whether the resulting tree structure satisfies









.
The method described above needs some further explanation. First, what is the most
general Kripke model representing a MAS configuration? How are we to build it? Our
answer is the same as that given by Halpern and Vardi. Assume the set of atomsis finite,
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as we set it to be in Section 5.1.1. We take the model whose universe

is equal to

	
with
an interpretation that covers all the possible assignments to the atoms. We take the relations







to be the universal relations on



, andto be the actual world of the given
MAS.
In general we will require thatis more specific than the most general model, e.g. some
agent will have certain knowledge about the world. We can add all the formulae that need
be satisfied to the set of updates









. For example in the muddy children example
we can start from the model with universal relations and add





















 




to the set of updates.
We have already explained how to execute steps 1, 2, 3, and 5. We now present a notion
of refinement to execute step 4.
Definition 5.19 (Refinement of Kripke tree structures). Given a truncated Kripke tree 
 

 







, a point


 
, and a formula

, the result 

 

 




 

of refining by

atis procedurally
defined as follows. We assume that the negation symbols in

apply only to atomic propositions (to
achieve this, negations may be pushed inwards using de Morgan laws and dualities

 and

 ).
If 
 
, then 

 
.
If 
 
 

, then 

 
 .
Otherwise the result is defined inductively on

:
–

 
. 

 
.
–

 

. 

 
.
–

 

 . 

 

 




 




 




 
 

.
–

 

 . If

 




 



 




 
 then 

 

 




 
 , and if

 




 
 


 




 

then
 

 

 




 

. Otherwise 

is non-deterministically given as

 




 

or

 




 
 .
–

 



. 

is given by computing as follows:
 


 
 ;
for each

such that










do
if

 






 
 
, then
 


 
 





 


else
 


 

 






 

–

 
 


. Letbe the set
 

 





 














.
If
 

, then 

 
,
else 

is non-deterministically chosen to be a

-maximal element of.
–

 


. 

is given by computing as follows:
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 


 
 ;
for each

such that









 do
if

 






 
 
, then
 


 
 





 


else
 


 

 






 

–

 
 

. Letbe the set
 

 





 











 

.
If
 

, then 

 
,
else 

is non-deterministically chosen to be a

-maximal element of.
 
 

means

 




 

, whereis the root of .
Lemma 5.20. Given a tree , a formulaand a point,

 




 
is a tree.
Proof. It follows from the fact that if is a tree then  is also a tree.
The intuition behind

 




 

is that it is obtained by removing as small a set of links from
 as possible, in order to satisfy

. Note that, due to the clauses for the connectives



 



 ,
we have that the tree

 




 

is not uniquely defined. However, we will see that running
the procedure on the muddy children example does not introduce non-determinism.
5.4 The muddy children puzzle using Kripke trees
In Section 5.2.1, we described the muddy children puzzle and we reported the formalisation
that was given in [FHMV95], [HV91]. The aim of the present section is to solve an instance
of it (where the actual situation is coded by the tuple

that we equivalently write as









; all the children are muddy) by using Kripke trees and the methods we introduced
in Section 3.
We start with the most general model to represent the puzzle: this is the modelof
Figure 5.13. Given, we generate the infinite tree forand then the truncation of
 

. In this example we truncate at level, say, ten. The starting tree and the three successive
refinements are in Figure 5.7, and 5.8 (shown to three levels). Let


 











(this is the father’s announcement), and


 













































(the children’s simultaneous reply that they don’t know whether or not
they are muddy). We now sequentially update by

and then by

three times. Note
that since all children are muddy, they will have to speak three times before everyone knows
he is muddy.
Consider the algorithm of Definition 5.19 and . Following the algorithm, the refined
tree  


 
 
in Figure 5.7 is in which the links to states where no children are muddy
3According the the notion of most general model as described in Section 5.3.2 the model should actually
be 




















, where

is a family of universal relations on	


	, and










	


 

. The
model we analyse is the result of the update of by












  



 










where the formula above represents the fact that children can see each other. For brevity (as in [FHMV95],
[HV91]) we start our analysis from ; i.e. rather than building the tree for and update it first by











, we directly build the tree for . The reader can check that this leads to the same result.
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have been removed. The tree  
 
 

 

(shown in Figure 5.8) is then constructed by
isolating worlds that do not see two worlds for every relation. In fact, only in this case one
of the formulae 

 



can fail on a point of . We can now obtain similarly.
Having made all the refinements, we can now check whether or not the muddy children
know that they are muddy. This involves checking
 


 









 






which is indeed the case.
Analogously we can prove that the procedure given in Section 5.3 produces solutions for
the other cases of the muddy children.
Note that had we decided to consider the Kripke tree truncated at


, the formula









 




would still be satisfied at the root after three refinements.
Let us now consider the example presented in Section 5.2.2. By following the above
described procedure with the assumption of synchronicity, thefaulty robots will announce
their fault and disconnect from the system afterrounds, allowing the system to start normal
production again and substitute the faulty units.
5.5 Properties of refinement on Kripke trees
In the rest of this chapter we analyse some more properties of the refinement procedure that
we defined in Definition 5.19.
The first remark that we should make is that refining a scenario by some agent’s knowl-
edge cannot affect other agents’ knowledge, as was the case in Example 5.2.1 for Kripke
models. This is because by unravelling a Kripke model we produce a tree whose leaves are
in a bijection with paths of the original model. We formalise this as follows:
Theorem 5.21. Let be a tree, and




two formulae, we have the following:
If 
 



then  


 




with


 
 

Proof. Nodes of a Kripke tree are in a bijection with paths of the generatingmodel. Therefore
by removing some
 
-links we cannot affect the interpretation of any modality whose index
is not
 
. The only problematic case would arise if

 
 
and  
 
, but this is excluded
by hypothesis.
Although the theorem above refers to infinite trees, an analogue version can be proved
for truncated trees.
The second point worth stressing is that Kripke trees solve the problem of Example 5.2.3,
i.e. we can prove commutativity although the result is limited to safe formulae (Defini-
tion 5.2). We need a few results before achieving this.
Lemma 5.22. Let 
 

 












 

 

 










be trees. The following hold.
1.

 




 


 .
2. Ifis disjunction-free, then 

 
implies

 





 



 





 
, where


 


 
.
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Figure 5.7: 
 : The Kripke trees before and after the father speaks.
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Figure 5.8: 
 : The Kripke trees after the children speak the first and second time.
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Lemma 5.24. Ifis safe, then the outcome of
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We show that, for universal formulae, the change made by a refinement is the minimal
one possible in order to satisfy the formula:
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Theorem 5.27 (Commutativity). If
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Proof. By Theorem 5.26,   
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are maxima in the same set. Therefore they
are equal.
It is worth mentioning an example of which non-universal formulae can make commu-
tativity to fail, independently of non-determinism.
Example 5.5.1. Commutativity can fail for arbitrary formulae. The problem is that if the formulae
are non-universal, the order of updating can play a role in the outcome of the update and we might
have that one of the two cases fail. The example we report here is the tree  , illustrated in Figure 5.9,
where the root is the top vertex. Consider now  
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5.6 Conclusions
This chapter is related to Section 3.8. While that section was focused on the study of hyper-
cubes, there we saw a low-level formal technique for reasoning explicitly about the evolution
of the local states of the agents. Here we isolated the case of internal actions consisting in the
update of the agents’ knowledge and we showed that Kripke semantics can still be a useful
modelling tool.
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The work of this chapter builds upon the influential [HV91] in which model refinement
and model checking were first proposed in the case of modelling knowledge for MAS. With
respect to that paper, this chapter should be seen as an attempt to clarify issues such as
which are the appropriate semantic structures to use, which algorithms for refinement seem
to be promising and what properties this refinement should have. We argued that model
refinement could not be defined satisfactorily on Kripke models, and proposed a definition
on Kripke trees obtained from Kripke models instead. The shift from Kripke models to
Kripke trees let us achieve two technical results. First, we showed that it is possible to refine
trees by a formula expressing knowledge of an agent without affecting the knowledge of the
other agents (Theorem 5.27). Note that this was not apparently possible on standard Kripke
models (see Example 5.2.1). Secondly, while it seems impossible to obtain commutativity
even for safe formulae on Kripke models, we showed this is possible for Kripke trees.
More generally, the chapter (by following the approach suggested in [HV91]) tries to an-
swer one of the critics that are often addressed to using Kripke semantics for representing
knowledge in MAS scenarios. These critics involve essentially the fact that Kripke semantics
is “ungrounded” (see for example [Woo97]). By “ungrounded” it is meant that there is no
clear correspondence between possible worlds semantics and the physical state (in this case
the knowledge of the agents) the agents are in. By providing a notion of refinement on Krip-
ke trees and study how these evolve it is hoped that a more direct correspondence between
physical processes and Kripke semantics can be drawn.
It should be added that many of the issues discussed in this chapter seem worth investi-
gating further. For example, although it is reasonable to assume that the logic of Kripke trees
(as they were defined in Definition 5.7) is simply K because of the too weak characteristics
being imposed on the frames, it remains to be seen whether there is actually a logic for gener-
ated Kripke trees (Definition 5.8). What about the Kripke frames that result from the process
of updating? We know that generated Kripke frames satisfy axioms of S5 (Lemma 5.15) up
to a certain depth, but it is hard to think of a suitable restriction that will work for arbitrary
truncated trees that result from an update.
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Another interesting point would be to investigate whether there exist circumstances in
which commutativity fails for universal formulae in which no non-deterministic choices
have to be performed. In order to investigate further properties of the algorithm given in
Definition 5.19 it would seem appropriate to build an implementation of it.
In this chapter, the algorithm of Definition 5.19 was tested only on the muddy children
problem. In [Dav99] this algorithm has been implemented in JAVA and results for the mud-
dy children problem have been verified. [Dav99] confirmed that the algorithm produces the
expected result also for other scenarios such as the three wise men puzzle.
It would also seem promising to compare the approach presented in this chapter to a
recent work [Ger99], where similar themes are investigated by using non-well-founded set
theory. A solution to the problem of refinement on Kripke models by the use of trees is also
reported there, although the technical machinery is different.
Also related to this chapter is some recent work by Baltag and colleagues ([BMS98]).
[BMS98] develops a logic of epistemic actions. The machinery for updating Kripke models
developed there involves making copies of worlds when needed. The work is more con-
cerned with the expressivity of a formal language that can express announcements and it
has a somewhat different focus from this chapter. It would seem promising to extend the
multi-modal syntax used in this chapter to include the operators discussed in [BMS98].
The work presented in this chapter was developed independently from [Ger99] and
[BMS98] and the authors were not aware of each other’s ongoing research.
A final note concerns Section 5.2.2 in which we discussed an example in which the ideas
of this chapter can be applied. This consisted in a collective diagnosis problem among a
group of homogeneous robots working at a factory. It should be clear that the scenarios com-
monly analysed in collective diagnosis research (see for example [FNS98], [BD93], [JW92],
[Sch98]) are somehow different from our example. Our example is much closer to ideal
scenarios coming directly from robotics.
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Chapter 6
Discussion: combining logics for MAS
theories
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we have argued that completeness and decidability are very important features
of a MAS theory. Indeed these two properties played an important role throughout this
thesis. Most of Chapter 3 was focused on proving completeness for the logics that capture
epistemic properties of hypercubes. Similarly, Chapter 4 investigated whether a relatively
simple class of extensions of the epistemic system S5enjoy completeness. Although we did
not ask the question of decidability in Chapter 4, this was the topic of some of the discussion
we carried out in Chapter 3.
It would be fair to say that proving these two properties for the logics we have examined
in this thesis has not always been straightforward. In particular in Chapter 3 we have seen
that the canonical model for the logic S5WD is based on a DI frame and we had to rely on
some more subtle arguments to prove its completeness. In Chapter 4 we had to leave open
the completeness problem for two logics.
These were not unfortunate occurrences. Many of the logics for MAS proposed in the
literature have complex completeness and decidability proofs. Indeed this intrinsic difficulty
has seriously slowed down research in this area that can nowadays hardly keep the pace
with new developments in the applications. Given this thematic problem in developing
MAS theories, one could ask the question of whether or not it is possible to develop some
more abstract (and hopefully powerful) tools to prove properties about these. After all, recall
from Section 1.3.2 that when designing MAS theories we are very often dealing with quite
similar extensions of very basic normal modal logics, so how hard can it be to prove some
general results about them? These pages will discuss this question.
In Section 1.3.2.3 and Section 1.4.1 we argued that any fully-fledged MAS theory has to
deal with the multiplicity of the agents and of their mental states and with the interactions
between these. As an example, in Section 1.3.2.3.1 we noted that the multi-modal system
presented in [KL88] for modelling knowledge and belief can be seen as composed by two
different logical layers (specifically S5 for knowledge and KD45 for belief) linked together
by specific interaction axioms and enriched by operators for group properties. Many other
MAS logical theories can be seen in this way. They are basically well understood basic modal
logics “combined together” to model different facets of the agents.
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The observation above should remind us of “combining logics”. Combining logics is an
emerging area in logic that deals exactly with the problem of combining logic systems from
an abstract point of view. Some techniques have been developed in recent years for this goal
and the field is undergoing rapid development. These techniques aim to define a syntax, a
semantics and a proof theory of a combination of logics. Most crucially the area investigates
the problem of the transfer of properties such as completeness and decidability from the
basic components into the combination.
It should be evident how relevant this area can potentially be for MAS theories. If tools
for combining logics suitable to the problems ofMAS theories could be identified, this would
even let us re-define MAS theories altogether. MAS theorists could build formal models of
agency simply by considering basic well-understood logics and study the possible interplays
of the different components when combined together. If operating under the guidelines of
a well-developed theory of logic combination, properties of the logics such as completeness
and decidability would be inherited from the basic components. This would permit us to
develop not just a general theory for MAS (that would possibly turn out to be so general
that it would not model any realistic intelligent agent), but to define the criteria in order to
define appropriate specifications of the system the AI-user has in mind.
It is fair to say that what we described above would be quite an extraordinary develop-
ment; this chapter aims at answering the question of its feasibility, not just in the context of
knowledge theories but more broadly for any mental aspects of MAS. It is organised as fol-
lows. In Section 6.2.2 some of the best known techniques for combining logics are presented
followed by some negative results in Section 6.2.3. In Section 6.3 we will discuss whether or
not some existing MAS theories can be seen as results of the application of the combining
logics tools of Section 6.2.2. Section 6.4 concludes with a discussion.
Differently from the material presented so far, this chapter does not present original re-
search by the author. Instead it is a review, carried out from the point of view of the agent
theorist, of material published in the field of combining logics. Still I believe it is relevant to
the rest of this thesis and it actually constitutes its natural end as it aims to provide a glimpse
onto the possible future of theories for MAS.
6.2 Combining logics
6.2.1 Introduction
Combining logics is an emerging (see for example: [dRB96, BdR97a, BdR97b, Gab99]) area in
logic. The discipline addresses the problem of defining techniques that permit to integrate
two or more logic systems into a more expressive one.
The idea of combining logics is not new. As we have noticed before even the systems we
discussed in Section 1.3.2 have in-built the idea of a combination between more logics and
many other “combined” systems have been proposed in the past. The novelty of combining
logics is the aim to develop general techniques that allow to produce combinations of existing
and well understood logics.
Why should we interested in exploring such general techniques? For many reasons, but
most importantly because it is the natural answer to the need of formalising complex systems
in a systematicway. Combining logics recognises that the big problems of the formalisation of
complex logics such those required in many areas (Artificial Intelligence but also Linguistics
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and Computer Science in general) require a divide and conquer strategy.
Combining logics suggests identifying the basic components of a system, define the cor-
responding formal tools and combine them to produce a scalable formalisation of the whole
system. This methodology would allow the user to re-use previously defined and under-
stood components (logics) and would guide him on how to combine these in a proficient
way.
Technically, the discipline addresses the following problem. Given two logics Land 
define a logic 
 
 
, which is more expressive than and . Note the generality of the
setting. For example, the logics may be radically different:  may be a system of modal
logic, and a first-order fuzzy logic. Even if the logics are somehow similar, they may be
presented in very different ways; for example may be described by an axiomatisation,
while we may have only the semantics of . In order to be able to reason about combina-
tions, we should then identify a suitable working definition of logic system that allows to
define combinations of them.
The problem is indeed extremely complex to be solved in this general setting and we
cannot expect that a complete solution will be available in the near future; in the following
we will discuss more modest contributions that have been proposed recently.
Let us focus our attention to well-studied logics  
 for which we have a syntax, a
semantics and a proof theory. A general technique for combining logics should then address
the following points:
1. Define the syntax of 
 
 
from the syntax of and .
2. Define the semantics of 
 
 
from the semantics of and .
3. Define the proof theory of 
 
 
from the proof theory of and .
4. Prove the transfer of important properties (soundness, completeness, decidability, fmp,
etc.) of the logics and into 
 
 
.
A few different techniques are discussed in the literature ([FS77, Fit69, FS96, KW91, GP92,
Pfa87]) and some papers (for example [BdR97a]) relate them in order to make the overall pic-
ture of the discipline. Here we will discuss only the ones that seem to be the most promising
with respect to combinations of multi-agent theories. After this we will present some nega-
tive results.
6.2.2 Positive results
6.2.2.1 Temporalising a logic
The first of the techniques we discuss is the one known as “embedding a logic into another”,
“adding a temporal dimension to a logic” or simply “temporalising a logic” as it is described
in [FG92].
Finger and Gabbay propose a case of limited combination between a logic L and a propo-
sitional temporal logic T. In [FG92] a logic is supposed to comprehend a syntax, a semantics
and a proof theory. L can be any classical logic system, while T is a classical propositional
temporal logic with the binary modal operators since (

) and until (

). The semantics of T
is given in terms of possible worlds with linear flows of time, i.e. the accessibility relation of
the Kripke frames is irreflexive, transitive and total (see Section 1.2.2).
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Given the logic L, the temporalisation process defines a ‘temporalised’ logic T(L) . Syntax,
semantics and proof theory of T(L) are defined as follows.
6.2.2.1.1 Syntax. The language of the temporalised logic is structurally limited.
Definition 6.1 (Syntax of the temporalised logic). Let be the set of monolithic formulae of L,
i.e. the set of formulae of the language of L ,, that do not contain boolean connectives.
The language of T(L) is defined as the smallest set such that:
if



 
then




 


,
if

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then
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
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
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




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

.
Note that although the language of the combined logic T(L) includes the two lan-
guagesand , not all the formulae that we could build by freely mixing the two lan-
guages are in . For example, ifis built from a set of operators containing a unary,
and

and

are two monolithic formulae of L then the formula






is not in .
The language can only express temporal properties of a system specified with L;
as a consequence of this, in a formula of all the temporal operators must precede any
operator of L.
6.2.2.1.2 Semantics. Consider the logic T to have a semantics defined on the class of tem-
poral models , where each temporal model in the class is a triple 
 


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

, where

is a set whose elements represent time points; the relation





is a linear order
(i.e. an irreflexive, total and transitive relation) on such points; the function


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
is an
interpretation function for the atoms in. Pairs

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
are called temporal frames. Let
be the class of modelsfor L .
Models of the temporalised logic are then defined as follows.
Definition 6.2 (Models of the temporalised logic). Amodel for T(L) is defined as a triple

 
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
 


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

, where the frame






is a temporal frame and




is a function
mapping a time point to a model of L .
The models of the combination T(L) are combined models of L and T and can be seen as
composed by two layers: an upper flow of time, and a set of models of L . The two levels
are connected via the function

which associates a model of L to every point of time. The
upper level is used to interpret the temporal operators, while the monolithic formulae of L
are interpreted on the underlying layer of models.
More precisely, the satisfaction relation 
 
between models of


 

, points of such mod-
els, and formulae is inductively defined as follows:
Definition 6.3 (Interpretation of the temporalised logic).
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.
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6.2.2.1.3 Proof theory. Finger and Gabbay also give an axiomatisation for T(L) .
Definition 6.4 (Axiomatisation of T(L) ). If


 



 

1 is an axiomatisation for T, then


 



 

Preserve

is an axiomatisation for T(L) , where Preserve is an inference rule defined as:
If

is inand 

, then  

  




For the embedding technique Finger and Gabbay prove the following important result:
Theorem 6.5 (Properties of the temporalisation).
1. If L is sound and T is sound with respect to , then T(L) is sound with respect to .
2. If L is complete with respect toand T is complete with respect to , then T(L) is complete
with respect to .
3. If L is decidable and complete with respect toand T is decidable and complete with respect
to , then T(L) is decidable with respect to .
4. If T is complete with respect to , then T(L) is a conservative extension of L and of T .
The work does not analyse the transfer of other properties such as fmp or compactness.
Notwithstanding this, Theorem 6.5 is a very strong result: every classical logic can be tem-
poralised in a standard way by means of this technique.
For example, we can temporalise the predicate calculus obtaining a limited first-order
temporal logic, we can temporalise a modal logic obtaining a limited multi-modal logic,
etc. Finger and Gabbay are particularly interested in applying the method to a temporal
logic itself ([FG92, FG96a]), that is to temporalise a temporal logic. The idea is to define a
framework that allows one to reason not only about the temporal evolution of a system, but
also about the temporal change of the temporal description. This can be useful in a number
of cases; for example to model two computer systems with different clocks that observe each
other or to represent the historiography of a system.
Another interesting result is that the embedding process can be iterated. For example, if
we temporalise by using Ta linear temporal logic T, which includes the since (

) and until
(

) operators we obtain a logic






, whose language  	comprehends two families
of temporal operators (





and





), each of them to be evaluated on the corre-
sponding layer. According to Theorem 6.5, the logic






can be described axiomatically
by the axiomatisation of Tand the inference rule Preserve. Therefore, it is now possible
to temporalise the logic






using an element of	as upper layer, obtaining the logic









. The language 	  	will be composed by sentences which have some op-
erators of

followed by some operators of and then other operators of 	. Although
this is still a subset of the union of the two languages, we have that the language 	  	
includes  	.
1We assume

to be the set of axioms andto be the set of inference rules.
138 CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION: COMBINING LOGICS FOR MAS THEORIES
It is not really clear what is the purpose of adding more and more temporal dimension to
a system can be; notwithstanding this an iteration of the embedding process does enrich the
expressivity of the language and it may be very meaningful when the logics being combined
are not homogeneous. This requires to drop the assumption on the external logic that would
need not be temporal; the authors claim this is possible and that the role of the ‘upper-level’
logic can be taken by any classical modal logic, provided it is sound and complete. Indeed a
general technique allowing ‘to modalise’ a logic would be interesting on its own.
The powerful results of Theorem 6.5 have been achieved by imposing very strong limi-
tation on the language of the combined logic T(L) . Unfortunately, this leads to serious
problems for the expressivity of the logic that hinder many applications of the technique.
For example, as discussed in Chapter 3.6 one of the key interactions that one might want
to consider by combining two logics is the commutativity of two operators. Ifand
are one of the operators thatand	respectively are built from, then formulae like










2 are not in the language	, nor in	. In order to allow for this
sort of formulae to be in the language, the two logics cannot play different roles and a more
“neutral” approach is required.
6.2.2.2 Fusion of modal logics
[FG92] is very liberal about the requirements on the logics to be combined, but for doing
so it must pay a heavy price in terms of expressiveness of the language of the composition.
[KW91] takes a radically different perspective: the logics are restricted, but it aims to achieve
the richest expressivity. Specifically, Kracht and Wolter, extending some results already ob-
tained by Thomason in [Tho80b] and Fine and Schurz in [FS96]3, investigate the transfer
properties for a combination between two mono-modal normal logics into a particular nor-
mal bi-modal logic.
Consider a languagebuilt from a set of propositional variablesand the connectives











. Recall from Definition 1.8 that a normal bi-modal logic L is a set of formulae
closed under the axiom K and the inference rules of necessitation (for both connectives) and
uniform substitution. Consider now two mono-modal logics  and  defined from the
languagesand	respectively and assume them to be built from the set of connectives




and the mono-modal operators and respectively. The projections of a normal
bimodal logic L onto its two constituent languages are normal mono-modal logics; that is
 




 
 
and 



	
 
 
. In the following we use  

as an abbreviation for 



.
What is particularly interesting, though, is the converse of this construction, that is to
start with two mono-modal normal logics and and investigate the properties of the
bi-modal logics containing the two. There are many bi-modal logics that we can consider,
Kracht andWolter investigate the transfer properties in respect to a special one that they call
fusion.
Definition 6.6. If 
 are normal modal logics, the fusion 

 
is the least normal bimodal
logic containing the two.
If a logic L can be expressed as a fusion then L is also called independently axiomatisable
in consequence of a result that we report shortly. The fusion operator is commutative up to
isomorphisms; that is

 


 



 

 


 


.
2And indeed many of the axiom schemas analysed in Chapter 4.
3Although published later, this paper was actually written before [KW91].
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Kracht and Wolter do not use the standard possible worlds semantics to define the in-
terpretation of the logics. Instead, they use Boolean algebras [BS84] as in the tradition of
mathematical logic. For the purposes of this review it is not important to discuss these here.
This framework allows the authors to import a theorem which was already proved in
[FS96] and [Tho80b].
Theorem 6.7. If 
 are mono-modal logics,

 


 


 


 
 
except precisely when the logic
Lis inconsistent and the logic Lis not.
This gives the flavour of the fusion: the restriction to its own language of the fusion of
a mono-modal logic with another is the logic itself. In other words, the fusion does not add
any new theorem on the corresponding dimensions. Formally we say that a fusion 

 

of Lwith Lis a conservative extension of both. Still, it should be noted that the fusion of two
logics 
 is not equal to the union of with . This is because 
 

 


 


is closed
under substitution. For example: if  
 are normal mono-modal logics with operators





, then



















belongs to 

 
.
Kracht and Wolter prove a number of properties for the fusion. The most important are
the following.
Theorem 6.8 (Properties of fusion). Let LLbe two consistent normal modal logics. Then the
following holds.
1. The logic 

 
is finitely axiomatisable if and only if the logics and are.
2. The logic 

 
is complete if and only if the logics and are.
3. The logic 

 
is compact if and only if the logics and are.
4. If the logics 
 are complete, then the logic 

 
is decidable if and only if the logics 
and are.
5. If the logics 
 are complete, then the logic 

 
is Hallde´n-complete4 if and only if the
logics and are.
The results in [KW91] are very strong and the process of fusion can be extended to the
fusion of normal-ary modal logics.
Notwithstanding this, the fusion technique works only for independently axiomatisable
modal logics and it does not address more general cases. As an example of what is not
covered, Kracht and Wolter discuss the minimal tense extension of a logic. Given a logic
L, whose modal language is built from the modality, the minimal tense extension of L
is defined as:


 
 

K





 








 


. In other words

is the fusion of a
normal logic with the system K	plus the two axioms





 



and





 


.
Kracht and Wolter report that their technique did not seem to help in order to prove the
completeness of

, given the completeness of L, although this is a generally considered an
expected result.
Apparently, the fusion technique provides a more expressive language than the embed-
ding, but it does not give any result if we want to express interactions between the two
components.
4A logic L is said to be Hallde´n-complete if
 



and 













implies


or



,
where




and




are the sets of propositional variables that appear inand

respectively. The notion
of Hallde´n-completeness is related to the concept of “relevance”.
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6.2.2.3 Independent combination of linear temporal logics
In this section we discuss a technique called “independent combination”, which has been
developed on the purpose of the combination of linear temporal logics.
The independent combination was developed by Finger and Gabbay [FG96a] to over-
come the expressivity limitations of the embedding (Section 6.2.2.1) and it is similar in defi-
nition and results to the fusion of Kracht and Wolter.
Although it is designed especially for temporal combinations, it is worth discussing be-
cause it shows an interesting relation between embedding and fusion. Given the similarities
that will arise between fusion and independent combination we will denote by




the
independent combination of

and

.
In the following the logics





are modal temporal logics for the operators of since
and until defined on their respective classes of linear frames (see Section 6.2.2.1 and Sec-
tion 1.3.1.4).
6.2.2.3.1 Syntax. The fully combined language   	of two logics

and

is obtained
by making the union of the formation rules of the two languages 
 	over a single set
of propositional variables.
Definition 6.9 (Syntax of fully combined temporal language).
ifis a propositional variable, thenis in   	,
if




are in   	, then








are in   	,
if




are in   	, then (












) are in   	,
if




are in   	, then (












) are in   	.
This language is indeed very similar to the one of fusion, presented in [KW91]. The
only difference is that [FG96a] discusses the case of binarymodal operators, while [KW91] is
restricted to more traditional unary operators.
6.2.2.3.2 Semantics. Assume





have associated two classes of temporal models 
and 	. The class is made by models

 









, where is a set of time points,
the relation

is a linear order on 

andis an interpretation for the atoms. The class

 
	is built similarly.
A model for




is a tuple   	
 

 












where

 





is a linear frame
for

,

 





is a linear frame for

, and

 

	
is an interpretation function for the
atoms. In the following we use the symbolto refer to models of the fusion   	. By

 

 
 
	we will denote the class of models of the independently combined logics

and

.
The definition of satisfiability for formulae of   	can then be defined by merging the
definitions for the two temporal logics:
Definition 6.10 (Satisfiability for




).

 



where


if 


.

 



if it is not the case that
 


.

 






if 
 


and
 


.
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
 







if there exists a point , 



and
 


and
for all points


 , if 






then
 


.

 







if there exists a point ,



and
 


and
for all points


 , if







then
 


.

 







if there exists a point , 



and
 


and
for all points


 , if 






then
 


.

 







if there exists a point ,



and
 


and
for all points


 , if






then
 


.
6.2.2.3.3 Proof Theory. The proof theory of the independent combination is defined in
terms of the union of the proof theories of the components. Assume once again that Hilbert-
style proof theories (Section 1.2.3) for





are defined. These are pairs






of axiom
schemas and inference rules.
Definition 6.11. Let


 



 


and


 
	


 
	

be the axiomatisation of

and

respectively and
let and 	be disjoints. The axiomatisation of




is then defined as


 



 
	


 



 
	

.
Finger and Gabbay claim that Thomason’s theorem5 that we presented for fusion in The-
orem 6.7 applies for independent combination as well. The difference is that [Tho80b] and
[KW91] prove the theorem for normal unary modal operators, while Finger and Gabbay are
working with the binary operators of since and until.
Similarly to Kracht andWolter, Finger and Gabbay prove a number of transfer properties
from the mono-temporal logics into the combination. What is interesting to note is that
the proofs of the transfer properties use the embedding technique. In fact, consider the
following.
Given a formula

in   	it is possible to define a degree of alteration,





, which is
the minimum number of alternate temporalisation between

and

which is necessary
to make in order to see

as part of an iteratively temporalised language. The degree of
alteration can be defined inductively on the structure of the formula; for the purpose of this
review we do not give the details.
Lemma 6.12. Let

be in   	with





 
. The formula

is a theorem of




if and
only if

is a theorem of the logic obtained byalternate temporalisation of

and

.
The lemma is indeed revealing. It is not only the case that by embedding alternately
a logic inside another a finite amount of times it is possible to express any formula of the
language of the independent combination (or fusion), but any theorem of the independent
combination is a theorem of an iterated temporalisation and vice versa. This means that the
independent combination of two logics can be considered the infinite union of the alternate
temporalisations of the two logics. By using this result, Finger and Gabbay can prove the
transfer of soundness, completeness and decidability more simply than Kracht and Wolter.
Theorem 6.13 (Properties of the independent combination).
1. If

and

are sound and complete logics with respect to and 	respectively, then




is sound and complete with respect to   	.
5If a formula is valid in then it is valid in every independent combination of .
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2. If

and

are decidable and complete with respect to and 	respectively, then




is decidable.
Finger and Gabbay do not discuss the transfer of other properties. Notwithstanding
this, their analysis covers the basic properties and builds interestingly upon their previously
defined methodology.
Of course, the drawbacks of the fusion technique are all present in the independent com-
bination. In particular, the lack of interplay between the different dimensions of time is
reflected in the absence of interaction theorems in the logic. Finger and Gabbay also suggest
that a broadly two dimensional logic, should have a fully two dimensional definition of sat-
isfiability. This means that formulae should be evaluated at pairs of time points instead of
single points. While this is theoretically very interesting, we cannot see any possible use of
this in agents theory and therefore we do not report here this aspect of their work here (see
[FG96a] for details).
6.2.2.4 Fibring and dovetailing
The most general technique for combining logics is potentially the one conceived by Dov
Gabbay in the 1990s and generally referred to with the term “fibring”. In fact, [Gab96b],
[Gab96a] and the forthcoming [Gab99] present a general methodology for combining logics
irrespective of their presentation and type.
The methodology allows the user to combine (henceforth fibre) the semantics of the two
systems and weave the two proof-theories into a combined logic that preserves the basic
properties of the components. In order to do so, the two logics should be fully presentable,
through their syntax, semantics and proof-theory. If that is not the case, the methodology
is still usable. The strategy is then to extract the consequence relations from the two logics,
however they are presented, give a basic point relational semantics to the two logics (through
a method conceived by Gabbay) and finally fibre the relational semantics into the combined
logic.
The fibringmethodology is sufficiently general to be applied to any combination, but this
generality renders any attempt of applying it not a straightforward one. For the aims of this
section we will not discuss the general methodology, but we will focus on how to fibre two
modal logics.
Given two modal logics, and and their corresponding languages
	, classes
of models
	and satisfaction relations 
 




 
, we would like to define a logic that
has the expressivity of both. As we have seen above the problem is not to define the syntax
of of the combination: for example we can consider the formation rules of both languages






	. The real problem is to define the models and the satisfaction relation. The basic
idea of fibring is to perform a model construction while calculating the interpretation a for-
mula. So, consider a formula as being composed by a preamble operator (inherited from one
of the two logics, sayin this case) and the rest. We can inductively interpretin one
of the models for and then interpret the rest. If the rest hasas preamble (or there are
no more operators at that level of parsing), we can interpret it on that model, otherwise in
order to interpret the other modal operator, we have to use a model for . In order to
do so, we are to link (to fibre), via a fibring function, the model for with a model for 
and in the process of doing so, we build a fibred model of the combination. In one line, the
interpretation of a formula

of the combined language in the fibred model at a statecan
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

	

 

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 







	




Figure 6.1: An example of fibring.
be summarised as:

 



if and only if 
 
 







where is a fibring function that maps a world to a model suitable for interpreting

and

 
 
is the corresponding satisfaction relation (either 
 
for or 
 
for ). We present an
example to convey the main thrust of the idea.
Let us consider twomodal logics, Kand KB	. Suppose we are to interpret the formula


 

on a world of the fibred semantics, say. The situation is represented in Figure 6.1.
We start by evaluating the preamble of  , , at . According to the standard
definitions, we have to check whether is true at everyaccessible from. Intuitively,
atwe cannot interpret the operator , because we are in a model of K, not of KB	.
This is when the fibring functioncomes to help. The functionatpoints to, a world
in a model suitable to interpret formulae withas preamble. Now, all we have to check is
whether , is true atin this last model, and this can be done in the usual way.
In order to present the general case of the fibring ofmodal logics, let 




mono-
modal logics.  need not be normal. In the following we denote bythe modal operator
of the logic .
The syntax of the fibred logic 

 is defined as follows6.
Definition 6.14 (Syntax of the fibred modal logic). Given a family 




of modal logics de-
fined from the same set P of propositional atoms, the language

of the logic 

 is defined by taking
the union of the formation rules.
Since we will not have the chance to use the semantics of fibring I do not feel the need of
presenting here with its complex details. I therefore refer the interested reader to [Gab96b,
Gab99] for the semantic definitions that define the class

of fibred models.
Axiomatically the fibred logic 

 is defined as follows.
Definition 6.15. Let 




be modal logics; let 

 be defined as follows:
6This is actually a simplification on the definition given in [Gab99, GG98] where different sets of atoms and
connectives are assumed for the logics. Since this is particularly compelling for MAS theories it makes sense to
simplify the definition.
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1.  

 

 for any



.
2. (Modal fibring rule):
If


 
 
, and 
 

 








 











 

, then for all

,


 


 

;
3.  

 is the smallest set closed under item 1 of this list, Modus Ponens, uniform substitution, and
modal fibring rule.
Gabbay proves the following:
Theorem 6.16 (Properties of the fibred modal logic).
1.  

 is the set of valid formulae of every model in

.
2. If all the 




, satisfy finite model property, then so does 

 .
3. If all the are finitely axiomatisable, so is 

 .
A special case of fibring, called dovetailing, arises when the fibring function is set to map
the actual world of the target model. Dovetailing has the same syntax, a much easier seman-
tics (that for the same reason as before we do not report here) and it generates a different
logic 

, defined on class of dovetailed model

.
Definition 6.17. Let 




be modal logics; let 

 be defined as follows:
1.  

 

 for any

in.
2. (Modal dovetailing rule):
If


 
 
, and 
 

 













 





 









 

, then for all

,


 


 

,
where are atoms (or their negations) and 

list all the atoms (or their negations) in
any





,
 



3.  

 is the smallest set closed under 1, Modus Ponens, Substitution, and the Modal Dovetailing
Rule.
We have the following properties.
Theorem 6.18 (Properties of the dovetailed modal logic).
1.  

 is the set of valid formulae of every model in

.
2. If each of the  




include and can be formulated by an Hilbert style system with
necessitation rule, then 

 can be axiomatised by taking the union of the axiomatisations.
3. If all the 




satisfy finite model property, then so does 

.
So, from a proof-theoretical point of view, dovetailing is the special case of fibring that
generates simply the fusion of the logics. In some cases fibring and dovetailing produce the
same result. The following addresses one of such cases:
Theorem 6.19. If each of the 


in admits necessitation and satisfies the disjunction property7,
then 


 
 

.
7If





 



, then



or


.
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Gabbay shows the extent to which some nonstandard logic systems can be analysed ei-
ther as fibrings or dovetailings of two or more logics. For some systems ([Wij90], [Fit48],
[Ono77], [Ewa86]) this analysis is successful, for some others (for example [FS77]) it is not.
Adaptations of the fibring technique can apparently be applied to many other cases we
did not discuss here. In particular, it is possible to fibre a logic with a fuzzy logic, fibre a
first-order logic with itself or with a non-standard logic, combine a logic with its meta-level
(for example by bringing inside the logic its own consequence relation), and many more.
Self fibring has also been used very recently ([GN97]) to model context.
But the big question which still remains without an answer is to what extent fibring,
when applied to modal logics, extends the results we presented for fusion and independent
combination. In other words, is there a way to specify interaction between the logics in
the fibred logic, or is it just another way to define fusion? How do interactions between
the logics translate into restrictions of the fibring function? To my knowledge these hard
questions have not been answered yet. What we can notice is that it is sometimes possible
to recognise some existing combined systems as fibrings or dovetailings but difficulties arise
when the combination is not a simple fusion, but an interaction between the components is
present.
Perhaps the fibring technique is still too young to give all the answers we need and
by investigating some class of fibring functions it will be possible to give a basic class of
interactions and prove properties about these. This is verymuch part of the ongoing research
carried out by Gabbay and colleagues.
6.2.3 Negative results
Apart from the technical difficulties of the previous section, the story we have presented so
far of combining logics is one of positive results. After all, completeness and decidability do
transfer for all the cases we have examined in Section 6.2.2. Still, the feeling that a casual
listener would get from overhearing a conversation on the subject would possibly be not
quite the same. What follow are some of the reasons for that.
Since the discovery of incomplete logics, advanced research on modal logic has also fo-
cused on negative results. This has proven to be as useful as research on positive results and
it has helped understanding notions such as completeness, fmp, decidability, etc. in more
detail. It was therefore natural that when the problem of identifying classes of combinations
for which transfer of properties occurs came about, many logicians tried to find examples
for which this does not happen.
In [dRB96] at least two strong negative results are present and others have been pub-
lished even more recently. It would not be appropriate to discuss here all this material and I
only report three representative results.
6.2.3.1 Incomplete minimal tense extensions of K4
A normal bimodal logic with the operators 


is a tense logic if it contains the axioms
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
Consider a modal logic
containing K4 and its minimal tense extension
 , which is the
smallest tense logic containing 
. [Wol96] shows that completeness and the fmp do not
transfer in general from
to
 .
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Since minimal tense extensions can be intuitively seen as one of the less demandingways
of temporalising a logic and since K4 is contained in most of the logics for representing men-
tal states, the paper shows that even some natural combinations can suffer from undecid-
ability and incompleteness.
6.2.3.2 Undecidability of modal logics with reflexive transitive operators
We now report on an important negative results published in [Hem96].
Consider a complete and decidable modal logic
with a modal operator, whose inter-
pretation is defined on a relation

in the usual Kripke semantics. Consider now
enriched
by the reflexive transitive modality* , which is defined in terms of the reflexive transitive
closure of the relation associated withon the Kripke models.
From examples in the literature ([FL79, Pra79, EH85, BAHP82]) one could think that de-
cidability of a logic
should not be lost by adding* (in fact this has also been conjectured
in [GP92]). Hemaspaandra shows that this is not the case by proving that there exists a uni-
modal decidable, canonical logic for which adding the reflexive transitive modality* causes
undecidability.
* –modalities are used in MAS theories to express, for example, common knowledge and
common belief (Section 1.3.2). We know from Section 1.3.2.2 that epistemic logics like S5 
and doxastic logics like KD45 are not affected by this problem. Nonetheless this could
indeed fail in any combination of knowledge with other mental states.
6.2.3.3 Failure of interpolation in combined modal logics
This result is by Marx and Areces and it appears in [MA99]. Recall that a logic  has in-
terpolation if whenever
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, where



is the set of atomic symbols
occurring in

, and 
 
is a global (on models) consequence relation for the class of models
for 8.
As mentioned in [MA99] the importance of interpolation in normal modal logics is con-
nected to the fact that it is equivalent to the property that whenever two theories 
 both
have a model and one does not contradict the other on the shared language, then the union
of the two has also a model. This property has been used in specification of software (see
[MS85] cited in [MA99]) and it is therefore one of the properties that we would like to trans-
fer into the combinations. Note that interpolation holds for all the logics of MAS theories
discussed in Section 1.3.2.
[MA99] shows that interpolation does not in general transfer neither into union (Sec-
tion 6.2.2.2) of modal logics nor in the product (see [GS98]). It is been discussed ([MS85])
that when a logic enjoys the interpolation property the efficiency of an automatic theorem
proving technique can be dramatically increased. Given the importance of automatic theo-
rem proving to the verification of agent specifications, this could be a problem.
8There are actually a few variants of the definition of interpolation; for this section the one presented above
is adequate. See the cited paper for more details.
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6.3 MAS theories as combined logics
In Section 6.2.2 we have examined some of the most successful techniques to combine modal
logics. In this section we investigate the extent to which the MAS theories we discussed in
Section 1.3.2 can be seen as particular examples of logic combination.
6.3.1 Knowledge and other single mental state theories
Let us consider once again the logic S5 that we have been using for most of this thesis as
a base for an epistemic theory9. Recall from Section 1.3.2 that S5 was motivated as the
indexed extension of the logic S5 which was proposed long ago to model knowledge.
Alternately, let us consider -copies of the the mono-modal logic S5, one for every a-
gent of the group: S5

S


. Having done so, consider now the fusion (as defined
in Section 6.2.2.2) of these. We obtain the logic S5
 

 
S5. Note that the fusion is
well-defined because all the logics involved are normal logics. We can then apply the re-
sults of Theorem 6.2.2.2 and Theorem 6.2.2.3. We have that the fusion can be axiomatised
by taking the union of the axiomatisations of thecopies of S5, one for every modal box.
We now notice that the union of theaxiomatisations gives exactly the logic S5 . In other
words S5 can effectively be seen as the fusion (precisely as defined in Section 6.2.2.2) of
S5-components, one for every agent of the model:
S5 S5
 

 
S5
Indeed, by Theorem 6.13, it follows that the logic S5 is complete and decidable, which is
something that had already been proved by more standard means.
Consider now the operators of distributed knowledge and common knowledge of Sec-
tion 1.3.2.2. The semantics of these is defined by using the accessibility relations of the pri-
vate knowledge operators and so they cannot be seen as independent as in the above case of
S5 . Moreover, interaction axioms between common knowledge and private knowledge are
also present and so we are unable to recognise the system S5 

 
as either a fusion or as an
independent combination of logics. That is certainly not the result of an embedding because
of the syntactic limitations of this technique. It might be the result of a fibring or dovetailing
but that is not clear either.
So, we conclude that the logic S5 is a fusion or independent combination ofcopies of
S5, but it is far from being obvious whether any of its extensions devised to deal with group
properties can be thought of as the result of a logic combination.
6.3.2 BDI logics
In Section 1.3.2.3.3 we briefly discussed a family of logics commonly known as BDI logics.
There we introduced the very basic BDI logic. This was a multi-modal logic for belief, desire
and intention skimmed of the temporal dimension (usually CTL ).
In Section 1.3.2.3.3 we discussed that the basic BDI logic is defined from three logics:
KD45 for belief, and KD for desires and intentions. In top of this, the two interaction
axioms
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9It should be noted that what follows actually applies equally well to any logic modelling a single mental
state of a group of agents, e.g. all the logics discussed in Section 1.3.
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that regulate the relation between desires, intentions and beliefs of every agent are imposed.
Following the observation regarding S5 of the previous section we can now see the three
different component logics as being fusions ofcopies for each logic. The basic BDI logic L
can then be seen as the fusion of these plus the two interaction axioms. In symbols:
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We can now apply the results of Section 6.2.2.2 or Section 6.2.2.3 to prove that the logic
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
is sound, complete and decidable, but note that these results do not transfer to the logic 
when we we add the required interaction axioms.
So, combining logics for this case is of limited use. We have the transfer of properties for
the three components fused together but we do not have a result that we can apply in the
case of interaction axioms being present in the combination.
6.3.3 Knowledge and belief
In Section 1.3.2.3.1 we discussed the system introduced by Kraus and Lehmann to model
knowledge and belief in a community of ideal agents. As noted there this system includes
operators for common knowledge and common belief. By the same considerations of Sec-
tion 6.3.2, we are unable to identify this system as the result of a logic combination.
In this case, differently from the BDI case, it is not even possible to recognise in a straight-
forward way even a fragment of the system, private belief and knowledge for example, as a
fusion plus interaction axioms. To see this, note that in the axiomatisation of [KL88] the in-
ference rule of necessitation for belief is not present. Still, the rule is actually sound as we can
apply necessitation for common knowledge that via Modus Ponens implies necessitation for
common belief, from which we can derive “everybody believes” which in turn implies the
belief of any agent. Therefore by restricting the axiomatisation to the fragment defined only
on the bi-modal family of operators and , we would not be getting all the theorems that
we have in the combined system, restricted to the language of and .
Our conclusion must then be that this system, as it was presented by Kraus and Lehmann,
is so interconnected that it cannot even be easily recognised as a fusion of mono-modal logics
plus extra interaction axioms. It may be that the logic defined on the language of private
knowledge and belief as
 
KD45
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
KD45

S5



S5

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is complete with respect to the class of models considered in [KL88] but in order to prove
that, as things stand, it looks easier to refer to traditional methods.
6.3.4 Knowledge and time
So far we have had limited success in applying the techniques of Section 6.2.2 to our MAS
theories. As a last example, we analyse the system for knowledge and time the we explored
in Section 1.3.2.3.2.
Although also in this case the logic is clearly a combination between the epistemic S5 
and a basic temporal logic, this time it is even less obvious than before whether the system
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can actually be seen as an application of combining logics. Indeed, apart from the above
mentioned lack of formal tools to handle interaction axioms (required in this case to model
perfect recall, no learning, etc.) we have two extra technical problems here.
Firstly, the semantics in use in Section 1.3.2.3.2 (based on interpreted systems) is different
from the one used in the analysis of [FG96a] and [KW91] (based on Kripke models). In
Chapter 2 we studied a technique for mapping one into another, but that was limited to the
case of hypercubes. So it is not clear how to proceed in this case.
Secondly, the logic S5

 cannot straightforwardly be seen as a normal modal logic, simply
because the temporal part with its binary operators of since and until does not conform to
the usual definition of normality.
To try to overcome these difficulties two ways may be promising.
The first is to develop a technique (perhaps similar to the one presented in Section 2.4)
for relating any class of interpreted systems to Kripke models. This is necessary in order to
translate the classes of agents defined with interpreted systems into the semantics used by
fusion or independent combination. Once this tool is available and normality can be defined
for binary operators in a way such that the results of Section 6.2.2.2 hold we still face the
problem of the interaction between the temporal and epistemic dimension. This interaction
would this time be represented by semantic conditions between the temporal and epistemic
relations on the Kripke models that result from the interpreted systems (see page 34).
Alternately we can think of using the technique of fibring. This may be more appropriate
in this case because it does not require the logics to be normal. The procedure would be the
same as before: translate the semantics of interpreted systems into Kripke models and apply
the fibring technique. Still, as we suggested in Section 6.2.2.4, fibring does not seem to be
easily applicable when we need to impose interaction axioms. In principle it should even
be possible to fibre directly the components on a semantics based on interpreted system, al-
though it should be said that adapting fibring for a new semantics is itself a very challenging
task.
So, quite predictably the existing combining techniques cannot be applied straightfor-
wardly in this case either.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we reviewed some promising tools for combining logics with respect to their
applicability to agent theories. We argued that, in principle, they are very relevant for the
needs of MAS theorists as they aim at tackling the same technical problems but in a more
general context.
The embedding technique gives a way of temporalising any logic for agents. This tech-
nique has been used in the literature to model temporal evolution of epistemic states in a
MAS (see [Pre96] for example). The authors claim that embedding is equally applicable in
other cases as well, like an external epistemic logic referring to a doxastic setting; I am not
aware of any work that follows this line. With respect to agent theories, the main drawback
of embedding is clearly that the language of the combination is strictly limited and therefore
not suitable for expressing temporal-epistemic constraints of a MAS, such as perfect recall.
At present is hard to see whether the result relating independent combination (or fusion) to
multi-embedded logics (Lemma 6.12) could help overcome this strong limitation.
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Both fusion and independent combination clarify the issue of completeness and decid-
ability for the extension of normal modal logic to the multi-modal setting. These results do
not really add anything new in the context of agent theories, as it has been known for some
time that all the single agent theories presented in Section 1.3 extend to theMAS case. It must
be said though that these techniques offer a clear explanation of the reasons behind this and
draw a line on where these extensions might fail, i.e. in presence of interaction axioms.
As for the technique of fibring, the literature shows that most uses of it actually boil down
to fusion, which, as noted above, has the problem of not being able to express interaction ax-
ioms, much needed for MAS theories. Still, at least in principle, fibring is more powerful
than fusion because of the possibility of adding conditions on the fibring function. These
conditions could encode interactions between the two classes of models that are being com-
bined and therefore could represent interaction axioms between the two logics. At the time
of writing, this is still an area of research with little or no results and it is therefore hard to
say whether it will be successful. If so, I believe MAS theories with interactions axioms will
be one of the ideal test-beds for fibring and, as a result, MAS theories could much benefit
from this.
In view of all these considerations, our conclusion has unfortunately to be that the au-
tomatic transfer of meta-properties of the logics into non-trivial combinations of the type
studied in this thesis is not possible with the current techniques. The only results that we
have been able to achieve with combining logic methods refer to the MAS theories with no
interaction axioms and these had already been proven by other means. The techniques pre-
sented in Section 6.2.2 were not applicable neither to any of the complex systems defined in
Section 1.3.2 nor to the logic S5WD examined in Chapter 3.
Clearly, the main difficulty with trying to apply combining logics to MAS theories is that
while the latter heavily depends on interaction axioms between the various logics to be com-
bined, the former hardly addresses this case at all. The reasons for this are not in a supposed
indifference of the theorists about more applied problems, but in the intrinsic difficulties of
the subject. As seen in Section 6.2.3, negative results of all sorts are just around the corner as
soon as we start dealing with interaction axioms. For example, the transfer of one of the key
properties for a MAS theory, decidability, is known to be particularly hard, as the following
words by of one of the world-experts on this subject, Marcus Kracht, demonstrate:
Polymodal logics are not just alleys, they are highways into undecidability.
([Kra95], page 93)
Notwithstanding this gloomy picture we have discussed, I still believe that the construc-
tion of cultural bridges between the two areas is a useful exercise. On the one hand, this
could encourageMAS theorists to recognise the need of shifting the attention from the single
case analysis to the general problem of the combination of mental states. On the other hand,
the problem of interaction axioms (expressed in whatever format) between logic fragments
in a combined logic might become more central in combining logics. Results of properties
transfer, even if limited to very small classes of interaction axioms, would be of extreme
importance to the whole area of MAS theories.
Appendix A
Some proofs for Chapter 4
The proofs that do not appear in Chapter 4 are reported here.
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

 
 . We have 

 

 
 , but 
 


 
 ; so
we have 

 



 
 . But by using the contrapositive of our assumption we deduce
 





 
 , which gives 

 
 .
Second part. Suppose 

 
 and substitute in there uniformly for. We obtain
 





 


 ; but then we have 


 , which is the contrapositive of what we
needed to prove.
A.1.2 Interaction axioms of the form



  

A.1.2.0.6 






Lemma A.11.  
 








if and only if 
 











is such that


.
Proof. From left to right. Consider a frame  
 











and two points 





such that

. Consider a valuationsuch that



 




. By reflexivity, we have

 





 


 

 

. Then

 





 


 
 . Butis true only at

, which implies that

.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence model
 














such that
 



 . So for every

such that

we have that
 



; indeed since the model is
an equivalence model we have
 





, for any







. Consider now 



	; by
hypothesis we have 



	






. So 



	





and so
 






.
Lemma A.12.   	
 








	







and  	
 






	










.
Proof. First part. Suppose





. But



, so we have




Second part. Suppose



and necessitate by. We have





, so we
obtain





.
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A.1.2.0.7 





Lemma A.13.  
 







if and only if 
 











is such that


.
Proof. From left to right. Consider a frame  
 











and two points 





such that

. Consider a valuationsuch that



 




. By reflexivity, we have

 





 


 

 
 . Then

 





 


 
 . Butis true only at

, which implies that

.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence model
 














such that
 



 . So for every

such that

we have that
 



; indeed since the model is
an equivalence model we have
 





, for any







. Consider now 


	; by
hypothesis we have 


	





. So
 





 .
Lemma A.14.   	
 






	









and  	
 






	










.
Proof. First part. Suppose





. But

, and so



and so by
transitivity we have the result.
Second part. Suppose



and substitute uniformly in this formula for. We
have




 , so we obtain the desired result




 .
A.1.2.0.8 



 

Lemma A.15.  
 





 
 if and only if 
 











is such that


.
Proof. From left to right. Consider a frame 
 











and two points





such
that

. Consider a valuationsuch that



 








. We have

 





 


 


 .
Then

 





 


 
 . So there exists a point








such that

; but then

.
From right to left. Consider any equivalence model
 














such that
 



 . Since


we have also
 




. But then
 




 
 by reflexivity.
Lemma A.16.   	
 






	
 









and  	
 






	







 
 .
Proof. First part. Suppose



 
 . We have 

 

 
 and so, by Lemma 1.30, we
have 

 



 
 . But then by using our assumption we can infer  

 

 
 .
So, by transitivity and 
 
 

 
 we have 

 
 , which is the result we aimed
for.
Second part. Suppose



. But



 
 . So we have



 
 .
A.2 Interaction axioms of the form  

  

A.2.1 Interaction axioms of the form






  

A.2.1.0.9  






Lemma A.17.   	
 

 


	





	







 and  	
 


	






 









.
Proof. First part. Suppose 





. We have 

 

 

. But since we have
 

 





 

, we obtain 



 

, which in turn implies 

 

.
Second part. Suppose 

 

and substituteforin it. We obtain 

 



, which is equivalent to 



. Now, by Lemma 1.29 we obtain 





, which, given Lemma 1.30 gives us to the result 





.
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A.2.1.0.10  



 


Lemma A.18.   	
 

 


	




 
	








and  	
 


	






 







 

.
Proof. First part. Suppose 



 

. We have

 



. So, by Lemma 1.30 we
have

 





. From this, by applying our assumption, we obtain



 



,
which is equivalent to





. By an instance of axiom T we then obtain


 .
Second part. Suppose


 . By Lemma 1.29 we have 

 


 , which is
equivalent to 


 . But then by an instance of axiom T we obtain 



 

.
A.2.1.0.11  






Lemma A.19.   	
 

 


	



	









 and  	
 


	






 









.
Proof. First part. Suppose 




 . By axiom T we have 

 

 
 . By the
contrapositive of our assumption we have the implication  



 

. So we obtain
 


 

.
Second part. Suppose 

 

and substitute for in it. We have  

 

 

, which by Lemma 1.30 is equivalent to  

 

. Now by Lemma 1.29 we have


 

 





 

, which is equivalent to  



 

. By taking the contrapositive
of this formula we have the formula 





. All it remains to prove is that under
the assumption we also have 




 , i.e.   

 

 

. To see this apply
Lemma 1.29 to the formula 

 

to get  

 

 

. By Lemma 1.30 we get
 

 


 

. By applying axiom T and transitivity to this formula we can get  

 

 

, which by the observation above is the result we need.
A.2.1.0.12  



 

Lemma A.20. The logic S5


 







 


is sound and complete with respect to equiva-
lence 2WD frames, i.e. frames 
 











satisfying the property for all









such
that








there exists a pointsuch that










.
Proof. The lemma follows from Theorem 3.12 for the case
 

.
A.2.2 Interaction axioms of the form






  

A.2.2.0.13   

 




Lemma A.21.   	
 

 

 
	


 


	


 



 



and  	
 

 
	


 


	


 

 



 



.
Proof. First part. Suppose  

 



. We have 

 

 

, so by applying our
assumption we obtain 

 



.
Second part. Suppose 

 



. From Lemma 1.29 we obtain  

 

 



;
so by Lemma 1.30 we have  

 



.
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A.2.2.0.14   






Lemma A.22.   	
 

 

 
	





	


 




and  	
 

 




	


 

 







.
Proof. First part. Suppose  





. We have 

 

 

, so by applying the
contrapositive of our assumption and transitivity we obtain 





, from which we
obtain 



.
Second part. Suppose 



. So, by axiom T we obtain 
 



 
 


 

 .
So we have  





.
A.2.2.0.15   

 



Lemma A.23.   	
 

 

 
	


 
	




 



 



and  	
 

 
	


 
	




 

 



 


 .
Proof. First part. Suppose  

 


 . We have 

 

 

, so by applying our
assumption we obtain 

 


 .
Second part. Suppose 

 


 . So by Lemma 1.29 we have  

 

 


 .
But by a proof equivalent to the one presented in Lemma A.2 it can be shown that when
 



 



holds also 



holds. So by using this observation we obtain the
formula  



 



; so by axiom T we have  

 


 .
A.2.2.0.16   

 

 

Lemma A.24.   	
 

 

 
	


 
	
 



 







 
 and  	
 

 


	



	
 



 

 



 

 
 .
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.24 by considering the contrapositives of the two formulae.
A.2.2.0.17   





Lemma A.25.   	
 

 

 
	



	




 




and  	
 

 




	


 

 







.
Proof. First part. Assume  




 . So, we have 

 

 

. But by the assump-
tion we infer 




 . So by axiom T we have 



.
Second part. Assume 



and substitute for. We have  



 

.
But under the hypothesis 



, so by Lemma 1.29 we obtain  




 .
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